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Minstrels in the drawing room: 
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“Minstrels in the Drawing Room” is an investigation of the representation of musical 
listening in the nineteenth-century novel.  Theoretical accounts of the novel have tended to 
see it as a universal form, one that opportunistically subsumes all others as its represented 
content; descriptions of the novel’s implied audience often interpret novel-reading as an 
essentially absorptive activity linking private reading to public belonging through an act of 
identification.  For the writers I discuss here, however, musical listening is interesting 
because it is a rival mode of shared aesthetic experience that, before the advent of sound 
recording, was necessarily social.  This dissertation draws on recent developments in the 
history of reading and media theory to describe how novels by three central figures of the 
European novelistic canon – Goethe, Scott, and Eliot – turn to musical listening to reflect 
upon the ways in which the absolutely open nature of the novel’s mode of address is 
nevertheless prone to limitation.  The dissertation thus complicates often all-or-nothing 
theories of novel-reading, offering instead a description of how novels model a distanced 
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On my lap was the score of some concerto I had been studying in a lackadaisical way 
for the previous hour, which I had been considering abandoning for one of the 
nineteenth-century novels piled on the wooden floor near my feet. 
       -- Kazuo Ishiguro, The Unconsoled 
 
 Wavering between two of the nineteenth century’s most important long forms, 
Ishiguro’s Ryder knows that he can’t have both.1  The scene, like The Unconsoled as a whole, is 
an investigation of social isolation, and of its relation to those abstractions from the everyday 
offered both by reverie and reading.  At this moment, Ryder, a concert pianist, is reminded 
of precisely how much his constant practicing removed him from society in his student 
years, preventing him from taking part in even that most basic ritual of going drinking after 
exams.  The moment Ryder recalls here – sitting on the couch in his room on a sunny day, 
deciding whether to exchange concerto for novel – is accordingly one in which his choice of 
reading material is also a choice between two ways of living in the world.  On the one hand, 
Ryder’s room is a self-conscious echo of those scenes of private reading that tend to appear 
early in Victorian novels: specifically Jane Eyre, reading a copy of Bewick’s History of British 
Birds on a window-seat, placed comfortably between “[f]olds of scarlet drapery” and a 
window’s “clear panes of glass, protecting, but not separating [her] from the drear 
November day.”2  Ryder, like Jane, seated next to a window, uses his piles of novels to create 
a place for himself, to turn the otherwise impersonal and barren room – “just a mattress on 
                                                          
1 Kazuo Ishiguro, The Unconsoled (New York: Knopf, 1995), 305. 
 
2 Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre, ed. Richard Nemesvari (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 2004), 64.   
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the floor, and, in the corner, a small desk and upright chair” – into something he could be 
“very fond of.”   Yet – as with Jane’s reading, though far less agonistically – Ryder’s private 
reading both encloses itself from and permits entry to its social surround: his remembering 
eye passes over those heaps of books, and finds its way to the door, which Ryder “had got 
into the habit of leaving… ajar so that whoever happened to be passing could just wander in 
for a talk”; through the open window, he remembers, he could hear the voices of other 
students “whom [he] had once languidly welcomed when they had peered around [that] 
door,” and who had often come in for an hour’s talk about “some novelist” (305).    
The passage is thus a kind of metacommentary, in which Ryder’s novels remind us of 
what nineteenth-century novels say about reading: books do furnish a room, as reading 
encloses the self, nourishes it; at the same time, though, reading makes that interior space 
permeable, creating the possibility for a negotiation between inside and outside.3  Ryder’s 
nineteenth-century novels socialize as they individuate, separate as they connect: a familiar 
and true image of the complex double movement of novel-reading and of the self it both 
represents and forms, one built, as Lukács observes, in the hope “that a reconciliation 
between interiority and reality, although problematic, is nevertheless possible.”4  And what 
of the concerto?  The scene has less to say about it, as The Unconsoled has little to say about 
music, and what it does say is far cruder, in more ways than one, than its ideas about novel-
reading.  If the novel creates pathways for a complex but comfortable back-and-forth 
movement between interior and exterior space, the concerto  – at least from the perspective 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Nancy Armstrong’s overview of these matters in the opening of her How Novels 
Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719-1900 (New York: Columbia UP, 2005): “the modern 
subject came into being as it took in sensations from the outside world and, of that material, 
composed first the ideas and then the judgment and moral sense that gave it a self-enclosed and 
internally coherent identity” (1).  I discuss Armstrong’s arguments at greater length below. 
 
4 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 1971), 132. 
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of society – seems to exist in an entirely oppositional world, one in which the instrumental 
soloist, absorbed in his obscure and fantastical doings, is pitted against a hostile and mocking 
mass: the performer “piano-playing in the air,” his audience united in “making the most 
disgusting noise, something half-way between a jeer and a retch” (304).5   
 Ishiguro’s novel is of course more complex than this schematic opposition suggests.  
Even within the scene Ryder recalls, it is surely important that his reading of the concerto 
score is not fervent but “lackadaisical”; on a larger scale, this entire process of recollection, 
in which the choice between the formed but permeable self of novel-reading and the 
absorbed, isolated self of piano-playing is posed, is itself an involuntary reverie, but one with 
a specifically social use: Ryder slips into apparently idle musing to isolate himself from an 
awkward conversation – about his isolation.  Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank argue that the 
self-enclosure of the solitary “reading posture registers as extroversion as least as much as 
introversion, as public as it does private.”6 The Unconsoled, as a page-turner in which little 
happens, a novel about the social meaning of apparently inward states of abstraction from 
the everyday, is constantly undermining the distinctions this passage sets up.   
Yet the choice between concerto and novel is in a sense true to the nineteenth-
century novelistic tradition it echoes so strongly.  Those novels on Ryder’s floor in all 
likelihood do represent musical listening as a threat to the self that can either overwhelm it, 
                                                          
5 My discussion of this image of reading, as enclosed from yet also connected to an outside world, 
clearly owes a debt to Paul de Man’s essay on Proust in Allegories of Reading (New Haven and London: 
Yale UP, 1979).  It will be noted that Marcel’s “inner, sheltered space” is, as de Man emphasizes, 
connected to an exterior world by means of a likeness existing inside the mind of the reader – as 
Jane’s implicitly is, too, when she draws upon her reading to tell John Reed that he is “like the 
Roman emperors” (67); Ryder’s reading, in contrast, is connected to the world through what 
Jakobson would call a metonymic rather than metaphorical logic, of juxtaposition without similitude.  
The relationship between reading-as-like-the-world and reading-as-spatially-in-the-world is a major 
topic of this dissertation’s chapter on Scott. 
 
6 Sedgwick and Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold,” in Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2003), 115. 
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or merely fail to do so and thus be emptied of all significance.  When Emma Bovary goes to 
Lucia di Lammermoor, she first “gives herself up [se laissait aller]” to “gusts of music,” a willed 
self-loss that climaxes in her uttering, at the end of the first act, a “sharp cry that merged 
with the vibrations of the closing chords” of the orchestra.7  Later, however, after Charles 
Bovary has punctured Emma’s reverie with his confusions about the plot, the opera turns 
into “nothing more than a vivid fantasy for the entertainment of the eye” (197).  One can see 
the same stark opposition – music as wholly absorbing, or as mere cynically-produced 
fantasy – at work in a scene whose domestic setting could not be more different from the 
opera: George Eliot’s account of Rosamond Vincy at the piano.  Here, however, these two 
accounts of music are distributed not over time, but rather between character and narration: 
   Rosamond played admirably.  Her master at Mrs. Lemon’s school… was one of 
the excellent musicians here and there to be found in our provinces, worthy to 
compare with many a noted Kapellmeister… Rosamond, with the executant’s 
instinct, had seized his manner of playing, and gave forth his large rendering of 
music with the precision of an echo.  It was almost startling, heard for the first time.  
A hidden soul seemed to be flowing forth from Rosamond’s fingers; and so indeed it 
was, since souls live on in perpetual echoes… Lydgate was taken possession of, and 
began to believe in her as something exceptional. 
   […] 
   Her father looked around at the company, delighting in their admiration.8  
Rosamond’s playing, to Lydgate at least, appears as authentic communication from her 
“hidden soul.”  But in fact it corrupts boundaries rather than transcending them: firstly, 
                                                          
7 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Viking, 2010), 195-6. 
 
8 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. Margaret Harris, Judith Johnson, and Beryl Gray (London: 
Everyman, 1997), II.16. 
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through performance itself – performance being at once socially aggressive appropriation 
(Rosamond seizes her master’s manner) and a contemptible act of self-abnegation (as, in so 
doing, she becomes mere echo): a whole system of social class in a single gesture – and 
secondly through “possession” of its hearers.  The hidden soul of music is thus doubly a 
mere “seeming.” Music really offers masquerade and usurpation, a conquering of its 
listeners, and it is the measure of our status as readers rather than as listeners that we know 
this: privy to the novel’s narration, we know, as Lydgate does not, that Rosamond’s 
interpretations are not her own; with the larger breadth of vision afforded by novel-reading, 
we can see Walter Vincy’s proprietary pleasure in the scene, suggesting both paternal 
affection and the sense of a sound investment bearing fruit; armed with this ironic 
knowledge, we can step outside the mere seeming of musical rapture that traps Lydgate and 
see its emptiness.   
 Music in the nineteenth-century novel, then, appears as an all-or-nothing 
proposition: either it accomplishes a mystical merging of souls, or nothing at all.  The trouble 
with music, in other words, is that it can never allow for the compound category so 
important to the novel: the socialized individual; the room with doors and windows.  The 
novel’s resistance to music seems as if built into a distribution of functions between the arts 
in the nineteenth century, something Edward Said suggests in his Musical Elaborations by 
juxtaposing Adorno on the new music and Lukács on the novel, as two ways of responding 
to the “degraded and therefore meaningless world”: if the office of music is to cast its 
“devastatingly critical light” on that world, the novel is the always-failing attempt to reconcile 
it.9  The century’s music proclaims, with E.T.A. Hoffmann, that its kingdom is not of this 
world; its novels – so committed to the worldly, in both senses, and to the individual’s 
                                                          
9 Said, Musical Elaborations (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), 14. 
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finding a place in it – must therefore either spurn music entirely, or represent its claims to 
both naïveté and the transcendence it makes possible only to undermine them.10    
There are, of course, good reasons to be skeptical about music’s claims: Hoffmann’s 
account of the transcendence of music from the everyday suggests an image of musical 
listening in which listeners gain access, together, to a realm beyond the real.  To many 
commentators, both in the nineteenth century and after, this experience of musical listening 
purports to provide a “direct relationship to a collectivity,” as Theodor Adorno and Hanns 
Eisler put it, and thus becomes a prominent figure for a specifically pre- or anti-rational 
whole, typically a national one.11  These are precisely Thomas Carlyle’s rhetorical aims in his 
1831 essay “Characteristics,” which laments the sign of contemporary decline in the 
proliferation of writing: “it is not in the vigorous ages of a Roman Republic that Treatises of 
the Commonwealth are written.”12  As Carlyle sees it, social self-consciousness – which he 
defines as the writing of treatises and the giving of names – is “virtually the meaning of that 
phrase ‘artificial state of Society,’” for an “artificial Society is precisely one that knows its 
own structure, its own internal functions” (361).  A true society, however, is unconscious of 
itself; true social feeling, Carlyle insists, “cannot be reasoned of; except musically” (362, 
                                                          
10 “Our kingdom is not of this world, say musicians, for where in nature do we find the prototypes 
for our art, as painters and sculptors do?  Sound resides in all things; but notes, that is to say 
melodies, which speak the higher language of the spirit-realm, repose only in the breast of men.”  
The passage is in “Johannes Kreisler’s Certificate of Apprenticeship,” in Hoffmann’s Kreisleriana, first 
published 1814.  In ETA Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, trans. Martyn Clarke, ed. David Charlton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), 163. Dahlhaus describes Hoffmann’s centrality to the century’s 
music aesthetics in his always provocative book The Idea of Absolute Music, trans. Roger Lustig 
(Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1989), particularly in chapter 3, “A Hermeneutic Model.”  
For a more recent and equally wide-ranging, reading of musical Romanticism’s turn towards the 
ineffable, see Ruth Katz’s A Language of Its Own: Sense and Meaning in the Making of Western Art Music 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2009). 
 
11 Theodor Adorno and Hanns Eisler, Composing for the Films (London: Continuum, 2007), 13. 
 
12 Thomas Carlyle, “Characteristics,” originally published in Edinburgh Review 54:108 (December 
1831), 351-383, at 361.  
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emphasis original).  Music stands in here, and in a great many other romantic texts, for all 
that Gemeinschaft possesses which Gesellschaft does not.    
One can hardly imagine a more unlikely partner for the realist novel.  The novel is a 
descriptive form in which society tries to know its own structure and therefore, to stay with 
the terms of Carlyle’s argument, must become artificial; it is also one whose central 
procedure, as critics from Schlegel to Bakhtin and beyond have noted, is a self-distancing 
irony: “Thus does Literature also,” says Carlyle, “like a sick thing, superabundantly ‘listen to 
itself’” (370).  Little wonder, then, that Regula Hohl Trillini’s recent survey of Rosamond 
Vincy and a host of other dangerous musicians finds in the nineteenth-century novel a 
veritable catalogue of “narrative strategies which contain and repress music” in order to 
preserve the boundaries between persons; the representation of music seems bound by an 
iron rule, that “[t]he rapture of music is never fully shared with the reader” – something for 
which, in this context, certain political commitments to a cosmopolitan modernity, or even 
the desire to keep possession of our own souls, might in fact make us rather grateful.13   
 This argument – that the novel repressed musical rapture – is not the one that I 
make here.  This is partially for familiarly Foucauldian reasons: the containment or 
repression of musical rapture, after all, might in historical perspective be better thought of 
instead as a stage in the apophatic strategy that produced its conceptual recognition; as Carl 
Dahlhaus notes, “were it not for the poetic conceit of unspeakability, there would have been 
no words available for reinterpreting the musically confusing or empty into the sublime or 
wonderful.”14  But even before finding a new place in a history of aesthetics – or even the 
                                                          
13 Regula Hohl Trillini, The Gaze of the Listener (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2008),  142 and 
113. 
 
14 The Idea of Absolute Music, 63.  For a recent discussion of this apophatic strategy in Hoffmann and 
other central texts of German musical romanticism, see John T. Hamilton’s Music, Madness, and the 
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modern system of the arts – for scenes like Flaubert’s or Eliot’s, it is worth first simply 
noticing that what matters in these scenes is not music per se, but rather musical listening.  
Musical listening in these novels unfolds as an experience that takes place in public, rather 
than as a simpler encounter between an isolated listener and the rapturous event.  What is at 
stake here is not the essence of music, or even the movement from a musical source to a 
single receiver.  Neither scene asks Pater’s questions: “What is this song... to me? What 
effect does it really produce on me?” Nor, however, do these scenes pursue Arnold’s aim, 
“to see the object as in itself it really is.”15   Rather, these novels ask: Is Lucia di Lammermoor 
the same thing to Charles Bovary that it is to Emma?  Does Walter Vincy hear the same 
music as Lydgate?   
These are not, of course, particularly complicated questions in these novels.  But to 
read either novel’s engagement with music solely in terms of the opposition between 
transcendence and emptiness (or, for that matter, illusion and analysis) is to miss that the 
questions must be asked, to ignore that a crucial part of how these novels ask us to think 
about music’s effects is by thinking of its effects on multiple listeners – by making the full 
effect of the musical work knowable only as by a process of social triangulation.  
 
I 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Unworking of Language (New York: Columbia UP, 2008); for Foucault on the “repressive hypothesis,” 
see History of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990).  
 
15 Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Donald L. Hill (Berkeley: U of California Press, 
1980), xix-xx. Arnold, “The Functions of Criticism at the Present Time,” in The National Review 1 
(Nov 1864), 230-251, at 230. Pater is of course not advocating for a solipsistic impressionism – on 
this point see George Levine, “Two Ways Not to Be a Solipsist: Art and Science, Pater and Pearson,” 
in Victorian Studies 43:1 (Autumn 2000), 7-41 – but he does put forward the individual’s testing of 
himself (and no other) as the situation of aesthetic thinking. 
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This dissertation is an investigation of musical listening as a social, public experience 
– that is, one that imagines feeling to be potentially generated in public, amongst strangers – 
as it is represented in writing (primarily novels) by Goethe, Walter Scott, and George Eliot.  
All three writers, it goes without saying, engaged with the possibilities and perils of the 
musical throughout their careers.  More to the point, however, all three insistently positioned 
their writing within a modern world, and understood modernity more or less in Carlyle’s 
terms: that is, all three wrote for and of a society that was self-conscious, and ineluctably so, 
but also one with a supposed memory of an earlier era – or of a rural life – in which social 
feeling could not be reasoned of, of the pre-modern community for which music is Carlyle’s 
figure.  I do not think there is much that is controversial in this description; I mean here 
nothing more than the obvious point that Goethe, Scott, and Eliot broadly share a 
preoccupation with the problems and uses of culture for a century imagined to be newly in 
need of it, in a “new kind of society” as Raymond Williams puts it, out of which the idea of 
culture merges two responses:  
first, the recognition of the practical separation of certain moral and intellectual 
activities from the driven impetus of a new kind of society; second, the emphasis of 
these activities, as a court of human appeal, to be set over the processes of practical 
social judgment and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying alternative.16 
In this way, the grouping of Goethe, Scott and Eliot could be said to define (as three points 
define a plane) a common tradition that would exclude more stably urban nineteenth-century 
novelists – e.g., Flaubert – as well as novelists for whom a return to pre-critical social feeling 
is an important possibility – say, Disraeli; or, to aim a little higher, the Tolstoy who sends 
Levin to the wheat fields, and who marks the pathology of a class-riven society as one of 
                                                          
16 Raymond Williams, Culture & Society, 1780-1915 (New York: Harper, 1966), xvi.  
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almost literal deracination, by making both Anna Karenina and Vronsky dream of a peasant 
speaking French.17  What Goethe, Scott, and Eliot all find in music (albeit in quite different 
ways) is a way of mediating between piano-playing in air and jeering retch.  Each writer turns 
to the interrelationship between music  – intensely private and yet also mysteriously shared – 
and the social world in which listening is embedded as a way of exploring potential 
alternatives to liberal modernity: modes of culture that, to again quote Williams, could fully 
acknowledge “the new kinds of personal and social relationship” but that could nevertheless 
function “both as a recognition of practical separation and as an emphasis of alternatives” 
(xvi).  
This study has benefited from a wide range of recent scholarship, but it may be said 
to derive its orientation from three ongoing intellectual projects.  The first of these is the 
turn within musicology towards an interest in the social uses of music.  I mean by this two 
things: very broadly, the rich vein of scholarship devoted to Western art music’s social 
meaning that began with the “New Musicology” of thirty years ago, and one of whose 
originating problems has remained the work of Theodor Adorno.  More specifically, this 
project finds models in particularly recent work within musicology and the philosophy of 
music that, moving out from under the long shadow cast by Nazism’s appropriation (and, it 
should be said, development) of Romantic musical nationalism, has taken a neutral, even 
appreciative interest in the socially formative or synthetic powers of musical works.  In its 
outlines, such writing has attempted to find what Jean-Luc Nancy has described as the 
                                                          
17 As Nabokov observes, the French words of the peasant – “Il faut le battre, le fer, le broyer, le pétrir” – 
are part of “the French patter” both characters use “in speaking of everyday things in what Tolstoy 
considered a sham world.”  In Lectures on Russian Literature, ed. Fredson Bowers (Orlando, Fla.: 
Harvest, 1981), 182.  See also Priscilla Meyer, “Anna Karenina: Tolstoy’s Polemic with Madame 
Bovary,” in Russian Review 54:2 (Apr. 1995), 243-259.  One way of describing what I am trying to bring 
out in Goethe, Scott, and Eliot is the way in which musical models allow for a critique of liberal 
modernity that remains allergic to the opposition, so important in  various nineteenth-century 
nationalisms, between the real and the sham.  
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“thinking of being-in-common” without “the thinking of an essence of community,” and 
which Nancy himself has found in an account of listening as a shared “relationship to 
meaning, a tension toward it” that never finds it.18  Similarly, Michael P. Steinberg writes, in 
his book Listening to Reason, that “the subjectivity inscribed in musical utterance is 
immediately a mode of intersubjectivity” – but, importantly, Steinberg further insists that the 
intersubjectivity both posited in, and demanded by, so much nineteenth-century bourgeois 
music need not be figured as an act of possession (as in Lydgate’s hearing of Rosamond) by 
another (typically national) subject.  Steinberg draws on D.W. Winnicott’s well-known 
account of culture as transitional object, rather than on Nancy, to describe the 
intersubjectivity demanded of nineteenth-century listeners as “a mode of experience where 
self and world are difficult to distinguish.”19  What he finds musically in the requiems of 
Brahms, Verdi, and Dvořak, however, can be productively aligned with Nancy’s thinking: in 
these works, Steinberg discovers a way of grappling with an articulation of shared experience 
in music that does not transform the individual into a mere moment of a collective (the state, 
the nation) that is only instantiated in listening; a listening in which a collective is hailed, but 
rather than being hailed as united by a common origin, is instead conscious of being formed 
in the moment by aesthetic experience. 
 Secondly, this project relies on recent work on the dynamics and history of reading 
by literary critics and cultural historians.  An earlier generation of historians of reading found 
                                                          
18 Nancy, “Preface” to The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1991), xxxvii; Listening, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham UP, 2007), 27.  Nancy’s 
account of music and of the social is, I believe, a serious and deliberate attempt to imagine models 
for an open society without recourse to grounding concepts; for a perspicuous critique of Nancy’s 
writing as essentially apolitical, however, see Miranda Joseph’s Against the Romance of Community 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002). 
 
19 Steinberg, Listening to Reason: Culture, Subjectivity, and Nineteenth-Century Music (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton UP, 2004), 8-9. 
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themselves called upon to resist the hypothesized reader of reader-response theory, or the 
even more mythical general public for which reading could be safely assumed to be an 
“undifferentiatedly collective experience,” with a wide array of accounts of the particular, 
contingent practices of specific, real readers.20  More recently, however, scholars of reading 
building on this important historical move have nevertheless moved beyond its polemical 
oppositions; as Kate Flint writes, in recent work “reading is increasingly acknowledged to be 
an activity poised between an intensely private, inward experience, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, as inseparable from a social world.”21  The “collective experience” of a united 
public, in this view, was not merely a methodological error, but actively at stake in 
nineteenth century controversies over styles of reading and writing.  I will argue here that 
Goethe, Scott, and Eliot each turned to musical listening precisely in order to think through 
the nature of reading: to consider, on the one hand, the relationship between the reader 
formed by the text in the moment of reading – the single, private reader who is the text’s 
effect – and the particular reader existing in the world; and on the other, to test the 
possibilities offered in reading for the creation of a social feeling that could, in fact, be 
reasoned of by individuals – for imagining a fluidity of self in terms other than those of loss.  
 Lastly, this argument – like so much writing in the past decade – is in part a delayed  
response to Eve Sedgwick’s call, in Touching Feeling, for a form of criticism to stand alongside 
inherited models of ideology critique.22  Sedgwick characterizes the literary-critical scene of 
the late twentieth century as caught up in the “infinitely doable and teachable protocols of 
                                                          
20 See Helen Small, “A pulse of 124: Charles Dickens and a pathology of the mid-Victorian reading 
public,” in The Practice and Representation of Reading in England, ed. James Raven, Small, and Naomi 
Tadmor (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), for a capsule sketch of these developments.  The quoted 
phrase appears on 263. 
 
21 Flint, “Women and Reading,” in Signs 31:2 (Winter 2006), 511-536, at 512.  
 
22 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2003). 
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unveiling” (143) –  in which criticism seemed committed, almost without realizing it, to the 
operations of symptomatic reading, to the single claim “It’s not natural” (109).23  I share 
Sedgwick’s sense that this critical style, if practiced to the exclusivity of others, both 
represents an impoverishment of the available ways of writing about literature and displays a 
strange naïveté about the political force of knowledge, and I find her account of the 
reparative work of Melanie Klein’s paranoid position – “to use one’s own resources to 
assemble or ‘repair’ the murderous part-objects into something like a whole – though, I 
would emphasize, not necessarily like any preexisting whole” (128) – to be both an appealing 
alternative model for criticism and a surprisingly apt description of the work of novel-
writing.   
 One of the most significant ways of moving past ideology critique in recent years has 
been the so-called “affective turn” in cultural studies, in part as practiced by Sedgwick 
herself.  Affect theory is by no means a homogeneous body of scholarship – Ann 
Cvetkovitch’s recent overview of the field begins, for good reason, with a diverse and 
lengthy list of things affect theory can be said to be doing at the moment24 – but in the 
broadest strokes, scholarship on affect shares a concern with breaking down barriers 
between minds and bodies.  This concern takes many forms: for Michael Hardt, the central 
task of affect theory is to straddle the divides “between the mind and the body, and between 
actions and passions.”25  For many other scholars, what has been most significant about the 
                                                          
23 For a recent overview of this critical style, and some suggested ways out of it, see Representations 
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vocabulary of affect has been a specifically social straddling: its ability to describe a 
“contagious energy” occurring between persons, as Elizabeth Wissinger writes26; its access to 
“those intensities that pass body to body,” as Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg put 
it.27  Yet if “contagious energy” is very much what is at stake when the nineteenth century 
thinks about music, that century nonetheless thinks of music’s ability to act on us as an 
action on subjects; what is most interesting in these novels is the potential resistance that music 
and subjectivity offer to each other.   For this reason, these pages do not much resemble 
affect theory as such – often driven, as Seigworth and Gregg put it, by the desire to leave 
“behind the interiorized self” (8).  Rather, like David Kurnick’s recent work on the novel 
and theater, this dissertation is concerned with the ways in which a private form may still be 
“lined with longing references to the public world.”28 
 
 In the remainder of this introduction, I do three things.  Firstly, I address the public 
setting of real musical listening in the nineteenth century, and suggest ways in which a 
specifically British tradition of thinking about music at the close of the eighteenth century is 
well suited to addressing its workings.  I provide a very brief overview of three decades of 
British writing on music – one beginning with the Newcastle organist and composer Charles 
Avison’s 1752 Essay on Musical Expression, and continued by figures both marginal (John 
Brown, Daniel Webb) and relatively central (James Beattie) to British intellectual history.  
These writers put forward a description of musical listening which often operated via 
                                                          
26 Wissinger, “Always On Display: Affective Production in the Modeling Industry,” in The Affective 
Turn, 232. 
 
27 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory Reader, 
ed. Gregg and Seigworth (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2010), 1. 
 
28 Kurnick, Empty Houses: Theatrical Failure and the Novel (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011),  3. 
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comparison with poetry; unlike more widely-known German theorists of music from this 
period and slightly afterwards, these writers placed the audience at the center of their 
accounts, locating the significance of music in a strange “as if” collective experience, one 
which both recalls the Kantian sensus communis and refuses it.  Secondly, I consider in more 
detail Adam Smith’s essay on the imitative arts (likely written around 1780, but unpublished 
until 1795), an essay in which, as I hope to show, Smith engages in a style of writing that 
marks itself as writing, refusing any ability to mime music’s effects, while simultaneously 
doing precisely that.  I treat Smith’s essay in such detail here not only because of its intrinsic 
interest, but also because of the importance of Smithian sympathy in many accounts of the 
novel’s rise.  Nancy Armstrong, in particular, has recently placed Smith at the center of her 
description of How Novels Think, finding in Smithian sympathy a self-protective individualism 
that she correlates to the “self-enclosed” novel reader – a key opening move in the creation 
of a novelistic writing that can “express and … limit the excesses of individualism at one and 
the same time.”29  I find in Smith’s comments on music a kind of writing that provides 
possibilities for, as Armstrong puts it, “thinking otherwise” than inside this universalized 
individual subject (10) – a set of possibilities that the novels this dissertation treats will 
develop.  And lastly, I provide a brief overview of this dissertation’s chapters. 
 
II 
 That listening to music in the nineteenth century, both inside and outside of novels, 
was a social experience may seem a point too obvious to be worth mentioning: before the 
advent of sound reproduction, and indeed for the most part before the regime of darkened 
silence had settled over the concert, listening – in domestic parlors and concert halls alike – 
                                                          
29 Armstrong, How Novels Think 42. 
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could hardly have been otherwise.  The dating of the movement in concert halls towards 
something like the listening conditions that exist today – that is, towards an internalized and 
silent listening – varies from scholar to scholar, and according to place and genre of 
performance.  James H. Johnson, describing the audience at the Paris Opéra, suggests that 
the new system was firmly in place by around 1850; Mark Twain, on the other hand, could 
be surprised as late as 1891 that the Bayreuth audience “sit in the dark and worship in 
silence,” while “in New York… they hum airs, they squeak fans, they titter, and they gabble 
all the time.”30  Kenneth Hamilton, writing of the development of the rituals surrounding the 
piano recital, dates the silent concert hall to as late as 1920, and notes that a purely 
“internalized audience response in a public concert would have been thought inappropriate, 
even downright peculiar, for much of the nineteenth century.”31 
 I review this history here for two reasons.  The first is that it suggests that a 
commonplace of much word-and-music criticism – that the novel and music could have 
particular relevance to each other only after writers moved away from their commitments to 
representation of the social world – is essentially an anachronism.  Werner Wolf writes, 
along these lines, that modernism allowed fiction to engage with music anew, as modernism 
“is, after all, a period in which beaten paths of (mimetic) storytelling were abandoned on a 
large scale and in which the emphasis shifted from a referential focus on the outer world to a 
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preoccupation with the inner world of the psyche.”32  But if the “inner world” was not, 
precisely, where music met its listener in the nineteenth century, it might be that our 
twentieth-century habits have been causing us took look in the wrong place for traces of it.  
Secondly – and relatedly – the historical fact of nineteenth-century talking-while-
listening should encourage us to find in that century’s representations of listening as a social 
event something other than failures to be “truly” musical.  In a provocative essay, Daniel 
K.L. Chua claims that “the sound of the nineteenth-century self” has finally found its 
material analogue in the iPod: if the “entire Romantic project is based on an inner audition 
of the self,” then with the iPod (or, surely, the less glamorous Walkman too) we have finally 
achieved the condition of “a self closed off from the outside world like a sonic monad,” only 
to discover not “the revolutionary spirit of humanity hibernating in hard times but an 
isolated privatized self, absorbed in what it thinks it already has.”33  Chua’s broad 
formulations seem in some ways familiar: consider, for instance, the young Wordsworth 
walking in “storm and tempest” in the second book of the Prelude, famously encountering 
“possible sublimity” in “whate’er there is in the power of sound / To breathe an elevated 
mood.”  Sound transcends form and image to create a “shadowy exaltation” that is recalled 
as an effect without cause, the soul “[r]emembering how she felt, but what she felt / 
Remembering not.”34  Yet the “nineteenth-century self,” at least as it appears in the novel, 
listens to actual music in quite a different way: the nineteenth-century novel, like nineteenth-
                                                          
32 Werner Wolf, The Musicalization of Fiction: A Study in the Theory and History of Intermediality 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 125. For a variation on this argument, see Angela Frattarola, 
“Developing an Ear for the Modernist Novel” in Journal of Modern Literature 33:1 (Fall 2009), 132-153 
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Abrams, and Stephen Gill (New York and London: Norton, 1979).  See also Jay Clayton, “Visionary 
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century people, listens typically in public, and it is far more circumspect about the division 
between the “what” of aesthetic object and the “how” of aesthetic response.   
 Thinking about listening in nineteenth-century novels thus necessarily requires an 
approach to the relationship between literature and music that is able to theorize listening as 
a social activity.  The nineteenth century inherited its basic structures for thinking about 
music from the late eighteenth century, at which time an older aesthetics based on musical 
imitation was in the later stages of breakdown.   The so-called Affektenlehre – the doctrine of 
the affections prevailing from the seventeenth century until the middle of the 18th – had tied 
musical expressivity to feelings that, as Carl Dahlhaus notes, were imagined to exist 
objectively: music represented those affections rather than “expressing” them as though from 
within itself.35  Accompanying this theory was a baroque musical practice in which certain 
figures were, indeed, conventionally tied to the affections they represented, thus creating a 
relatively stable system of musical representation.  Towards the end of the century, however, 
this system began to break down; the problem facing critics in the late eighteenth-century  
was thus one of articulating an alternative way of understanding how music might 
comprehensibly create effects in the world without reference to representation.  
There were two primary responses.  The more familiar of these – the expressive 
theory of music associated with Richter, Tieck, Wackenroder, and above all Hoffmann – put 
forward an influential account of music as a transcendent world apart from the everyday, 
one centered on the instrumental music that would come to be called absolute, that 
accomplished what Ruth Katz describes as a remystification of musical language, a deliberate 
                                                          




turn to “the mysterious and magical, the ineffable and enchanting.”36  As M.H. Abrams 
argues in The Mirror and the Lamp, these theorists articulated an “expressive theory” of 
composition in which the audience of music and literature alike became an afterthought.37  
Hoffmann took perhaps the most extreme position possible in his writings on Beethoven: 
“Music reveals to man an unknown realm, a world quite separate from the outer sensual 
world surrounding him, a world in which he leaves behind all feelings circumscribed by 
intellect in order to embrace the inexpressible.”38  What Hoffmann rejects here is not merely 
the imitative theory of music that European modernity had inherited from Aristotle, but 
even the possibility of music’s expressing anything other than, paradoxically, the 
“inexpressible”: Hoffmann’s music thus has no referent, but also no addressee (except, 
perhaps, a hoped-for audience of the future).39  The consequences for the representation of 
music in literature are likewise extreme; as John T. Hamilton puts it, “[e]very linguistic 
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37 The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Norton, 1958), 89.  
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encounter” with music necessarily “seems poised on the brink of two abysses: the emptiness 
of the abstract concept or the awed silence before the ineffable.”40  
 The social occasion of listening falls away entirely in Hoffmann’s account.  But as 
Abrams notes, this approach to music was only one of two strands of anti-representational 
thinking about music in the eighteenth century.  Abrams finds an alternative account of 
music in a group of British critics who, in the second half of the eighteenth century, replaced 
the older imitative theory of music not with the ineffable, but instead with a study of music’s 
“power of raising affections in the listener” (Abrams 92).  For Charles Avison, writing in 
1752, music’s ability to create effects and generate coherence over time was best understood 
in terms of linguistic categories: “cadences in Music,” he wrote, “are the same as Stops in 
Speaking, or Writing,” thus anticipating Friedrich Schlegel’s comments on the potential 
relationship between literature and  “grammatical music” by a good forty years.41  Others 
following Avison would echo his commitments, both to an expressive theory of music, and 
to one articulated in relationship to the other arts, chief among them poetry.42  The audience, 
rather than the composer or poet, was of primary interest for these critics.  For this reason 
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these writers have received careful attention in recent years from literary scholars 
investigating how Romanticism conceived of its audience.  Thus Kevin Barry finds that this 
body of writing moves beyond both the “relative emptiness” of the musical sign and 
alternative understandings of music as necessarily dominating its audience; instead, Avison, 
James Beattie, and Adam Smith treated music as an “intention towards a response which is 
relatively uncertain.”43  More recently, Noelle Chao argues that Avison, in particular, began a 
tradition of English musical speculation that “by shifting the focus to ‘effects’ … avoids a 
discussion of what music is, instead favoring one that covers what music can do.”44  
The often heated debate between imitative and expressive theories of music that 
these writers took part in can appear bewilderingly muddled – Thomas Twining’s statement 
that “music can be said to imitate, no farther than as it expresses something” is sadly 
representative.45  Chao and Barry both suggest, however, the larger significance of the 
controversy.  As Barry shows, the expressive approach to music was immediately 
controversial because an account like Avison’s was clearly open to the charge of dissolving 
musical experience into relativistic solipsism.  This was the purport of the Oxford composer 
William Hayes’s 1753 Remarks on Mr. Avison’s Essay: “without Imitation there cannot possibly 
be any such Thing as true musical Expression” (quoted in Barry, 34).  Imitation had 
provided a ground for judgment; if the new writing about music could only speak of its 
effects – and uncertainly at that – was there still anything about those effects that pertained, 
“truly” or necessarily, to the music itself?  Unlike Hoffmann, these British critics could not 
                                                          
43 Kevin Barry, Language, Music and the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987), 10 and 35.  
 
44 Noelle Louise Chao, Musical Letters: Eighteenth-Century Writings on Music and the Fictions of Burney, 
Radcliffe, and Scott (PhD. diss., U of California Los Angeles, 2008), 3. 
 
45 Twining, “On the different senses of the word, imitative, as applied to music by the antients and by 




ground the identity of the musical work in a hypothesized future audience: what mattered 
about music was its real expressive power in the here and now. 
Music thus found itself caught up in the larger taste debate – the controversy over 
“the incurably private in experience, and… the specific needs of the shareability of 
experience that arise in aesthetic contexts,” as Richard Moran puts it in a recent essay.46  But 
music’s position was a particularly fraught one, as at once the traditionally most persuasive 
and, now, rather suddenly the least meaningful of the arts.  As Smith put it, “[w]hatever we 
feel from instrumental music is an original, and not a sympathetic feeling: it is our own 
gaiety, sedateness, or melancholy; not the reflected disposition of another person” (198).  
The difficulty, of course, lies in how such specific feelings can be said to be ours and the 
music’s; why our being gay or melancholy means that the music is, and thus why we might 
expect others to respond in the same way.  Harold Osborne, in a recent essay on musical 
expressivity that, while citing none of these authors, seems to recapitulate much of this 
tradition, puts the problem in a way that particularly emphasizes its philosophical 
awkwardness – at least in relation to more familiar, Kantian terms: 
 [W]hereas our experience of our own feelings is private to ourselves, to be 
communicated to others only by words and gesture, we believe that during a 
performance of music the other members of the audience have experiences very 
similar to our own and to this extent the feelings perceived in the music are 
nevertheless interpersonal.47   
                                                          
46 “Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty,” in Critical Inquiry 38:2 (Winter 2012), 298-329, at 303. 
 
47 “Expressiveness in the Arts,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41:1 (Autumn, 1982), 19-




The words echo the “as if” of the second moment of Kant’s treatment of beauty – his 
account of how it is that, even though judgments of taste “cannot be other than subjective,” the 
beholder of beauty will nevertheless “talk about the beautiful as if beauty were a 
characteristic of the object” that can be assumed “to be valid for everyone.”48  But the 
situation with musical expression is if anything more excruciatingly embarrassing: the listener 
here is projecting a particular emotional response onto her fellow listeners, not making the 
normative claim that others should share her free liking of the object.  Subject to these 
difficulties, the bulk of British musical writing abandoned the imitative hypothesis 
nevertheless, and therefore found itself confronting the difficulty that, as James Beattie put 
it, while “expression is the chief excellence of music,” and music’s chief aim one of 
“introduc[ing] into the human mind certain affections,” that expression is “vague or 
ambiguous,” and the affections produced might in fact be formed “only [by] an accidental 
connection.”49   
 
III 
 Smith’s essay “Of the Nature of That Imitation Which Takes Place in What Are 
Called the Imitative Arts” is an illuminating response to this dilemma – illuminating precisely 
because Smith seems to enact this difficulty, or develop a way of writing through it, rather 
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than resolve it.50  While Smith concedes to music some imitative powers, he is particularly 
eager to show that expression operates independent of imitation, as “the immediate and 
necessary effect of melody and harmony” (206).  What he is after, in other words, is an 
alternative way of grounding expression – the “effect upon the mind” produced by music – 
within music as heard, and without reference to any external source.  Smith goes about this 
by directly addressing the social situation and effects of music.  Smith’s image of music is 
twofold: it is, on the one hand, the most private of the arts, best suited, Smith writes, to the 
person who has “one thought or idea which dwells upon his mind, which continually haunts 
him, which, when he has chaced it away, immediately returns upon him, and which in 
company makes him absent and inattentive” (191).  As a result, Smith writes, this obsessive 
“takes refuge in solitude,” where he can freely indulge in the repetition – “almost always in 
the same words” – of the haunting thought.  “Neither Prose nor Poetry,” Smith writes, “can 
venture to imitate those almost endless repetitions of passion,” though, as he writes, “[t]hey 
may describe them as I do now.”  Music, however, is entirely in keeping with the compulsion 
to repeat: “Music frequently produces its effects by a repetition of the same idea; and the 
same sense expressed in the same, or nearly the same, combination of sounds, though at first 
perhaps it may make scarce any impression upon us, yet, by being repeated again and again, 
it comes at last gradually, and by little and little, to move, to agitate, and to transport us” 
(192).  In Smith’s account, then, music does not so much imitate a particular passion, as it 
does the repetition that is the form of private experience; for this reason, it is ideally suited 
to “express sometimes all the sedateness and composer of a serious but calm discourse, and 
sometimes all the exquisite sensibility of the most interesting passion” (191).  
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This is a startling account of music, and in Smith’s portrait of the haunted obsessive, 
a strangely specific scene of its paradigmatic use.  What is even more startling, however, is 
the paragraph that immediately follows the sentence I have just quoted, in which Smith – 
without apparent embarrassment – introduces his second image of music: “[t]he sentiments 
and passions which Music can best imitate are those which unite and bind men together in 
society; the social, the decent, the virtuous, the interesting and affecting, the amiable and 
agreeable…” (192).  Out of a discussion of music as rooted in precisely the most isolating 
emotional experiences, ones that force the individual to take refuge in solitude, Smith 
develops, without transition, an account of music as a force for social cohesion.51 
What is happening here?  There are, I think, two overlapping answers – and both 
have particular relevance to the novels the remainder of this dissertation will discuss.  The 
first connection between the solitary individual and the social whole is a conceptual one: 
Smith’s writing here is an intervention in an ongoing discussion of melancholy.  In the first 
of his Essays, David Hume separates out what he calls “delicacy of passion” – being 
“extremely sensible to all the accidents of life” – from “delicacy of taste,” the same extreme 
sensitivity towards “a poem or a picture.”52  The former, Hume writes, exposes the 
individual to every vicissitude of fortune, and makes him susceptible to self-loss: “his sorrow 
or resentment takes entire possession of him” (4); as a result, this delicacy of passion must 
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be eliminated.  Delicacy of taste, however, distracts “the mind from the hurry of business 
and interest” and thereby produces the tranquility of “agreeable melancholy, which, of all 
dispositions of the mind, is the best suited to love and friendship” (7).  Melancholy, then, is 
Hume’s name for the state of the aesthetic observer set apart from the everyday, and it is this 
state that he links to sociability, rooting social feeling, therefore, in an explicitly detached 
mode.  In his description of the musical obsessive, however, Smith seems to have quite 
another melancholy in mind – the obsessive melancholy found in Samuel Johnson’s 
Dictionary (and about which Johnson himself knew a great deal): “[a] kind of madness, in 
which the mind is always fixed on one object.”53  For Smith, this obsessive insularity, so 
closely allied to the over-sensitivity toward the “accidents of life,” is itself and without any 
intermediate gesture towards self-detachment an aesthetic state productive of social feeling.  
But again, how? 
If I am right about the dynamics of this passage, then what opens up in Smith here is 
not so much an argument about but a mode of writing in relation to music, and to the social 
feeling that occurs in moments of listening.   Thinking of music leads Smith slightly astray 
from his familiar account of sympathy in the earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments.  In that work, 
as Nancy Armstrong writes, Smith preserves the “self-enclosure” of the individual by 
insisting that sympathy operates entirely within the self: “to share the feelings of another 
person [is] to imagine ourselves in that person’s place and experience his or her emotions at 
one remove” (Armstrong 19-20).  As Armstrong sees it, this way of thinking of our relation 
to others is what is both tested and practiced in the main tradition of novel-writing, which 
from Austen on worked to maintain the “radically individualistic logic of sympathy” against 
the threat of “spontaneous and collective emotional responses” (20); what is at stake in 
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Smithian sympathy is, Armstrong writes, a way of converting a subject’s emotional response 
to the world into “ideas that enrich that subject’s personal storehouse of knowledge.”  This 
is this work of the novel – and indeed Armstrong means all novels: to “incorporate any 
number of sentimental arguments” into an amplification of the individual (16).  The self-
enclosed reader, like the character he reads about, feels in order to transform that feeling 
into experience, all in the service of “reproducing modern individuals wherever novels are 
written and read” (10).  
In thinking about music, however, Smith carves out a quite different role for writing 
and reading.  This is not to say that Smith advocates here for a directly expressive writing, or 
indeed that he attempts to produce one.  Yet at the very moment that Smith disclaims any 
power prose or poetry might have to imitate the repetitions of passion, thereby installing an 
absolute difference between musical imitation and the mere description of writing, his own 
prose immediately falls into obsessive, repetitive patterns, stacking clauses one after the 
other: “he can repeat to himself, which he does sometimes mentally, and sometimes even 
aloud, and almost always in the same words…” (191).  As he installs, in theory, the 
opposition between language’s presentation of “different thoughts and ideas” and music’s 
“repetition of the same idea,” he then concludes his sentence with a series of repetitions: 
“the same sense expressed in the same, or nearly the same, combination of sounds, though 
at first perhaps it may make scarce any impression upon us, yet, by being repeated again and 
again, it comes at least gradually, and by little and little, to move, to agitate, and to transport 
us.”  We are moved “little by little,” indeed: surely our discovery, as readers, of the binding 
powers of music is being doubled here by the motions, the agitations, the transports of 
language.  Smith’s writing about music explicitly opens up a space between the reader who 
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understands and the reader who is acted upon; Goethe, Scott, and Eliot, as I will argue, all 
seek to use that space to imagine alternative modes of novel-reading subjects.  
 
 The dissertation is made up of three chapters, whose arguments are as follows: 
1.  The opening chapter focuses closely on Mignon, the apparently mysterious and pathetic 
character from Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship.  Mignon poses a problem for the 
understanding of this hyper-canonical yet under-read novel because her songs – and her 
apparently musical soul – seem to represent a world of affective content that cannot be 
effectively incorporated into the novel’s form.  Mignon seems, in a word, oddly kitschy for 
Goethe.  Drawing on the interpretation of Mignon in nineteenth-century rhetorical manuals, 
on the first edition of the novel (in which musical settings of her songs were printed on 
attached sheets, for the reader to use as she saw fit), and on a wider range of musical inserts 
into eighteenth-century print narrative, I argue that Mignon is troubling not because she 
suffers from an excess of affective content, but rather because she poses a sharp question 
about the experience of reading.  Mignon’s most famous song, “Kennst du das Land,” asks 
the reader to consider whether the novel represents a world, or operates in one.  It is this 
instability, I argue, that the retrospective re-reading of Mignon – begun, most influentially, 
by Friedrich Schlegel – seeks to master. 
 
2. The dissertation’s second chapter discusses Walter Scott’s techniques for hailing the 
reader’s interest in both his verse romances and the Waverley novels.  The received critical 
account of Scott finds in his historical fiction a paradigmatically modern gesture of ironic 
framing, an ideological obfuscation in which history (as romance) can be safely isolated from 
the everyday reality of the reader’s own existence, which is therefore upheld as the normal.  I 
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suggest, through a more surface reading of explicit calls for attention in Scott’s fiction, that 
Scott – though undoubtedly at times practicing this sort of double-switch – is typically at 
once more obvious and less nefarious than this.  Scott uses a visual language for attention, I 
argue, in his verse romances to model for the reader an experience of intense absorption; in 
these long poems, he stages visual absorption repeatedly in ways, as I will suggest, that 
closely resemble Michael Fried’s reading of Greuze.54  However, Scott’s second verse 
romance, Marmion, itself shows that this form of consciously sought-after absorption in 
fiction is too easily dismissed as an escapist maneuver. Scott’s novelistic style, however, 
draws upon a quite different, and specifically musical model for layered attention that Scott 
first crafted in his work as a ballad collector: one that demands from its reader not an 
absorbed encounter with the page, but rather a layered one – one in which the reader can 
exist in both the fiction and her reality without, however, enforcing an opposition between 
the two.  
As both a translator of Goethe and a primary site of what Homer Obed Brown 
refers to as “the institution of the English novel,” Scott is both the chronological and 
conceptual center of this dissertation’s argument.55  I therefore connect this central chapter 
to the two on either side of it with two brief inter-chapters.  The first focuses on Scott’s 
reception of Goethe in his early translation of Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen.  Goethe’s play 
rejects the possibility of a literature that could attach its readers to a culture; Scott’s 
translation, however, subtly modifies the play so as to leave open the possibility that reading 
might perform the task of cultural attachment that Goethe reserves for listening.  The 
                                                          
54 Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Chicago and London: U 
of Chicago P, 1980). 
 




second inter-chapter indexes, via Maggie Tulliver’s reading of Scott in Eliot’s The Mill on the 
Floss, the development of the Victorian image of Scott into what I argue he never was, a 
natural storyteller. 
 
3. The third and final chapter of this dissertation treats George Eliot’s final novel, Daniel 
Deronda, which represents both becoming and being Jewish as being moved by a song whose 
words one cannot understand.  If theory, as Sedgwick and Frank write, has indeed seemed at 
times to reduce itself to a pointing-out of the unnatural, then I would suggest Daniel Deronda 
has drawn so much attention in recent years precisely because it is a post-theoretical novel in 
those terms: one that knows that meaningful cultural and political attachments are unnatural, 
and yet strives to make them convincing nevertheless.   Listening to poorly understood 
music is Eliot’s model for that kind of attachment – an experience, as I will argue, that both 
links Eliot back to Scott (despite her earlier criticism of him), and allows Eliot to combat the 




 The Interesting Child: Mignon (as though) for the first time 
 
Mignon and “Kennst du das Land” – the character’s first song in Goethe’s Wilhelm 
Meister’s Apprenticeship, and the one that often stood in for its singer in the nineteenth century 
– represent an interpretive problem.56  The problem arises less because we do not know how 
to understand the singer or her song, but because we seem to understand both all too well.   
 What does a reader of this novel know about Mignon?  The circumstances leading 
up to her first appearance are these: Wilhelm, the novel’s mild-mannered hero, loiters in the 
square of a small town outside of an inn where he is thinking of taking a room, and buys a 
bouquet of flowers; suddenly “the window of another inn on the other side of the square” 
opens and Wilhelm sees in it “an attractive woman” whose face he longingly observes: “Her 
blond hair fell loosely around her neck, and she seemed to turn and look at him” (49-50).  
This silent scene of looking is then replaced by an exchange of messages.  The woman in the 
window sends a boy to ask for Wilhelm’s flowers; he gives them to her “with… his 
compliments,” and the woman responds “with a friendly greeting” (50).  It is as Wilhelm 
walks away from this satisfying exchange that he first encounters Mignon: “Reflecting on 
                                                          
56 For the interchangeability of Mignon and “Kennst du das Land,” one need only look at the many, 
many instances in nineteenth-century periodicals in which this song – unlike, for the most part, 
Mignon’s others – is identified as “Mignon’s Song” or even only “Mignon” – as, for example, “In 
that splendid song, Mignon, again, the refrain is neglected…” See the review of Poems and Ballads of 
Goethe in Bentley’s Miscellany 45 (1859), 403. 
     A note on editions: In this chapter, I chiefly use three editions of Goethe’s novel.  All references 
in German are to Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre in the fifty-five volume Weimarer Ausgabe, or WA 
(Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1887-1918), vols. 21-23; following the congenial procedures of the Goethe 
Society, I cite the German text by book and chapter, where practical, rather than volume and page.  
For reasons that will become clear below, I also discuss the layout of the novel’s first edition, Wilhelm 
Meisters Lehrjahre, 4 vols. (Berlin: Unger, 1795-6); though I have consulted this edition, for reasons of 
quality my images are from the exact reproduction of this edition in Goethes Werke in Form und Text 
ihrer Erstausgaben, ed. Karl Georg Wendriner (Berlin: Morawe und Scheffelt, [1912]).  For a useful 
discussion of the Unger edition itself, see Siegfried Unseld, Goethe and his Publishers (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1996).  References to the novel in English are, unless otherwise noted, to Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship, ed. and trans. Eric A. Blackall and Victor Lange (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995); page 
citations will be given in text.   The English translation of “Kennst du das Land” is also to the 
translation in this edition, by Hal Draper.  
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this pleasant episode, he was going upstairs to his room when a young creature jumped out 
at him and immediately attracted his attention” (50).  He looks at her “with amazement” and 
tries to speak with her, but loses her in the crowd.  This sequence of events – (longing) 
observation, (satisfying) interaction, Mignon – then neatly repeats itself.  Again, Wilhelm 
finds himself in fascinated observation – this time, watching “two men… practicing fencing, 
trying out their skill on each other.”  He “admire[s]” their skill, and after one of the two has 
“left the scene,” Wilhelm enters into it himself, first fencing with and then speaking with the 
man who remains.  This conversation, however, is itself “interrupted”; at this point that 
Wilhelm “notice[s] again the dark, somber-looking young girl” (50).   
 Mignon is a being that attracts attention, then, and she does so at very particular 
moments.  Twice she interrupts narrative scenes, or appears during moments of reflection 
upon “episodes”; more specifically, she twice appears immediately after Wilhelm has entered 
into an exchange of some kind with the very scene he has observed.  Like the woman in the 
window, or the men fencing, Mignon draws Wilhelm’s eye – but she draws the eye only to 
escape it.  When she reappears yet again, she does so as “the child who so interested him 
earlier” (53), and it is this quality, that of being consistently interesting, that seems to best 
describe her.  Repeatedly in the novel, she is das interessante Kind  – the object, as one recent 
critic writes, of “interest never-ending.”57   
Mignon, then: the interesting child.  The phrase’s first appearance is near the end of 
the fourth chapter of the novel’s second book of eight, and it has seemed oddly difficult to 
render literally into English.  Perhaps the best recent translation of the novel, that by Eric 
Blackall and Victor Lange, translates das interessante Kind as “the mysterious child” (57); 
Thomas Carlyle, translating the novel into English for the first time, in 1824, thought to 
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provide his readers with “poor Mignon.”58  Mignon’s ability to draw and hold attention is 
thus changed, via translation, into either enigma or pathos; in each of these translations a 
phenomenological fact has been replaced by an inferred cause.  These are not at all 
unreasonable interpretations of Mignon’s interest, or rather of Wilhelm’s interest in her: 
Mignon is enigmatic, not least in her ambiguous gender status (the novel uses masculine, 
feminine, and neuter pronouns for her initially): “He looked at the figure with amazement, 
uncertain whether it was a boy or a girl” (50).  She (the pronoun the novel eventually settles 
on) is also, from the beginning, moving: in the moment in which Goethe makes Mignon 
interesting and Carlyle poor, she is being dragged by the hair and beaten, and Wilhelm’s 
response is immediate and direct: “Wilhelm tore over to the man and seized him by the 
chest. ‘Let go of that child!’ he cried, yelling like a maniac, ‘or one of us will be dead!’” (57).  
These translations of Mignon’s interest, into mystery and into moving victimhood, are 
therefore exactly right replacements.  They are, furthermore, replacements that can almost 
stand in for much of an entire century’s habits of thinking about music – as a moving force 
of mysterious power.      
As I have suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, music in the nineteenth 
century novel is not merely a shadowy force; music also serves novelists as a way of 
reflecting on their audiences, of imagining forms of reading that are other than merely 
private.  Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship is, of course, a founding instance of that most central 
genre of liberal, private reading: the Bildungsroman.  Part of my argument thus traces the 
formation of that private reader, who is both moved and puzzled by Mignon’s music in ways 
that, as I will suggest below, are ultimately self-protective.  Yet my argument here is also that 
to forget that Mignon is above all interesting, and interesting before she is either mysterious or 
moving, is to have in effect re-read the novel before reading it – a strange activity that 
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34 
 
immediately catches us in an unhappily familiar revolving door of cultural criticism, one 
whose motion is already signaled in the choice between poor Mignon and mysterious Mignon.  
It is also, as I will argue, to obscure the extent to which Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship is, 
especially around Mignon, a deliberate intervention into styles of reading – to forget, that is, 
that the novel enacts a transformation of reading for what is interesting into reading for 
explanation or pathos. 
 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship ; or, the re-reading of “Kennst du das Land” 
I make this argument here almost exclusively with reference to “Kennst du das 
Land.”  I quote the poem here, in Goethe’s German and the English version by Hal 
Draper59: 
 
Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen  
blühn,    
Im dunkeln Laub die Gold-Orangen  
glühn, 
Ein sanfter Wind vom blauen Himmel weht,  
Die Myrte still und hoch der Lorbeer steht. 
Kennst du es wohl? 
 Dahin! Dahin 
Möcht’ ich mit dir, o mein Geliebter, ziehn! 
 
Kennst du das Haus, auf Säulen ruht sein Dach, 
Es glänzt der Saal, es schimmert das Gemach, 
Und Marmorbilder stehn und sehn mich an: 
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Know you the land where lemon blossoms  
blow, 
And through the dark leaves the golden  
oranges glow, 
A gentle breeze wafts from an azure sky, 
The myrtle’s still, the laurel tree grows high– 
You know it, yes? 
 Oh there, oh there 
With you, O my beloved, would I fare. 
 
Know you the house? Roof pillars over it, 
The chambers shining and the hall bright-lit, 






Was hat man dir, du armes Kind gethan? 
Kennst du es wohl? 
 Dahin! Dahin 
Möcht’ ich mit dir, o mein Beschützer,  
ziehn. 
 
Kennst du den Berg und seinen  
Wolkensteg?   
Das Maulthier sucht im Nebel seinen Weg, 
In Höhlen wohnt der Drachen alte Brut, 
Es stürzt der Fels und über ihn die Fluth: 
Kennst du ihn wohl? 
 Dahin! Dahin 
Geht unser Weg; o Vater, laß uns ziehn!  
 
The song appears at the very beginning of the third book of the novel, and, like its singer a 
few chapters earlier, makes a great initial impression upon Wilhelm – “[t]he melody and the 
expression pleased Wilhelm greatly” (83).  Later, in its eighth and final book, the novel 
devotes an extraordinary amount of space to re-reading Mignon, and this song in particular.  
As Mignon is dying, and after she is dead, various authority figures provide Wilhelm and the 
novel’s readers with an account of what these words mean; perhaps most memorably, the 
novel inserts, after narrating her sentimental and aestheticizing funeral, a brief history of her 
life in the form of a letter from her uncle. The letter refers explicitly to many of the images 
from “Kennst du das Land,” and it seemingly offers the pleasure of explanation: So that’s 
what she meant! Mignon sings of lemons, oranges, and myrtle because her father spoke of 
them; Mignon sings of marble figures because she used to visit a villa to “peer at the statues” 
“You poor poor child, what have they done to  
you?” 
You know it, yes? 
Oh there, oh there, 
With you, O my protector, would I fare. 
 
Know you the mountain and its cloudy trails? 
The mule picks out its path through misty veils, 
The dragon’s ancient brood haunts caverns here, 
The cliff drops straight, the stream above falls  
sheer. 
You know it, yes? 
 Oh there, oh there 




(359) on long walks; Mignon sings of a waterfall because she lost her hat near “the place 
where a mountain torrent gushed into the lake” (360) while running away from home.   
The problem with these explanations is of course that they hardly offer pleasure at 
all, seeming indeed to mock rather than supply satisfactory explanations.  In his book 
Wonder, The Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences, Philip Fisher attacks an “anti-
intellectual idea of poetry” associated with the sublime that can only imagine explanation as 
loss.60  Fisher finds a representative of this strand of thinking about explanation in Keats’s 
Lamia, the second part of which contains the famous lament on “cold philosophy,” which 
transforms the “awful rainbow” into a mere part of “the dull catalogue of common things.”  
Mignon could have served Fisher just as well as an example (except, perhaps, that she might 
work too well with his claim that narrative is in its essence inimical to wonder): for George 
Henry Lewes, the reader’s first sight of Mignon has “the effect of a rainbow in the London 
streets” – and as Lewes notes elsewhere, “in the case of a rainbow, we discover that it is only 
the appearance of certain drops of water.”61  To learn that Mignon saw statues, or lost her 
hat at a waterfall: these are prime instances of explanation as damaging demystification, 
inviting the disgust (and subsequent, thickly remystifying, novel-writing) of a reader like 
Novalis, who after a first, equivocal response, eventually determined that “Wilhelm Meister is 
actually a Candide directed against poetry.”62  Readers of the novel’s concluding revision of 
Mignon have long responded, in part, like the one Walter Scott imagines when considering 
the dangers of the explained supernatural in Radcliffe’s Gothic: if an “inadequate cause is 
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assigned for a strong emotion, the reader feels tricked, and like a child who has once seen 
the scenes of a theatre too nearly, the idea of paste-board, cords, and pulleys destroys 
forever the illusion with which they were first seen from the proper point of view.”63  
Central to a view of Mignon-as-rainbow is, as Scott suggests, the notion of an absolute and 
destructive distinction between a first and a second reading created by a change in the 
reader’s knowledge.  As Scott wrote elsewhere of The Mysteries of Udolpho, it is “impossible to 
re-peruse the book without feeling… contempt.”64  Once we know that Mignon is from 
Italy, and was abducted, and lost her hat at a waterfall, “Kennst du das Land” loses its charm 
for us; the child’s taste for theater collapses after he has seen behind the curtain.   
But of course this has not been true of readers responding to Mignon: the novel’s 
concluding re-reading of Mignon may produce contempt, but that contempt never seems to 
have made “re-perusal” impossible.  The nineteenth century always wanted to hear “Kennst 
du das Land,” and indeed preferred it to the novel – Willi Schuh finds that this one song 
receives at least eighty-four settings over the course of the century, a density of musical 
output that suggests not only popularity but a longstanding desire to get this song right.65  
Carlyle wrote in the preface to his translation of the novel that the reader unconvinced by 
the narrative as a whole should simply “turn to the history of Mignon.”66  Following his 
suggestion, Carlyle’s reader did indeed consume Mignon in precisely this way, as a part best 
consumed independent from its whole: indeed those who, like a critic in The Yankee and 
Boston Literary Gazette, found the novel “nothing but a piece of patch-work” were haunted all 
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the more by Mignon: “The flavor is on your lip. The impregnating odor about you, and the 
color pursuing you, forever…”67  For Francis Jeffrey in 1825, Mignon’s songs were moving 
evidence of the character’s own disordered but therefore all the more fascinating inwardness 
– her “unaccountable” nature that was “full of sensibility.”68  Twenty years later, Margaret 
Fuller refers to Mignon as an “inspired, lyrical nature” – a prime example of those women 
who, “though we see them in relations, we can think of as unrelated” to the society, the 
world, or for that matter the novel in which they live.
69
   
How, then, is one to read the persistence of Mignon’s appeal?  Perhaps the simplest 
statement of our problem with Mignon is this: that around her we seem to still have feelings 
that, according to standard narratives of demystifying explanation, are no longer appropriate.  
We can have “poor Mignon,” who stands apart, “unrelated” to a whole; we can also have the 
“mysterious child” whose mysteries are explained away; our difficulty is that we seem to be 
stuck with both at the same time.  Wilhelm himself suggests one vaguely unsettling model for 
this desire in his childish attitude towards the theater’s curtain, so unlike that of Scott’s 
reader of Radcliffe, or for that matter Dorothy’s feelings upon finally seeing the Wizard: 
The first time I had the joy of surprise and astonishment; at the second performance 
I was intensely curious and observant.  This time I wanted to find out exactly how 
everything was done.  I had decided on the first evening that it couldn’t be the 
puppets themselves that were speaking… But why it was all so agreeable, and why 
the puppets themselves seemed to speak and move, and where the lights were, and 
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Emphasis original.  This stylistically notable but anonymous critic is likely to have been John Neal, to 
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68 Jeffrey, “Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister,” in Edinburgh Review 42:84 (Aug. 1825), 409-449, at 429. 
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the people who operated all this – these mysteries disturbed me so much that I 
wanted to be both among the enchanted and the enchanters, somehow secretly to 
have a hand in it, and at the same time, as a spectator, be able to enjoy the pleasure 
of the illusion. (7) 
Carolyn Steedman suggests that the nineteenth century’s craze for Mignon and “Kennst du 
das Land” is childish in much the same way, a deliberate forgetting of what the novel tells us, 
a purposeful reversion to an innocent first reading: as though one needed to forget that the 
rainbow is made of water to find it interesting.70  In Steedman’s account, then, Mignon’s 
appeal for the nineteenth century (and for us) is ultimately a kind of false consciousness; in 
Scott’s language, it is a continued liking for which we ought to have learned contempt, yet 
somehow haven’t.    
The name for this structure is kitsch.  Where Wilhelm wants “to enjoy the pleasure 
of the illusion,” Milan Kundera identifies kitsch as the “second tear” in our weeping, the one 
that says “How nice to be moved.”71  And for the Frankfurt School critics who gave the 
term its decisive meaning in cultural criticism, kitsch is an effect of precisely the kind of 
decontextualization Margaret Fuller suggests we fall into with Mignon.  For Walter 
Benjamin, in his essay “Dream Kitsch,” the decontextualization is above all historical: “No 
one really dreams any longer of the Blue Flower. Whoever awakes as Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen today must have overslept.”72  Kitsch is a soporific one applies to oneself, an 
effect of remaining caught up in ways of living – particularly in longings, as in the case of 
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Novalis’s blue flower – that have become outmoded.  Theodor Adorno develops Benjamin’s 
account across a wide range of texts; like Benjamin, he sees kitsch as the past in the present, 
the “precipitate of devalued forms and material into history.”73  Adorno particularly 
emphasizes, however, that the dehistoricization that happens in our liking for kitsch is 
typically made possible by a formal decontextualization of some element that, in so being cut 
off from its context, becomes kitsch.  When one removes the blue flower from Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen, or the Adagietto from Mahler’s Fifth, one is left with what Adorno refers to as a 
“deceptive image of uniqueness”: a mere “illusion of the concrete,” of an immediate 
experience of subjective emotion beyond history or large-scale form.74  In enjoying kitsch, as 
Wilhelm wants to enjoy illusion, I persuade myself to be contented with what I know to be 
fake.  Such “delight in the moment,” Adorno writes in his essay “On the Fetish-Character in 
Music,” “becomes an excuse for absolving the listener from the thought of the whole.”75  
Mignon thus creates a bad choice between two bad satisfactions: that of explanation, 
or that of an illusionistic and self-defeating kitsch.   Critics have made this case – notably 
Michael Minden, who finds in Mignon a “pure and original” subject, a kind of not-yet-
objectified interiority whose death and subsequent revivification marks the creation of 
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kitsch, that is, “what becomes of the aesthetic ideal of Goethe and Schiller in the increasing 
divergence between private and public worlds of the nineteenth century.”76  Mignon’s 
revivification after her death offers us the “inauthentic autonomy of consumption” that has 
been cut off from the historical: we enjoy Mignon only because she is dying, and will never 
be able to make her inward, private feelings public (165).   And, in fact, in Minima Moralia 
Adorno himself reads the response to Mignon in much this way, as a marker of the reader’s 
complicity in a course of events that he only pretends to mourn: 
So Sade’s Justine, who falls from one torture-trap into the next, is called “notre 
intéressante héroine,” and likewise Mignon, at the moment of being beaten, the 
interesting child… There are traces of this in the relation of northern peoples to the 
southern: the prosperous Puritans vainly try to get from the dark-haired denizens of 
foreign countries what the course of the world, which they control, denies not only 
to them but all the more to the vagrants…77    
We are struck by “Kennst du das Land,” in this reading, because we in a sense always already 
know the story behind it, and thus enjoy falsely – even ghoulishly – consuming it out of its 
context: “this is the circle,” as Adorno puts it, “of bourgeois nostalgia for naivety” (170).  
Yet to read the re-use of Mignon as kitsch is, as Terence Cave has recently argued, to 
castigate as inauthentic much of what makes Mignon interesting to begin with.78  It is also, 
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78 Mignon’s Afterlives: Crossing Cultures from Goethe to the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 
30-33. Cave’s basic concerns are in many ways quite different from my own: as he writes, “formal 
issues are not salient” in his discussion (x).  Rather, his book treats Mignon as a “cultural figure” 
generally – in novel, opera, and song.   My concerns are more narrow: the story I am telling is about 
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paradoxically, to take for granted the position created in the moment of second, 
“demystified” reading: to presume that whatever made Mignon interesting was the unknown 
content of an original, not-yet-objectified interiority and the mysteriousness of its words, and 
to presume that the significance of Mignon’s singing lies in the link between music and 
“unmediated” or “unrepressed” feeling.79  And Minden’s broader historical argument – 
based on a narrative of Mignon’s gradual kitschification, corresponding to a disappearance of 
a possible harmony of public and private, or the fall from response to self-congratulation – 
seems shaky, when Goethe’s very first English readers in 1824 are already constructing for 
themselves a sociology of taste, in which Mignon’s story is of the “greatest interest” for the 
“mere novel reader”80; or when Goethe himself, in June of 1796, is already writing to Schiller 
that “I had to insert Mignon’s song because of its effect, as you will see.”81   
Most importantly, as I will argue below, the evidentiary basis of the critique of 
Mignon as kitsch – that “Kennst du das Land” is taken out of context by readers, musicians, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the novel and its mode of address, not about Mignon as a phenomenon in cultural history generally, 
and I thus take up Mignon as a figure around which Goethe’s novel works through questions about 
how it can speak to unknown readers.  My Mignon, in that sense, is not Cave’s “crossover 
phenomenon” (10).  These differences aside, Cave’s understanding of “Kennst du das Land” is quite 
similar to my own: he too sees the song as having an important “threshold” function, and he too 
emphasizes the disorientations that this song works on its readers (he indeed refers to the appearance 
of the song as “one of the most arresting moments in the history of the novel” [14]).  While Cave 
notes his heavy use of electronic archives to create the “Mignon corpus” his book investigates, he is 
also one of the few English-language critics to consider Goethe’s novel in its initial form of 
publication.  As I argue here, in the 1795-6 Unger edition – both because of the division of the novel 
into four volumes (not something Cave points out, strangely) and the presence of Reichardt’s songs 
(which he does) – the question “who speaks,” though implicit in this moment generally, in whatever 
edition, is as it were forced on the reader in a way it is not when the book is read in a single volume.  
 
79 Variations on this argument are common; I quote here from Stefanie Bach, “Musical Gypsies and 
Anti-Classical Aesthetics: The Romantic Reception of Goethe’s Mignon Character,” in Music and 
Literature in German Romanticism, ed. Siobhán Donovan and Robin Elliott (Rochester, NY: Camden 
House, 2004), 106-7.   
 
80 Review of Carlyle’s translation, in the La Belle Assemblée 30:191 (August 1824), 78-82, at 80. 
 
81 Goethe to Schiller, 26 June 1796, in Correspondence between Goethe and Schiller, 1794-1805, trans. 
Liselotte Dieckmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 117. 
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and listeners throughout the nineteenth century – is misplaced.  Just as Mignon’s “interest” 
is born from her appearance  between moments of Wilhelm’s absorption into what he 
observes, so too “Kennst du das Land” was always out of context; the song has its effect 
within the novel – most spectacularly, but not only, in its first edition – because it already 
appears to exist in a way displaced from the narrative around it.  We need not so quickly 
project our embarrassment as readers of Mignon – that we have too much feeling about her 
song to know what to do with – so quickly onto a speaker’s “fervid and alive” interiority, to 
use Franco Moretti’s phrase, or onto her “prehistorical dimension,” to use Adorno’s.82  And 
yet as soon as we think of Mignon as a part within the whole of the novel, we seem locked 
into the very binary that gives rise to this entire interpretive dilemma – Mignon as the 
“poor” part stuck in a ruthlessly demystifying whole.   
 
 
The doctor’s case: the production of systematic reading  
 Now is the right time to recall that for the novel’s earliest reader, Schiller, and the 
Jena Romantics after him, Mignon was not a passive part of an aesthetic whole, but was 
more specifically where readers of Goethe’s novel learned to become systematic readers of 
aesthetic wholes.  Thus, Schiller on the novel’s final book:  
How did you succeed in bringing so closely together the encircling persons and 
events which had been scattered far and wide!  It all stands there like a beautiful 
planetary system; everything belongs together.  Only the Italian characters [i.e., 
Mignon and her father, the harpist], like comet-figures and just as horrifying, tie the 
                                                          
82 Franco Moretti, The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture, new edition (London 
and New York: Verso, 2000), 46-7.  Adorno discussed Mignon as pre- or ahistorical in the first 
course he taught at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research – see Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno: 
A Biography (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 141. 
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system to something distant and larger… What a beautiful thought it was to derive, 
from the theoretical horror and misconceptions of reason, the terrible pathos of 
Mignon’s and the harp player’s fate… [In their] cases one prefers to turn away from 
the individual to the idea of the whole.83 
Schiller’s terms are slightly confusing in this context, but his basic argument is this: in 
Mignon’s death, the aesthetic whole comes into view as a matter of the reader’s preference.  It 
is around Mignon, we might say, that the aesthetic whole is transformed from an object that 
is (as the planetary system “stands there”) to an object that is sought after.   
Friedrich Schlegel makes this claim the center of his celebrated 1798 essay “On 
Goethe’s Meister.”  In it, Schlegel understands Goethe’s novel as a unified whole, a “divine 
organism.”84  But Schlegel’s organicism is not Aristotle’s.  Aristotle’s poetic organism is a 
shape made present to its viewer’s memory, as the form of an animal is present to 
perception; thus, for example, one can determine that a work cannot have an overly long 
plot, as this would make it resemble “an animal a thousand miles long”: its “unity and 
wholeness [would] vanish from view.”85  But for Schlegel, the organicism of Wilhelm Meister is 
not something present (to a viewer, to memory) – as he puts it, for “poetic criticism,” the 
“original constituents [of a] work are dead things” (281) – but rather lies in hidden principles 
of organization.  What matters instead of an apparent, visible connection between parts is 
connection-forming as an activity; the unity of Wilhelm Meister for Schlegel is, as Elizabeth 
                                                          
83 Schiller to Goethe, 2 July 1796, in Correspondence, 120.  
 
84 Schlegel, “On Goethe’s Meister,” trans. P. Firchow, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J.M. 
Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 269-286, at 275. 
 
85 “A fine animal can neither be very small, for observation becomes confused when it approaches an 
imperceptible instant of time; nor [can it be] very large, for observation cannot happen at the same 
time, but its unity and wholeness vanish from the observers’ view, e.g. if there were an animal a 
thousand miles long.”  Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Richard Janko (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 10-11. 
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Millán-Zaibert writes, “a kind of unity that comes precisely by taking the parts and piecing 
them together.”86  Schlegel’s word for this is system – the novel is one “entire massive 
system” (272-3) – and it is as a system that the novel disappoints our “usual expectations of 
unity and coherence.”  Its coherence is not merely there to be viewed; rather, it requires a 
new kind of reader, “the reader who possesses a true instinct for system” (276).  As Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy gloss Schlegelian system, it “is not there (does not exist). It is ‘to do.’”
87
  
For Schlegel, as for Schiller, the energy of this system-as-process comes into being around 
Mignon: “with her appearance the innermost spring of this strange work is released” (272).   
In a series of provocative essays, Clifford Siskin has recently argued that in order to 
accurately conceive both of Romanticism’s continuity with and difference from the 
Enlightenment, we need to focus on the genre of the system: as he puts it, “[i]n system… 
lies the secret history of Romanticism.”88  In brief, Siskin’s argument is this: While we – as 
post-Romantics – are likely to imagine “System” as a ubiquitous entity to be ineffectually 
fought or blamed, it was also the genre of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment: a mode of 
book-writing that “proceeded by incorporating earlier systems into master SYSTEMS.”89  
Romanticism made itself up, in large part, by attacking systematicity – Siskin quotes Anna 
Barbauld’s bombastic “Let me make the novels of a country, and let who will make the 
systems” (“Novels and Systems,” 202) – yet in fact worked by incorporating systematicity 
                                                          
86 Millán-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy (Albany: SUNY P, 2007), 152. 
 
87 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in 
German Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 33. 
 
88 Siskin, “The Problem of Periodization: Enlightenment, Romanticism, and the fate of system,” in 
The Cambridge History of English Romantic Literature, ed. James Chandler (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
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into its own mode of writing.  As Siskin argues in “The Problem of Periodization,” 
Romanticism, and above all the Romantic novel, are the literary-historical moment at which 
systematicity is “redeployed as form and thematized” – negatively – “as content” (118).  
Siskin keeps his historical eye firmly trained on British developments; as writers in German 
(or, indeed, Coleridge), in whose texts system is the quite explicit history of Romanticism, 
have as of yet played little role in his arguments, it seems unclear whether he intends his 
critique of Romanticism’s account of itself to include the Jena circle, or rather to champion 
Schlegel’s coherence-as-system in a new literary-historiographical context.  All the more 
reason, then, to eagerly await Siskin’s book – but in the meantime, I would suggest that 
Siskin’s insistence on system as the genre of incorporation, one defined quite simply as 
“anything that talks to itself” (113), suggests a path out of the unfortunate loop between 
Mignon-as-subject and Mignon-as-victim: that is, that in reading Mignon we might be 
looking for where in this book it is that we learn to read her as part of a system, where it is 
that we learn to hear her utterances as part of a larger talking-to-oneself belonging to the 
novel as a whole. 
For, indeed, the pivotal moment in the creation of our Mignon problem is not the 
addition of new biographical information with which we can suddenly understand what 
Mignon meant all along.  Rather, the key moment comes earlier: long before the letter 
appears, after Mignon’s death, to fill in the details of Mignon’s early life, the doctor who has 
been treating her in her illness arrives to report to Wilhelm on her “condition.”  It is in the 
doctor’s visit that the novel transforms Wilhelm’s understanding of Mignon; as the doctor 
makes clear, what is at stake in Mignon’s condition is not an irreversible narrative of 
disenchantment, but rather a conceptual alternative between styles of reading.  
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From his first appearances in the novel, the doctor has been closely affiliated with 
the mysterious Society of the Tower, the mysterious and vaguely Masonic educational 
conspiracy that has been coordinating crucial episodes in Wilhelm’s life.  So, in the 
manuscript of the Confessions of a Beautiful Soul which makes up the novel’s sixth book, and in 
which he makes his first appearance, the doctor transmits the educational philosophy of the 
Society’s head pedagogue, the Abbé: “in order to promote a child’s education, one must first 
find out where its desires and inclinations lie” (255).  A more complete account of that 
principle is revealed to Wilhelm only after he has been inducted into the Society himself, 
near the close of the seventh book, and has learned to see his own past as subject to the 
Tower’s peculiarly passive guidance (as Michael Bell notes, the Tower shares with Rousseau 
a commitment to delay as pedagogical means).90  At this point, Wilhelm objects to the 
fecklessness of his teachers: “If so many people have been taking an interest in you, knew 
what your life was and what was to be done about it, why didn’t they guide you more firmly, 
more seriously? … Why did they encourage your pastimes instead of deflecting you from 
them?” (303). 
A full answer to his objections comes only in book eight, as Wilhelm waits with 
Natalie for the doctor to report his findings.  As they wait, Natalie distracts the impatient 
Wilhelm by explaining – indeed, quoting – the Abbé’s theory of development in a way that 
makes the function of Wilhelm’s misguided “pastimes” clear.  The Abbé, she says, believes 
that while “one cannot engage in any activity without the necessary predisposition,” one also 
cannot uncover that predisposition without first attempting to engage in the wrong activities.  
The young person, therefore, must be allowed to “go astray on his chosen path” in order to 
determine the latent predisposition – the rule of self – by which the right path might be 
                                                          
90 See Bell, Open Secrets: Literature, Education, and Authority from J.-J. Rousseau to J.M. Coetzee (Oxford: 
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found.  Teaching must be passive: otherwise, it runs the risk of directing its pupils’ “activity 
towards objects, which are often out of line with the minds that are so taken up with them” 
(319).   Wilhelm’s initial response to the strange theatrical show of his induction into the 
tower had been an abashed skepticism: “is what we call ‘fate,’ really only chance?” (302).  
What the Tower allows for, however, is an ironic recovery of the sequence of chance errors 
that have made up Wilhelm’s life for meaning: only in the sequence of errors could 
Wilhelm’s “mind” or “predisposition” be determined.   
In German, the Abbé moves through a set of different nouns for this 
“predisposition,” that quality within the young person that makes some activities more 
appropriate than others and which education must find and develop: in order, they are 
Neigung (inclination); Anlage (gift for, tendency, “the makings of”); Instinkt; Fähigkeit 
(aptitude); and again, Anlage. It is as though the Abbé, conscious that the potential 
inclinations of the youth cannot be known from the beginning, is careful to avoid fixing 
those inclinations by rendering them in a consistent conceptual language.  Once education is 
complete, however, a single word comes into play: Natur.  The correctly-educated youth 
finds “the path suited to [his] nature,” just as it is the youth’s Natur which will, eventually, 
come to resist the objects that a too-directive education forces upon him.  For the Society of 
the Tower, in other words, “nature” is properly a concept that applies only to the fully-
formed, or rather fully-revealed, individual. 
It is at this point, as a sense of the principle of Wilhelm’s life’s – and the novel’s – 
shape is taking form, as the revelation of nature by error, that the doctor returns and makes 
his report on Mignon.  The explanation the doctor gives for Mignon’s illness is twofold: 
firstly, he links her current illness to an incident in the fifth book, in which Mignon (as we 
now learn), hoping to spend the night with Wilhelm, instead found him in bed with another 
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woman: “Her heart,” the doctor says, “which up till then had been beating with expectation 
and yearning, suddenly stopped” (321).  But secondly, this incident had its effect on Mignon 
only because of what he calls her Natur: “what we are concerned with is the strange 
personality [die sonderbare Natur] of that dear child Mignon.”  The doctor here supplies 
Wilhelm with a brief outline of the narrative of Mignon’s life  – abducted by acrobats as a 
child, she begged to be allowed to return home, but was treated cruelly and gave in to 
despair.  As a result, she made a vow “never again to reveal her home and origins to a living 
soul”; cut off from speaking of herself to others, Mignon instead determined to “live and die 
in the expectation of direct divine sustenance.”  For this reason, the doctor explains, 
Mignon’s desire is permanently directed towards objects she cannot attain: she longs for 
what is “inaccessible to her unusual nature” (320). Mignon cannot change, but it is not 
because she is (“by nature”) uneducable; it is because her nature has been created by a bad 
education.91  But at the same time, the relationship between nature and biography seems to 
have subtly shifted: for Wilhelm, events reveal nature, in the sense of unfolding it; for 
Mignon, biography reveals nature in the sense of being its sign – it is how we know that her 
nature “consists almost entirely of a deep sort of yearning” for two things she cannot have 
(320).     
But how has the doctor learned all of this biography?  And how, ultimately, should 
this new biographical knowledge be treated – that is, what difference does knowing Mignon’s 
nature make?  The novel’s answer to these questions is neatly circular: 
“… What I have been telling you, was not something she conveyed in so many 
words to Natalie, but what Natalie has pieced together from occasional remarks, 
                                                          
91 On this point, see William Gilby, “The Structural Significance of Mignon in Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre,” in Seminar 16 (1980), 136-150.  
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from songs and childish indiscretions which revealed what they intended to keep 
secret.” 
      Wilhelm could now account for many a song, many an utterance of the poor girl. 
(320) 
Mignon’s songs appear here as part of a larger set of parapraxes which Natalie and the 
Tower both have been able to read through, so as to “piece together” the narrative that lies 
beneath.92  And as a result of that pieced-together truth, Mignon’s songs can be “accounted 
for.”  Mignon, in the doctor’s telling, appears as the individual constituted as a “case” by 
what Michael Foucault calls a “field of documentation.”93   But – and this is the crucial point 
– there are no new documents produced here.  What allows Wilhelm to newly “account for” 
Mignon is a change in the way he interprets the songs and utterances that are already 
available to him.   
In the double movement formed first by Natalie’s “pieced together” synthesis, and 
then by Wilhelm’s application of that synthesis to each constituent fragment, Wilhelm learns 
to read “many a song, many an utterance” as documentation.  Mignon’s sum total of 
utterances reveal her nature which explains the sum total of her utterances.  The doctor, 
then, instructs Wilhelm in what Schleiermacher will later call the hermeneutic circle: 
Complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, [so that] each part can be 
understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, and vice versa… [A] text can 
never be understood right away.  On the contrary, every reading puts us in a better 
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position to understand because it increases our knowledge.  Only in the case of 
insignificant texts are we satisfied with what we understand on first reading.94  
Wilhelm learns to re-read Mignon – and in this case, learning to re-read her means forgetting 
what he already knew.  “Kennst du das Land?”  The doctor’s lesson imposes upon Wilhelm 
an answer.  If Mignon’s nature includes having decided “never again to reveal her home and 
origins to a living soul,” the answer can only be no: I can’t understand these words; they aren’t 
spoken to me, but were purely a kind of soliloquy, a self-enclosed lyrical utterance.  Mignon 
appears in this moment as she will haunt the nineteenth century, as an inverted image of the 
aesthetic object itself: as an excessively interiorized subject whose words cannot be 
understood but only overheard.  Mignon’s kitschiness, then, is not merely hers, or her songs’ 
– rather it is the effect of re-reading what were songs as documents.   
To recall this is to realize that Mignon’s lasting allure need not be castigated as kitsch; 
rather, the appeal of “Kennst du das Land” belongs to another style of reading, one better 
suited to song as a form in its own right, rather than as a mere part of the whole. 
 
 
“Yes, I know…” 
What, then, is a song in this novel?  What would it look like to read “Kennst du das 
Land” as something other than a document within a field, within a contextualizing system?  
Mignon, as I suggested at the opening of this chapter, interrupts Wilhelm’s absorption into 
scenes that he observes; “Kennst du das Land” performs an analogous task for the reader of 
                                                          
94 F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James 
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Kittler’s comments on this passage – that it “soars above the many reading practices which have 
existed and still do exist as if to exclude them” – have been particularly helpful.  In “Forgetting,” 
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Wilhelm Meister, isolating him in his interest.  Siskin suggests that system is that which talks to 
itself, whose parts talk to each other; Schlegel adds that that I, as the good systematic reader 
of the Romantic text, am constituted in the overhearing of this talk.  Song in Wilhelm  Meister, 
however, is what talks to me.   
What I propose here is an attempt at a “first reading” of Mignon.  Not the 
“innocent” first reading of an attempt to imagine Mignon without her eventual fate – the 
after-effect of the novel’s own demystified second look at her – or as a lyrical nature free 
from its relations to a larger whole.  Instead, I aim here at a naïve reading, one focused 
entirely on the first appearance of her “Kennst du das Land”: what is it about the song that 
catches us, even before it has been placed into the opposition between responsible reading 
for the whole, and kitschy reading for the part-in-spite-of-the-whole?  
The novel’s first edition, fortunately, makes such a reading relatively easy to achieve.  
In this four-volume edition, published by J.F. Unger in 1795-6, “Kennst du das Land” 




















      




Who asks these questions, and of whom?  These questions, of course, are there in every 
edition of the novel.  In modern one-volume editions and nineteenth-century three-volume 
ones, the voice that asks “Kennst du das Land” seems most likely to be the Harper’s, as his 
“heartfelt songs” are heard at the end of the second book (82).  In the first edition in 
particular, however, the lines raise a slightly different question: Are they part of an epigraph?  
As Gérard Genette points out, the years of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship’s first publication 
were those in which epigraphs were very commonly used in precisely this way, immediately 
after chapter headings, particularly in the English Gothic: Matthew Lewis’s The Monk, with 
an epigraph for every chapter, was also published in 1795.  Genette understands the function 
of this practice in the late eighteenth century as the provision of the novel with a “password 
of intellectuality,” a means of joining the perhaps lower-status book in hand to “cultural 
tradition” generally.95  In this sense, the epigraph (which this poem initially seems to be) is a 
specific case of the larger function of paratext: to “enable a text to become a book,” that is, 
to function as a permeable membrane, to at once serve as a boundary (enclosing the book) 
and as a “‘vestibule’ that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or 
turning back” (1-2).   
Genette suggests that the epigraph is typically a kind of “password” whose central 
element is the signature: the epigraph as quotation is a communication from the epigrapher-
author to the “potential reader, and, in practice, every real reader” (155).  But “Kennst du 
das Land,” however, lacks the kind of authorizing signature that would serve to join this 
book in hand to some larger tradition via the “password” of the tradition-bound name.  A 
“password” is something that (at least) two people know: when I open to the first chapter of 
The Monk and see four lines from Measure for Measure, I am pleased that both the author says 
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“Shakespeare” to me (the lines themselves, Genette suggests, don’t much matter, as indeed – 
in The Monk – they don’t); this shared knowledge of the password of the name is part of 
what invites me into the book.96  But in “Kennst du das Land,” of course, I do not find 
shared knowledge – an assurance that I am the right reader for the book, and that the book 
is the right book for me – but instead a question about what I know.    
This moment thus deserves to be read as bearing a family resemblance to Goethe’s 
many games with the idea of a reading public – his recurring exploration of instances of 
mistaken address, of actual overhearing, of the possibility that messages go awry or are 
received by the wrong recipient.  Examples from Goethe’s work run across a wide range of 
texts.  The late Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre is particularly rich in such oddities; perhaps the 
strangest is Lucidor, the hero of the inset novella “Who Is the Traitor,” who struggles to 
find out who has been betraying his inner feelings to his friends, only to eventually discover 
that he has been continually betraying himself through the habit of “passionate soliloquy” in 
his sleep.97   
But of course Goethe’s early works also abound in examples, in a wide variety of 
moods: to one extreme, the scene in The Sorrows of Young Werther in which Werther reads 
Lotte’s letter to her husband (“My dearest love, come back as soon as you can”) while 
imagining that “this was written to [him]” is only the most literal case of misplaced speech in 
a novel full of it.98   Werther places himself in the position of the letter’s “you,” allowing the 
pronoun to direct the letter to him just as we do, in reading his letters.  On the one hand, 
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“you” is of necessity open, referring only (as Benveniste says) to a “reality of discourse” 
rather than referring to any particular person99  – like the letter, like print, anyone can receive 
it; on the other hand, Werther reminds us there is always an intended you: as Barthes points 
out, the non-correspondence between writing’s mode of address as a “pure structural 
operation” and its direction towards the right reader is Werther’s tragedy.100   
At the other end of the spectrum, we have Goethe’s Die Geschwister, whose opening 
scene deploys a related mistake for rather more vaudevillian purposes: 
WILHELM: […] O Marianne! if you only knew that he whom you call a brother was  
working for you, with quite a different heart, with quite different hopes!  
Maybe – ah!  It’s bitter. –  – She loves me! – yes, as a brother. – No, no!  
Again, doubt – and that has never done any good.  Marianne!  I will be 
happy, and you too, Marianne! 
 MARIANNE [entering]: What do you want, brother?  You called me. 
 WILHELM: I didn’t, Marianne. 
 MARIANNE: Then are you willfully making jokes, to drag me out of the kitchen like  
this? 
 WILHELM: You heard a ghost.101 
“Kennst du das Land,” similarly, is a self-conscious exploration of how a speaker – and 
implicitly how the page – can call upon an audience, or hail the “you” who reads or listens.  
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Am I the right reader for Mignon’s questions?  When the book speaks to me in this way, is it 
to me – or am I making Werther’s mistake, overhearing a communication made to another?   
Questions about what I know are not in themselves necessarily destabilizing: often, 
they are quite the opposite.  In a suggestive comment, Mark W. Booth writes that “In a song 
where the singer addresses a second person… the audience identifies with the speaking 
voice.”102  Yet this seems to be by no means the case: one can just as easily identify with, or 
more precisely recognize oneself as, the song’s addressee.  This result seems particularly likely 
in question songs – typically, songs that bind singer and audience into a shared rhetorical 
structure, sometimes by literally allowing the audience to respond.  A look at two examples 
whose questions particularly resemble Mignon’s, however, suggests the extent to which 
songs of this form can work along quite different axes:  
D’ye ken John Peel with his coat so gray?  Do you know the muffin man,  
D’ye ken John Peel at the break of the day?        the muffin man, the muffin man? 
D’ye ken John Peel when he’s far, far away,  Oh, do you know the muffin man, 
With his hounds and his horn in the morning?      who lives in Drury Lane?  
 
‘Twas the sound of his horn call’d me    Yes, I know the muffin man, 
     from my bed,          the muffin man, the muffin man; 
And the cry of his hounds has me oft-times led; Oh, yes, I know the muffin-man      
For Peel’s view holloa would ‘waken the dead,       who lives in Drury Lane. 
Or a fox from his lair in the morning.         
    
Yes, I ken John Peel and auld Ruby, too, 
Ranter and Royal and Bellman as true;      
From the drag to the chase, from the chase  
     to the view,       --sometimes-- 
From the view to the death in the morning.   
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           Then two of us know the muffin man,  
‘Twas the sound of his horn, [etc.]103     the muffin man, the muffin man…104 
     
Neither the Cumbrian huntsman nor the London child hails any particular you; both songs, 
however, immediately move to reveal that I am the right you, qualified to say “Yes” to their 
own opening questions.  In the case of “John Peel,” the song works as an extended play on 
the two main senses of “to ken” – both to see and to know.  By starting from a question 
apparently about what is present (Peel with his gray coat), the song seems initially not to 
speak to me – that is, the first line suggests that the singer sees what I cannot and what no 
listener ever could, as though in some inner vision (unless, of course, one believes the story 
of John Woodcock Graves, the song’s author: that “John Peel” was written sometime in the 
1820s on the night before a hunt with Peel, and then first sung to the man himself the next 
morning).105  Yet as the stanza progresses and Peel moves out of view, receding into the “far, 
far away” of the third line, it becomes apparent that what is at stake is in fact familiarity, 
acquaintance.  This almost maudlin transmutation of vanished sight into the fullness of 
memory is, of course, what makes it so strange to imagine the song as anything other than 
elegy – and it is also what allows me to say yes to the song, because it in fact acquaints me 
with a wealth of representative details: the names of Peel’s dogs (“the real names of the 
hounds which Peel in his old age said were the very best,” Graves assures his reader in a 
note [417]); a modicum of hunting vocabulary (drag, chase, view, death); or, in other verses, 
                                                          
103 John Woodcock Graves, “D’Ye Ken John Peel?” in Songs and Ballads of Cumberland, ed. Sidney 
Gilpin (Carlisle: Coward, 1865), 416-7.  “Sidney Gilpin, of Derwent Cottage” was the assumed name 
of the book’s publisher, George Coward. 
 
104 In Mrs Henry S. Mackarness, The Young Lady’s Book: A Manual of Amusements, Exercises, Studies, and 
Pursuits (London: Routledge, 1888), 278-80.  For more on “The Muffin-Man” and the class of 
counting games to which it belongs, see Iona and Peter Opie, The Singing Game (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1985).  Opie and Opie date the song to sometime before 1820 (380).  
 
105 “An Autobiographical Fragment,” in Songs and Ballads of Cumberland, 414. 
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an array of local place names (Low Denton-holme, Scratchmere Scar) and a rider’s technical 
vocabulary for the built landscape (“I’ve follow’d John Peel both often and far / O’er the 
rasper-fence and the gate and the bar”).  For a particular listener, these may be deeply 
familiar things that the song merely brings to mind – and quite possibly were, for the song’s 
initial hearers in Carlisle, where the song was first published, or Cockermouth, where Groves 
lived as a child.  But – and this is the song’s success – they also become immediately familiar 
to a listener as a stock of referents, of common experience, that are firmly rooted enough in 
place to be safely exported, as the song’s first editor says, to “wherever English hunters have 
penetrated in the world” (416).    
The Victorian child, meanwhile, addresses the “you” as a test: do you have this 
knowledge, do you know of this muffin man in Drury Lane?  But of course the right answer 
is not “Why yes,” I know of this or that detail about the muffin man, but rather the sung 
“Yes, I know…”  What I “know” here is not a matter of experience, or of knowledge of the 
world; this question does not refer to any particular place or way of life. The pleasure of this 
game comes about when I, the hearer, become the singer – something that is made possible 
simply by my having heard the song before and thus knowing the abstract rules of the game.  
I am addressed effectively as “you,” then, not because of an experience I have had outside 
the song (of muffin-buying), or because I have learned about those details from the song 
itself, but rather because of my familiarity with the structure of this song.  If I know the song, 
I know that the question about the muffin man, the person, is in fact a question about “The 
Muffin Man,” the song which I now know; the apparently specifying “who lives in Drury 
Lane” – so clunkily formulaic in melody – is not meant to recall a specific man (whom I may 
or may not know), but is instead to be enjoyed sensuously (as metrically and melodically 
necessary).  The voice here takes on aspects of a game – becomes a kind of self-enclosed 
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aesthetic function – because it appears to refer when it does not, or rather refers only to 
itself.  Importantly, it is precisely this nonreferential game-character that allows the song to 
teach something “new.”  Homi Bhabha writes that the nation makes itself up in a tension 
between the “people as an a priori historical presence” and as “the people constructed in the 
performance of narrative” – between the pedagogical and the performative.106  These two 
songs define a similar opposition, between two ways of hailing a “you”: where “D’Ye Ken 
John Peel” both relies upon and forges a commonality between singer and audience based 
upon the details of a way of life, “Do You Know the Muffin Man” creates a commonality 
based around the event of the song itself.107   
 So, then: “Kennst du das Land?”  It depends, we might say, on whether or not 
Mignon is asking a question like “Do you know the muffin man,” or one like “D’Ye Ken 
John Peel” – whether her song gives me knowledge of something, or happens of itself; 
whether her words are present in themselves or allude to absent things.  The difficulty 
“Kennst du das Land” presents, however, is that it seems to alternate unstably between these 
two models of hailing a “you.”  Mignon sings of a class of objects I do know (e.g., the old 
dragon, familiar from many a Lutheran hymn108); of a class of objects I know that I don’t 
know (e.g., the lemon tree); and of a class of objects that are so specific and strange that I 
could only be hearing about them for the first time now (e.g., the neologism “Wolkensteg,” 
or “cloud bridge”: how could I possibly be asked whether I know this?).   The question 
                                                          
106 Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation,” in The Location 
of Culture, new ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 211. 
 
107 On the self-enclosed nature of games and the connection between games and the aesthetic, the 
classic texts are Huizinga’s Homo Ludens and Caillois’s Man, Play, and Games.  Huizinga, particularly, 
stresses the role of play in the formation of social groupings.   
 
108 At least seven such hymns, for example, can be found in Johann Crüger’s seventeenth-century 
hymnal Praxis Pietatis Melica – most famously the one beginning “Trotz dem alten drachen,” set in J.S. 
Bach’s Jesu, meine freude. 
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Mignon asks is therefore an impossible one – I do know, because I know her song; I don’t 
know, because I only know her song.  
 
“Kennst du das Land” in the rhetorical classroom 
This ambiguity about the status of the song’s words, the way they seem to both 
supply familiarity and refer to it, unfolds its implications in a rather unlikely place: a century’s 
worth of the song’s appearance as an example in German rhetorical textbooks.  Unlikely, 
because Goethe is often read as the key figure through which German poetry “freed itself 
from the rules of ancient rhetoric,” putting in their place the author as horizon of poetic 
interpretation.109  Yet if we would like to attend to the meaning of “Kennst du das Land” – 
and of its proliferation throughout the nineteenth century – it makes a great deal of sense to 
examine rhetorical textbooks: in the pages of these textbooks, writers make explicit attempts 
to make sense of the poem, or a part of it, under the conditions of mass reproduction, and 
to both explain the poem’s power and capitalize on it for pedagogic purposes.   
There is an interesting and rather technical controversy over “Kennst du das Land” 
in these manuals: the poem is very commonly cited as an example, but to teach two quite 
different figures. On the one hand, the song combines with Friedrich von Matthisson’s 
“Elysium” in the early decades of the century to become the standard way of teaching 
periphrasis.  Around 1800, periphrastic style was widely understood as belonging to ancient 
                                                          
109 Klaus L. Berghahn, “From Classicist to Classical Literary Criticism, 1730-1806,” trans. John R. 
Blazek, in A History of German Literary Criticism, 1730-1980, ed. Peter Uwe Hohendahl (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1988), 29.  Certainly this is the explicit aim of the oft-quoted line from Poetry 
and Truth: “All, therefore, that has been confessed by me, consists of fragments of a great 
confession.” See also Sandra Richter, A History of Poetics: German Scholarly Aesthetics and Poetics in 
International Context, 1770-1960 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 11.  This is also the point of much 
of Friedrich Kittler’s reading of Faust as the creation of poetry via a turning away from the book, in 
Discourse Networks, 1800/1900, trans. Michael Metter with Chris Cullens (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1990).    
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ballad and to epic (as in Scott’s 1805 essay on the authenticity of Ossian).110  Apart from its 
association with the sublimity of “the poetry of a rude people,” as Scott put it (447), 
periphrasis is also a sublime figure in Longinus; Quintilian discusses it as useful for the 
concealment of “something which would be indecent, if expressed in so many words.”111  
Indeed, as an anti-representational trope of absence or veiling, periphrasis can be seen as a 
kind of central term in discussions of the sublime.  This is particularly the case for 
modernists such as Walter Benjamin, who writes of the sublime in his essay on Elective 
Affinities in terms seemingly borrowed from Quintilian’s account of periphrasis, as a 
relationship between viewer and object that is possible only where the opposition of 
nakedness and veiling pertains.  In Benjamin’s account, the sublime is thus “a work beyond 
all images [Gebilden],” or a naked body whose “majesty” can be perceived only by not looking 
at it.  The sublime asks us both to look and not to look beneath (and here Benjamin quotes a 
letter of Goethe’s) “the transparent and opaque veil… to the form truly intended.”112   
When Karl Pölitz described periphrasis in 1825 as a way of “representing an object 
without its name, according to its characteristics,” he turned to Matthisson and to Mignon: 
“So Matthisson describes Elysium without naming it in the poem, and so Goethe Italy in his 
famous poem: Kennst du das Land.”113 “Elysium” is in many ways the more straightforward 
                                                          
110 “Report of the Committee of the Highland Society of Scotland,” in Edinburgh Review 6:12 (Jul 
1805): 429-462. 
 
111 Institutio Oratoria, vol. 3, in the Loeb Classical Library, trans. H.E. Butler (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard UP, 1922), 335 (VIII.6.59). 
 
112 “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” trans. Stanley Corngold, in Selected Writings vol. 1, ed. Marcus 
Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard, 1996), 351-2.  For clarity, I 
have altered Corngold’s translation of Gebilden (from “creations” to “images”).  Benjamin goes on in 
the essay to identify Mignon, Ottilie, and Faust’s Helena as such figures of veiled sublimity. 
 
113 Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, Das Gesammtgebiet der teutschen Sprache, vol. 1 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 
1825), 455. I found the capacious bibliographies in Richter’s History of Poetics to be of great assistance 
in fixing the historical data of the narrative I tell in this section. 
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example for textbook purposes – after all, the poem names in its title what it indirectly 
describes.114  Rhetoricians after Pölitz seem sensitive to this: they typically only refer to 
“Elysium” in a definition of the trope, but will quote Goethe’s first two or first four lines, 
leaving the identification of the place in question (and thus the confirmation of the concept) 
up to the eager student: periphrasis as time-bound process (now I see…).115  “Kennst du das 
Land” was thus not merely a common example but a good one: Johann Georg Beilhack’s 
1835 Lehrbuch der Deutschen Stylistik found the poem’s first four lines to be a “most excellent 
periphrasis,” defining the trope as that “through which the topic itself is not mentioned, but 
becomes recognizable through enumeration of its features.”116  C. F. Falkmann’s Praktische 
Rhetorik made the same enthusiastic classification in 1831 (“a beautiful periphrasis”), defining 
the figure as the “description of an object… without naming it.”117   
As the century progresses, however, the handbooks’ enthusiasm declines; the 
“beautiful” and “excellent” periphrasis of the 1830s has become, in Karl Becker’s 1850 
Lehrbuch des deutschen Stiles, a pragmatic way of overcoming conditions in which a word has 
become commonplace by overuse – of saving the everyday for poetry by obscuring it.118  
And in 1892, Karl Tumlirz supplies in his Lehre von den Tropen und Figuren a standard 
definition of the figure – the circumlocution of a topic through identifying it with an 
associated attribute – but arrives at “Kennst du das Land” in a particularly interesting way.  
                                                          
114 The poem was indeed printed under that title from the 1790s; “Kennst du das Land,” to my 
knowledge, has never been printed under “Italien.”  
 
115 See, for example, Karl Becker’s Lehrbuch des deutschen Stiles (Frankfurt: Rettembeil, 1850), 81, or 
C.H. Reichardt’s Logik, Stilistik und Rhetorik, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Hahn, 1877), 158.   
 
116 Lehrbuch der Deutschen Stylistik für Studienschulen und Gymnasien, 2nd edition (Munich: Joseph Lindauer, 
1835), 175. 
 
117 Praktische Rhetorik, 2nd  ed. (Hannover: Hahn, 1831), 184.  
 
118 Becker, 81.  
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Tumlirz clarifies that the attribute named need not necessarily be an important one, but 
merely should be “regularly associated with the topic in our minds”; he continues that “for 
us Italy is chiefly the country from which we obtain Südfrüchte [“southern” or tropical fruits]; 
hence we understand Goethe immediately when he has Mignon say, ‘Kennst du das 
Land…’”119  A hundred years of reading the novel  (and seventy years of rhetorical 
exemplification) have transformed what was once a “beautiful periphrasis” – an example that 
the student reader could be invited into figuring out for himself – into a dead one.  Tumlirz 
seems to say, along with Donald Davidson, that “there is nothing left to notice” about these 
lemons and oranges, as there is nothing to notice in bottles having mouths.  If Italy is “for 
us” where lemons come from, then Mignon’s line simply refers us to what we already know 
Italy is.120  
Yet if the phrase “das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn” was dying as a periphrasis – 
becoming an ever more “immediate” association with the missing name “Italy” – it was, 
simultaneously and paradoxically, becoming less obviously a periphrasis for Italy at all.   
Hermann Menge’s Repetitorium der lateinischen Grammatik und Stilistik, first published in 1871, 
places Goethe’s line at the end of a set of examples, with the note “(=Italien?).”121 Most 
interestingly, rhetoricians in the second half of the century began to edge away entirely from 
the classification of the phrase that had dominated earlier.  Thus, Gustav Brugier’s 
                                                          
119 Die Lehre von den Tropen und Figuren nebst einer kurzgefassten deutschen Metrik, 3rd edition (Prague: 
Dominicus, 1892), 31-2. 
 
120 Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1984), 252.  Davidson observes that in metaphor at least that “novelty is not the issue”; 
repeated exposure cannot kill a metaphor, in his view, but instead “the element of novelty or surprise 
in a metaphor is a built-in aesthetic feature we can experience again and again, like the surprise in 
Haydn’s Symphony No. 94” (252-3).  Periphrasis in these handbooks, however, seems to be 
imagined precisely as a kind of miniature narrative of discovery, and thus subject to death by 
repetition. 
 
121 Repetitorium der lateinischen Syntax und Stilistik, 7th edition (Wolfenbüttel: Zwiβler, 1900), 380. 
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discussion of the poem in his Geschichte der deutschen National-Literatur, first published in 1865, 
places “Kennst du das Land” not under periphrasis but rather under “distribution or 
individuation” – terms of rhetorical division, that is, used to refer to the process of 
describing a thing “in its constituent features.”122  This trope, Brugier writes, is easily 
confused with periphrasis, but in fact has a quite different purpose; the difference between 
the poet who lists the features of an object to “individualize” rather than as a way of 
referring to an unmentioned topic is that the former is attempting something far closer to 
hypotyposis: the poet who individuates does not refer indirectly to a single absent name, but 
instead simply amplifies an idea by presenting each feature “vividly and clearly.”123  Longinus 
excluded tropes of amplification from the sublimity of periphrasis for precisely this reason: 
sublimity “depends on elevation, whereas amplification involves extension; sublimity exists 
often in a single thought, amplification cannot exist without a certain quantity and 
superfluity.”124  What is at stake in Brugier’s reclassification of the lines, in other words, is 
whether the blooming lemon tree and the golden orange are each “vividly” present in 
Mignon’s lines, or disappear as objects in their own right in the process of becoming features 
of the name that they simultaneously suggest and obscure: Italy.  Paul Heinze and Rudolf 
Goette emphasize this further in 1891, in the section of their Deutsche Poetik devoted to 
classical rhetoric, calling the poem a “prime example of distribution”: what is important 
about “Kennst du das Land” in their account is not the absence of a name, but rather the 
“unfurling” (entfalten) of a set of “vivid images” for a “purely intellectual concept”: “the 
                                                          
122 For a contemporary gloss of Distribution, see Otto Lange, Deutsche poetik, 5th edition (Berlin: 
Gärtner, 1885), 13. 
 
123 G. Brugier, Geschichte der deutschen National-Litteratur, 10th edition (Freiburg: Herder, 1898), xlv. 
 
124 Longinus, “On Sublimity,” trans. D.A. Russell, in Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in 
New Translations, ed. Russell and M. Winterbottom (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1972), 474.  
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embodiment of what is less graphic [die Verkörperung des minder Anschaulichen] is thus the real 
purpose here.”125   
A century of reading the rhetoric of “Kennst du das Land” thus produces two 
narratives.  Periphrastic reading of the song, which treats the words as a veil, begins a 
process that inevitably lifts that veil as repeated reading-through kills the trope.  The song, 
read this way, becomes an attempt to obscure knowledge, or indeed a rather debased riddle – 
as it quite literally did in various parodic reformulations.  Thus, for example, two 
propagandistic Masonic songs of the 1860s begin with Mignon’s questions (“Do you know it 
well?”; “Do you know the land?”) but, after enumerating a set of characteristics (“it” is the 
most faithful heart of all, which sacrifices itself in duty; the “land” is where the wise scepter 
reigns and men live in harmony), then quickly proceed to the satisfaction of answers (it is the 
mother’s heart!; it is the fertile land of Prussia!).126  Sublimity exhausts itself when exposed to 
knowledge; reading “Kennst du das Land” as periphrasis is itself a miniature version of the 
Mignon problem as a whole.  Yet the collapse of the sublime does not exhaust the poem as a 
rhetorical example, but instead causes rhetoricians to re-describe it: lemons and oranges are 
no longer a way of making what is not mentioned recognizable, as Beilhack put it, but are 
rather present in the poem.  In Heinze and Goette’s language of Verkörperung, we are quite 
far away from the chastity of the Benjaminian sublime: the words no longer serve as a 
“transparent and opaque veil” over a body, but instead are the incarnation themselves. 
   
  
                                                          
125 Deutsche Poetik (Dresden: Heinze, 1891), 106-7. 
 
126 In Liederbuch für die Große Landes-Loge (Berlin, 1869), 264 and 39.  Gerhart Hoffmeister collects a 
number of parodies, not including these, in “Mignon-Parodien: von Falk bis Artmann (1797-1975),” 
in Goethes Mignon und ihre Schwestern, ed. Hoffmeister. 
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Repetition and allusion in the eighteenth-century musical insert 
As I have been suggesting, “Kennst du das Land” sets up a deliberate tension 
between two versions of the song’s addressee – two ways in which the song might speak to 
me: as the reader who is called into being by the song, and as an actually existing reader who 
exists apart from the moment of reading. The first edition of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship 
raises questions about the relationship between the reader of the text and her social existence 
in a still more direct way, by actually providing for its readers a way to allow Mignon’s song 
to become installed in real, social space.  In that edition, all of Mignon’s songs, and those of 
the Harper, were set to music by Johann Friedrich Reichardt, and inserted as foldout sheets:  
 
Fig. 2. Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (Berlin: Unger, 1795), opening of the second volume. 
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The range and function of musical inserts into eighteenth-century narrative is, as Tom 
Keymer observes, relatively uncharted territory.127  What discussions of the topic do exist 
tend to treat only single instances exclusively, and are thus likely to find each one to be a 
textual curiosity of uncertain use, surprising the reader with the absolutely new.  On the one 
hand, these discussions are surely mostly right: each instance of musical insertion into a book 
of print narrative is a new thing, a self-conscious and attention-grabbing foray across the 
boundary of medium and into a different mode of reading, one with different rules.  Yet 
some attempt at generalization, both theoretical and historical, seems in order – particularly 
because the musical insert proves to have been, for eighteenth-century writers, a complexly 
interesting tool through which they could not only notice the problems raised in Mignon’s 
song, that the page asks me to both be its reader and myself, but make use of that ambiguity 
for a range of effects. 
 The only familiar case is that of Clarissa, in whose fiftieth letter Richardson inserts a 
fold-out sheet of Elizabeth Carter’s “Ode to Wisdom.”  As a number of critics have recently 
noted, the insertion here takes full advantage of the novel’s documentary fiction: in 
December of 1747, when the first two volumes of Clarissa were published, Carter’s poem 
circulated widely in manuscript copies – but, by Carter’s instruction, had never been 
published.128  When Clarissa refers to the poem, assuming that Anna Howe has already read 
it, she refers to a poem that Richardson’s readers, too, had likely read or heard read aloud: 
                                                          
127 See Tom Keymer, “William Toldervy and Smart’s A Translation of the Psalms of David,” in The Review 
of English Literature, New Series 54:213 (2003), 52-66. 
 
128 I have benefited particularly from Steven R. Price, “The Autograph Manuscript in Print: Samuel 
Richardson’s Type Font Manipulation in Clarissa,“ in Illuminating Letters: Typography and Literary 
Interpretation, ed. Paul C. Gutjahr and Megan L. Benton (Amherst: University of Mass. P, 2001); 
Janine Barchas, Graphic Design, Print Culture, and the Eighteenth-Century Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2003); and Thomas McGeary, “Clarissa Harlowe’s ‘Ode to Wisdom’: Composition, Publishing 
History, and the Semiotics of Printed Music,” in Eighteenth-Century Fiction 24:3 (Spring 2012), 431-458.  
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I have been forced to try to compose my angry passions at my harpsichord; having 
first shut close my doors and windows, that I might not be heard below.  As I was 
closing the shutters of the windows, the distant whooting of the bird of Minerva as 
from the often-visited woodhouse gave the subject in that charming Ode to 
Wisdom, which does honour to our sex, as it was written by one of it.  I made an 
essay, a week ago, to set the three last stanzas of it, as not unsuitable to my unhappy 
situation; and after I had re-perused the ode, those three were my lesson. 
Clarissa encloses the fourteen-stanza poem and, then, her setting of it (fig. 3 below).  Before 
these pages, however, the letter itself ends with Clarissa’s sense that she “has not been quite 
unhappy” in her composition, adding that “If it obtain your approbation, I shall be out of 
doubt: and should be still more assured could I hear it tried by your voice and by your 
finger” (231). 
 
Fig.3: Clarissa’s setting of the “Ode to Wisdom,” in the second volume of Clarissa (1748).  
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Virtually everything Richardson as author-printer does at this moment aims to simulate the 
experience of reading assembled manuscripts rather than a bound volume: Richardson’s 
font, printed via an expensive copperplate process, stands in for Clarissa’s handwriting, while 
the surprise of the music itself create a moment of pleasurable recognition (the music 
Clarissa writes about is actually here!).129  And this pleasurable surprise is, in turn, echoed in 
the fold-out format, which requires the reader to engage in a self-conscious handling of the 
book, of the kind Diderot imagines were he to find, in the corner of a room, “higgledy-
piggledy, the letters of Clarissa and Pamela”: here, the fevered pleasure of arranging, of 
handling the page, is part of absorption in the narrative.130   
 But all this, of course, is precisely not what is happening when we open the second 
volume of Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre and find music for “Kennst du das Land” printed there.  
Clarissa explicitly supplies the reader with a role to play: we can stand in for Anna Howe, 
providing Clarissa, by our playing of her song, with our approbation, in a kind of 
paradigmatic case of sentimental reading.  But what happens when I play and sing, without 
being able to slot into a role of this kind?  What happens when I move from the reading of a 
poem, to the reading of a score on the same page? 
This is, in part, a theoretical question about the rules by which I read music. The 
nature of the musical score – its resemblance to and difference from other kinds of 
meaningful marks on a page – has been much debated of late, often subsumed into the 
larger controversy over Nelson Goodman’s claims about the nature of the musical work in 
                                                          
129 On the copperplate process, see especially Price, 117.  I depart here from Janine Barchas’s reading 
of this moment; Barchas claims – for reasons that seem to me not entirely clear – that this page, 
“despite its mimetic conceit and musical conventionality, aligns the novel not with the private epistle 
or even the epistolary novel but with the protean variety of contemporary print culture” (100). 
 
130 On “handling,” see Leah Price, How to Do Things With Books in Victorian Britain (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2012). 
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Languages of Art (that is, that a musical performance exists as the Peircean token of its type, 
the score).131  For the purposes of the discussion here, however, Theodor Adorno’s more 
focused (though still elusive) comments on the distinction between musical notation and 
language are more to the point: 
To interpret language means to understand language; to interpret music means to 
make music… [Musical notation] demands that it be imitated, not decoded.  It is 
only in mimetic practice – which may, of course, be sublimated into unspoken 
imagination in the manner of reading to oneself – that music discloses itself, never to 
a consideration that interprets it independent of the act of execution.  If one wished 
to compare an act in the signifying languages with the musical act, it would more 
likely be the transcription of a text than its comprehension as signification.132  
The musical score, for Adorno, is a set of rules for use, leading the reader to an activity 
rather than an understanding: faced with a score, inserted into a sheet of text, I “decode” the 
latter, while I “imitate” or “execute” the former.  To be clear, this distinction has nothing to 
do with imitations involved in sympathetic reading: a reader responding to Rousseau’s Julie 
may well have “felt all the feelings expressed in those letters become personified in [him] 
while reading them,” but surely that reader still decoded rather than imitated the marks he 
                                                          
131 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1968), and, for a response to Goodman, Lydia Goehr’s call for the historicization of the work 
concept in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Clarendon: Oxford, 1992).  Among musicologists, 
a major methodological development of the 1980s and 90s that continues to have widespread 
influence today was the turn towards semiotics as a way of thinking through longstanding problems 
of conceiving musical meaning; the score has tended to come under discussion as a subcategory of 
this problem.  Jean-Jacques Nattiez takes a Peircean look at the score in Music and Discourse: Toward a 
Semiology of Music, trans. Carolyn Abbaté (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990). Kofi Agawu adopts a more 
Saussurean line of thinking in Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1991).  
 
132 “Music, Language, and Composition,” trans. Susan H. Gillespie, in Essays on Music, ed. Richard 
Leppert (Berkeley: U of California P, 2002), 115.  See also Max Paddison, “Mimesis and the 
Aesthetics of Musical Expression,” in Music Analysis 29 (2010), 126-148. 
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found on the page.133  Rather, what Adorno has in mind by describing musical notation as 
demanding imitation is something like what Barthes calls “the operable” – the claim that 
written music is precisely what (as Barthes claims) novelistic realism never could be: a “code 
of execution.”134    
The conceptual distinction between imitation and decoding that Adorno makes by 
referring to the musical “mimetic practice” seems to be twofold:  firstly, musical reading, as 
“mimetic,” is somehow like-for-like – when I interpret the musical score, I end up with 
music, while when I interpret language I end up with something that isn’t language but an 
“understanding” of it; “Hence,” Adorno writes, “the idea of interpretation belongs to music 
essentially and is not identical to it” (115).  Secondly, the outcome of musical reading is an 
activity that takes place in time – thus its kinship to transcription rather than comprehension.  
One must make an exception here, of course, for the special instance of what Leo Treitler 
calls “read[ing] a score for study” – in which condition “we do not necessarily reproduce in 
our minds the sounds of music,” but instead perceive “the structure of the music” – as 
when, for example, I read the score of Mahler’s Seventh, but instead of internally “hearing” 
or “following” the music, instead notice or recognize that the same series of intervals 
appears first in the clarinet, and then in the cello eighteen bars later, etc. 135  Otherwise, 
however, in reading music I am, as Jerrold Levinson argues, caught up in what he calls 
“flow,” the movement from one moment to the next.  As Adorno points out, this imitation 
need not be physical; even in the privacy of “silent” musical reading I am caught in what 
Levinson calls an interior “seconding” of the score: this interior following in time is the 
                                                          
133 In Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre (New York: Vintage, 1985), 247. 
 
134 Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 80.  I think Nicholas 
Dames for pointing me to this reference. 
 
135 “The Early History of Music Writing in the West,” in JAMSA 35:2 (1982), 237-279, at 242.  
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content of musical interpretation; as Levinson writes, musical interpretation – unlike the 
interpretation of language – does not contain a moment of reflection or abstraction as a part 
of “basic understanding.”136   Assuming I have the necessary competence, then, when I 
encounter a musical score within a narrative, I move from reading as understanding 
(decoding, in a way fundamentally free from time, language into understanding) to reading as 
an imitation.137 
And this is precisely how eighteenth-century print narratives tended to deploy the 
musical insert: as a way of playing on the relationship between the present of reading-as-
reference and the absence of an original that the reader-as-music-maker imitates.  To be clear, 
this practice was an almost entirely eighteenth-century one: as Margaret Mahony Stoljar 
notes, in her study of Sturm and Drang song, that the insertion of music into narrative of 
various forms – not only in Germany, but in Western Europe – was extremely rare before 
the middle of the eighteenth century (mostly because of prohibitive cost), and essentially 
abandoned after 1810.138  The dates, of course, are, if nothing else, suggestive: Austen and 
                                                          
136 Levinson, Music in the Moment (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), 23-4.  
 
137 Some recent accounts of novel-reading – and here I am thinking in particular of Elaine Scarry’s 
convincing discussion of “dreaming by the book” – complicate this opposition. In Scarry’s view, the 
kind of precise description practiced by Proust and others involves a temporal following of the kind 
Adorno has in mind; and Scarry’s translation of a description in Hardy into a series of imperatives 
closely tracks, in some ways, Adorno’s discussion of the musical score as requiring “acts of 
execution” rather than understanding.  See Scarry, Dreaming by the Book (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
2001).  At a minimum, Scarry suggests that some language-reading is more act-like than other 
language-reading; Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship mostly lacks the kind of description Scarry is 
interested in, and indeed the quick succession of discrete images in “Kennst du das Land” seems 
about as far from Proust as one could get. 
 
138 Margaret Mahony Stoljar, Poetry and Song in Late Eighteenth Century Germany: A Study in the Musical 
Sturm und Drang (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 33-35. 
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Scott came of age in decades in which novels might have songs printed in them; their own 
novels, however, were published in decades when they virtually never did.139  
As Stoljar and other critics focused primarily on the German case have 
demonstrated, the practice grows out of the printing of musical drama – out of the craze for 
ballad-operas and Singspiele beginning in the 1730s. If readers – and here, supplementing 
Stoljar’s account, I focus on the English scene – came across music while reading a printed 
narrative, that narrative was most likely to be one of the many volumes of Covent Garden 
ballad-operas, comedies, and farces produced and printed, mostly by John Watts, in the 
1730s, in the aftermath of the stunning success of the Beggar’s Opera.  Watts began his run of 
musical editions printing the music from copper plates, but quickly switched to a cheaper 
process of printing from wood-blocks, which, as L.J. Morrissey notes, allowed for the 
placement of music directly alongside its lyrics, and in its proper place within a scene, thus 
permitting “the reader to read the music and then mentally [or, of course, actually] set the 
lyrics to it.”140  These editions circulated widely, serving as advertisement and vicarious 
experience for those who had never seen the play in question, and as “mnemonic prompts to 
London’s favorite farces,” as Berta Joncus puts it, for those who had.141  Making public 
music available in private, the ballad opera edition was a kind of forerunner of that central 
and still overlooked nineteenth-century form of bourgeois musical experience, the two- or 
four-hand piano reduction of operatic and symphonic scores – which, as Richard Leppert 
                                                          
139 The few exceptions are mostly either moments in which novels adopt an ethnographic pose, as in 
George Washington Cable’s The Grandissimes, or explicitly self-conscious allusions to eighteenth-
century practice, as in Balzac’s Modeste Mignon. See George Washington Cable, The Grandissimes: A 
Story of Creole Life (New York: Sagamore, 1957), and Balzac, Modeste Mignon, ed. Maurice Regard, in La 
Comédie humaine, vol. 1, Études de moeurs: scènes de la vie privée (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).   
 
140 Morrissey, “Henry Fielding and the Ballad Opera,” in Eighteenth-Century Studies 4 (1971), 382-402.  
 
141 Berta Joncus, “Handel at Drury Lane: Ballad Opera and the Production of Kitty Clive,” in JRMA 
131:2 (2006), 179-226. 
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writes, simultaneously allow for the repetition of a symphony or opera within the home, 
while at the same time “preserving allusion to the communal circumstances upon which the 
music depends.”142 
When music appeared in print non-dramatic narrative, it tended to maintain that 
same structure, at once alluding to an absent public occasion and repeating it.  The dominant 
form of music in non-dramatic narrative was the short musical interlude without words.  
John Kidgell’s satiric novel The Card, for example, prints in its second volume the Minuet 
that opened a ball and “was thus danced by [the] brilliant Assembly”; by including it, the 
novel enables the reader to hear the music too.143  The musical score inserted into travel 
narratives forms an ethnographic variation of this basic class: Georg Forster’s record of his 
journey with Cook, for example, includes a wordless tune heard in Tahiti at the point at the 
narrative in which the narrator hears it sung, an insertion that appeals both to repetition 
(what I heard you can hear) and to the creation of an enduring record (the tune is a “little 
specimen”).144  Beyond repetition, however, inserted music served as a self-conscious 
interruption in reading – a true interlude.  So, in his 1762 Something New, a kind of 
philosophical miscellany modeled after Shaftesbury but stitched into semi-narrative form, 
Richard Griffith periodically supplies  brief keyboard pieces  as deliberate narrative 
punctuation.  He introduces the first, inserted into chapter 33, “A Voluntary,” by means of a 
                                                          
142 “‘Four Hands, Three Hearts’: A Commentary,” in Cultural Critique 60 (2005), 5-22.  Leppert is 
glossing Adorno’s short and suggestive essay-memoir “Four Hands, Once Again,” trans. Jonathan 
Wipplinger, in Cultural Critique 60 (Spring 2005), 1-4.   
 
143 John Kidgell, The Card, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London: Newbery, 1760), 295-6. 
 
144 A Voyage Round the World, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: White, 1777), 42. 
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comparison: “After a Sermon generally follows a Voluntary on the Organ; for fear, I  
suppose, that the discourse might make too great an impression on the congregation.”145   
From this range of examples, which make up the bulk of eighteenth century practice, 
it is possible to generalize. In both the Covent Garden song, printed on the page, and the 
instrumental interlude, the inserted musical score serves two overlapping functions: firstly, 
the score interrupts the time of reading – which is only to say the obvious, that while I am 
reading music, whether to myself or by performing it, I am doing something other than 
reading text.  Like the Broadway musical before Oklahoma!, the eighteenth century musical 
insert does not adhere to what D.A. Miller calls the tedium of “narrative naturalism”: that is, 
these books never unfold their narrative in song.146  Secondly, the score offers a repetition of 
prior – chiefly public – experience, allowing readers the opportunity to recreate that 
experience in their homes, while simultaneously referring to a public original.  Like Mignon’s 
questions, the musical insert plays upon the interrelationship of presence and absence in 
reading: precisely where the page is most present to me, where it requires “acts of execution” 
of me in order to be read, it is also most deliberately allusive to the communal, commercial 
performance that I would only recreate. 
It is in a third category of musical insert – the song, or brief portion of song, placed 
within non-dramatic narrative – that this basic structure undergoes self-reflexive variations.  
Full-length songs, like Mignon’s, are extremely rare – in the four hundred literary works with 
musical inserts listed in Eighteenth Century Collections Online, for example, there are only 
three instances of this kind.  More commonly, writers and printers deployed a very brief 
phrase of music – often merely a few notes – next to a few words of text, activating the 
                                                          
145 Something New, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: Dilly, 1762), 242. 
 
146 Miller, Place For Us: Essay on the Broadway Musical (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1998), 2. 
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reader’s memory of a tune so that it operated alongside the words.  A variety of effects – 
especially comic ones – were possible in such moments, as such brief snippets allowed for 
reading-as-understanding and reading-as-execution to collide on the page .  I supply a single 
example here, a page from the parodic “Canterbury Tale” of John Wolcot (“Peter Pindar”), 
















Fig. 4: “Peter Pindar” [John Wolcot], “A 
Canterbury Tale,” in The Works of Peter Pindar, 
new  edition (3 vols.), vol. 3 (Dublin: 




In Wolcot’s poem, as the two travelers  prepare to toast the king before they take their leave 
of each other, the page provides the first three notes of “God Save the King.”  The 
juxtaposition immediately sets the reader’s memory of the tune running – but then leaves the 
reader holding the bag, as it were, alone with a song she never asked for.  By replacing 
“George our King” with the (rhyming) command to sing (itself sung or spoken?), Wolcot 
plays on the extreme, and politically charged form of any score’s “demand for imitation” 
found in the coercive force of anthems: to command playing in the head.    
 Wolcot’s poem – or other similar cases, such as the third chapter of John Carr’s 
spurious second volume of Tristram Shandy147 – makes a kind of game out of what it means to 
read.  The page represents something absent to me: I understand an exchange taking place 
between two travelers.  At the same time, the page enforces an imitation on me: I do what it 
says; I sing along with the national anthem; I execute the page as a set of instructions.  What is 
striking about “Kennst du das Land” in this context, then, is that while it visibly participates 
in this same reflection on reading as an embodied practice, it does so without citation (to a 
tune that I already know; to a social scene of reception which can be authenticated by a 
visible nod towards the social circulation of texts).  It is this particular force of Mignon’s 
questions, then, that is lost in the opposition between re-readings, de- and re-mystified, that 
is set up in the closing book of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship.   
 
Forgetting Mignon  
 What happens to Mignon?  She dies, and in death is transformed into an image – her 
body wrapped in “its angel costume,” changed into a “semblance of life,” a “beauteous 
image of the past” (353-4).  Paul de Man famously, and puzzlingly, claims that “[d]eath is a 
                                                          
147 John Carr, Tristram Shandy (London: [n.p.], 1760). 
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displaced name for a linguistic predicament,” its silence that of language itself, “mute as 
pictures are mute.”148  Marc Redfield makes a similar claim about Mignon’s death and 
subsequent aestheticization: that in giving her meaning, the novel “divert[s] attention from 
the linguistic predicament” she “personifie[s],” namely that Bildung is not an autotelic 
procedure but instead “depends on language’s rhetorical power to generate effects.”149  I 
have been making a similar claim here, except that I have a particular set of effects in mind – 
namely, that in re-classifying “Kennst du das Land” as a document, the novel not only 
generates “the reader,” but creates that reader in the place of one who, confronted with 
songs, reflects on his particularity as this reader.   
One might object that – precisely to the extent that it is positivistic – this argument 
requires a historical basis that it cannot meet, particularly as I have repeatedly turned to the 
first edition of the novel which, admittedly, almost no one read.150  There is at least a single 
trace of a contemporary reading of this edition, in a letter of Karl Morgenstern’s: 
Where does a song breathe such intimate longing as Mignon’s song on the zither at 
the beginning of the second volume, whose sweetness and richness of feeling has 
been further elevated by Reichardt’s soulful composition.  I know it by heart:  
     Know you the land?  
     etc.151 
                                                          
148 Paul de Man, “Autobiography As De-Facement,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1984), 80-1. 
 
149 Redfield, Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
UP, 1996), 73. 
150 Goethe and Reichardt fell out largely over the latter’s continued commitment to republican ideals; 
in June of 1796 Goethe writes to Schiller that he would prefer to take the Mignon songs back from 
Reichardt, and allow Unger to instead give the song to Carl Zelter.  See Goethe to Schiller, 22 June 
1796, in Correspondence between Goethe and Schiller, 115. 
 
151 In Klaus F. Gille ed., Goethes Wilhelm Meister: Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der Lehr- und Wanderjahre 
(Königstein: Athenäum, 1979), 15; my translation.  The emphasis is original. 
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This is a rather oddly unambitious display of memory – the song contracts to a single 
question, “etc.”  Morgenstern preserves in it, however, what I have been reading as the 
song’s essential gesture, the question, and indeed suggestively repeats it to his interlocutor 
(do you know the land, but also: do you know this song?).  Yet when Morgenstern, twenty-
five years later, revisits the novel in order to define the Bildungsroman, he seems to have 
forgotten the song entirely and the question it asks.  Instead, Morgenstern writes that the 
novel by definition possesses an audience that reads silently, rather than an audience that 
sings and listens, and a readership that knows precisely what it is: “us Germans,” in our 
development towards the “purely human.”152  Mignon’s song – its reflection on the 
discordance between myself as a reader and “the reader” – seems to have left precisely no 
effect on this statement of novel theory. 
 The remainder of this dissertation is in a way a discussion of the effects Mignon does 
have on the nineteenth-century novel in practice: of the recurring use of music in the hands 
of Walter Scott and George Eliot to reflect on the slippages between myself as reader, and 
the reader of the book – producing a kind of stable layering in Scott’s style, and then 
deployed by Eliot to query her readers’ interest in plot and its implications.  And certainly, as 
I have been suggesting throughout, Mignon’s questions are perhaps most forcefully posed in 
the novel’s first edition, but by no means only there: “Kennst du das Land” still puts on the 
appearance of an epigraph, even if the third book of the novel appears at the end of a first 
volume; though Mignon’s songs may not be inserted into later editions of the work, they 
nonetheless shadow it as the real (if external) twins of the fictional (but internal) songs in the 
text of the novel itself.153  
                                                          
152 Morgenstern, “On the Nature of the Bildungsroman,” trans. Tobias Boes, in PMLA 124:2 (2009), 
650-659, at 655. 
 
153 On this point, see Cave, 199. 
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In this spirit, a late reading of Mignon from a writer for whom Mignon is ultimately, 
as she is for Morgenstern, the source of questions that keep playing in the head, but who 
almost certainly never saw the first edition of the novel.  Of Mignon, and “Kennst du das 
Land,” H.D. writes this: 
She asks the question.  Each verse of the lyric is a question or a series of questions.  
Do you know the Land? Do you know the House?  Do you know the Mountain?  … 
Do you actually know this and all these things? 
The passage comes at the end of H.D.’s extraordinary memoir of Freud, “Writing on the 
Wall.”154  Why Mignon? In part, the logic is one of identification with Mignon’s biographical 
case: surprised by Freud’s gift to her, after one of their analytic sessions in Vienna in 1934, 
of a “box of oranges, and some branches with leaves of them,” H.D. finds herself thinking 
of Mignon’s song, with its mention of leaves and fruit (90).  Increasingly, this association 
comes to structure H.D.’s account of herself, and of Freud.  H.D. uses elements of Mignon’s 
biography to access her own: “One of these souls was called Mignon, though its body did 
not fit it very well… It was a girl between two boys” (106), she writes, thinking of Gilbert 
and Harold Doolittle.  
 But Mignon matters to H.D. also because, as she puts it, “she asks the question,” 
questions that H.D. repeatedly revoices, or rather, re-writes, with increasing density as the 
memoir comes to a close.  H.D., after all, is writing here both a tribute and a response to 
Freud’s particular technique for producing cases out of utterances.155  She came to see Freud 
for a great many reasons, but the event that she places at the center of her memoir is the 
moment when, on Corfu in 1920, she saw projected on the wall of her hotel bedroom a 
                                                          
154 In Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 2012), 108. 
 
155 The crucial discussion of H.D’s response to Freud is Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Susan Stanford 




series of images that she recalls – there are two acts of recollection here, one to Freud in 
1933-4, and one in writing the book in 1944 – in extraordinary detail, as the “writing” of the 
memoir’s title: 
I may say that never before and never since have I had an experience of this kind.  I 
saw a dim shape forming on the wall between the foot of the bed and the wash-
stand.  It was late afternoon; the wall was a dull, mat ochre. I thought, at first, it was 
sunlight flickering from the shadows cast from or across the orange trees in full leaf 
and fruit.  But I realized instantly that our side of the house was already in early 
shadow.  The pictures on the wall were like colorless transfers or ‘calcomanias,’ as we 
pretentiously called them as children.  The first was head and shoulders, three-
quarter face, no marked features… (44) 
The second is a goblet; the third, a tripod; then, finally, an image of Niké, surrounded by a 
series of inverted, half-S marks: “a series of question marks,” H.D. writes, “the questions 
that have been asked through the ages, that the ages will go on asking” (54).  She did not 
know where the writing came from – “[w]hether that hand or person” that wrote these signs 
was herself, “projecting the images as a sign… or whether they are projected from outside” 
(46).  Freud, says H.D., picked out this writing, of all of her memories, as “the only actually 
dangerous ‘symptom’” she presented (41) – a judgment, she writes, that puzzled her then 
and that continued to afterward. 
 Because for H.D., what matters about this writing is not, ultimately, where it came 
from but that it is: “[S]ymptom or inspiration, the writing continues to write itself or be 
written” (51). “Kennst du das Land” is another form of that writing which continues to 
write itself, which appears unprompted in H.D.’s head, “singing like an echo of an echo in a 
shell”: as she puts it, “I did not have to recall the words, I had not written them” (90).  Susan 
Bernstein writes of H.D.’s appropriation of Mignon that while “the inclusion of Goethe’s 
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lyric provides a stabilizing frame in H.D.’s text, the context” of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship 
“in fact shows the dissolution, rather than the becoming whole, of Mignon, the speaker 
position with which H.D. identifies.”156  One might say, also, that it is the particular strength 
of H.D.’s memory of Mignon that she knows two things about her at once: that Mignon is a 
case, a biography that one can know or even identify with.  But also that Mignon is a speaker 
of questions that, for all their suggestiveness, may not therefore have to be read as 
symptoms, but could instead speak to us, however puzzlingly: 
It is all there; the lyrical interrogation and the implication that the answer is given 
with it.  It is: do you know the Land – but you do know it, don’t you? (110)  
  
                                                          
156 Bernstein, Housing Problems: Writing and Architecture in Goethe, Walpole, Freud, and Heidegger (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2008), 114. 
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Interchapter 1: Scott reads Goethe 
  
The fundamental claim of the next chapter of this dissertation will be that in the style 
of Walter Scott, the disorienting oscillation set up in Mignon’s songs is transformed into a 
stably layered reading.  The reader of “Kennst du das Land” is faced with a song that speaks 
to him, and in two quite different ways: as a reader made purely in the moment of reading, 
and as one who shares – or doesn’t – with the song itself a horizon of cultural knowledge.  
Scott’s style will in effect introject that displacement between a purely formal and a culturally 
located reader and give it a name: history.  My argument is thus an articulation of how 
Scott’s style forms an audience for his books that understands itself as such, and the aim of 
the next chapter will therefore be one that links a particular formal feature of Scott’s novels 
– the stylistic means by which he hails his readers’ attention – to what Scott understood as 
his historical situation.  Before making this argument, however, I offer a description of that 
situation via a reading of Goethe’s play 1773 Götz von Berlichingen mit der eisernen Hand and 
Scott’s translation of it, which he published in 1799, at the very beginning of his career, as 
Goetz of Berlichingen with the Iron Hand.157   
Based loosely on an historical figure of the sixteenth century, the play’s title character 
is the last of an old order of relatively lawless nobility; the plot pits Goetz against a newly 
powerful imperial state – a fight that the play represents as a hopeless action against an 
inevitably progressive history.  As Herbert Lindenberger writes, the play depicts the passing 
away of a way of life, the “sense of time passing, of one set of human values gradually, 
                                                          
157 Goethe, Götz von Berlichingen, in the fifty-five volume Weimarer Ausgabe (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 
1887-1918), vol. 8; and Goetz of Berlichingen, with the Iron Hand; a Tragedy, trans. “William Scott” 
(London: Bell, 1799).   
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though inevitably, giving away to another.”158  Implicit in this style of representation, of 
course, is the claim that there exists something called a “way of life,” that human life is made 
up of discrete sets of values that operate as a system, coming to being and passing away in 
historical time as an ensemble.159  The play takes this position quite explicitly: as Goetz’s 
friend Weislingen puts it, “Those times are over” (32) – a statement that Weislingen means 
to make only about private life and friendship, and one that Goetz initially rejects.  By the 
end of the play, however, Goetz repeats this judgment in sweeping historical terms: “The age 
of frankness and freedom is past” (201).  As Bianca Theisen has recently argued, Goethe’s 
play stages the passage of the older age as a confrontation between the concrete and the 
abstract – between Goetz’s “natural, blunt, and physical expression of emotions” and the 
“new social structures based on the adoption of the more abstract Roman codex.”160 
In Goethe’s play, this passing of an age is made manifest in Goetz’s attempt to 
secure an heir: an age passes, in other words, when the past fails to transmit itself.  There are 
two potential heirs in this play, Goetz’s son Karl and his childhood friend Adelbert 
Weislingen.  Each character represents a different model, each associated with a different 
organ of the body, for the possibility of cultural inheritance: in Weislingen, the “new man,” a 
modern form of inheritance via actions of the hand is shown to be impossible; in Karl, on 
the other hand, an older kind of inheritance via the ear is shown to be no longer available.  
                                                          
158 Lindenberger, Historical Drama: The Relationship of Literature and Reality (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 114. 
 
159 The classic account of this way of viewing culture in history, as it relates to Scott, is Georg 
Lukács’s The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1983).  For an account of this structure that emphasizes its roots in the stadialism of 
the Scottish Enlightenment rather than Hegel, see instead George Dekker’s  The American Historical 
Romance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).   
 
160 Theisen, “The Drama in Rags: Shakespeare Reception in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” in MLN 
121:3 (April 2006), 505-513, at 512 and 510.   
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The play is tightly structured around these two figures, particularly that of the hand, and thus 
demands a rhetorical reading.  Goethe’s play is ultimately an anti-literary work of nostalgia, 
whose rhetorical argument suggests that cultural belonging cannot be satisfactorily 
transmitted through the hand-based circulatory processes of print and must instead rely, 
impossibly, on naturally lived belonging.  Scott’s translation, however, attempts to finesse 
this argument and create space for literature – an action of the hand – to work in the 
propagation of culture.   
The hand appears in two guises in the play.  Firstly, it is at the center of both the 
rituals and metaphors of loyalty.  Characters in this play are constantly shaking hands, in 
moments of sociability – “There’s my hand, man,” Karl says to Weislingen (31) – but also, 
more crucially, to perform acts of pledging.  This is how Weislingen declares his love for 
Maria:  
 GOETZ Pledge me your hand, that you will neither give open or under-hand  
assistance to my avowed enemies. 
WEISLINGEN   Here I grasp thy hand.  From this moment be our union and 
friendship as firm and unalterable as a primary law of nature! – Let 
me take this hand also [Takes Maria’s hand] – and with it the 
possession of this lovely lady… (51) 
Pledges are acts performed by hands to guarantee future acts performed by hands.  As 
Weislingen suggests, the hand thus works a figure for loyalty arising from an act of choice – 
the pledging of hands – that then obscures that act and re-describes loyalty on the model of 
a natural fact.  The pledging of hands, in other words, is not merely a contract but an 
identification, for when one pledges one’s hand, one becomes a hand: Weislingen’s entire 
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choice between service to the new imperial regime or loyalty to Goetz is figured as a 
determination of whose “right hand” he will be (2, 34). 
 The hand, however, is not only that which performs the process of identification; it 
is also a sign of established personal identity.  Well before the events represented in the play, 
Goetz’s hand was shot off in military service, and his prosthesis serves as a public marker of 
that event: thus, in the play’s opening, the monk Martin recognizes Goetz by attempting to 
shake his “knightly right hand” (15), and then kisses it once he sees that it is made of iron, 
“one with its mail’d gauntlet” (16).  Nor is it only Goetz’s hand that identifies or marks out 
the individual: in his first lines, Karl recounts to his aunt Maria the “story of the good child” 
(18), a boy who was rewarded for an act of charity by being granted a magical power in his 
hand – “It was the right hand, I think,” as Karl specifies (20) – to cure the sick.  In both 
accounts, the hand is linked to a past moment in which a character trait was revealed 
(bravery, charity), and then transforms that moment of revelation into a permanent sign of 
character: Goetz with the iron hand; the good child with the magical hand.  The difficulty 
for Goetz, however, is that his identity is thus not in fact a natural, present part of him, but 
is rather a prosthetic.  As Barbara Johnson writes, the prosthesis takes up a troubling 
relationship to bodily wholeness: precisely by returning the body to wholeness, the 
prosthesis emphasizes “that the body has parts.”161  Similarly, as “Goetz, with the iron hand,” 
Goetz is who he is only by virtue of his loss of wholeness – this, surely, is the only way to 
gloss this exchange, late in the play, after Goetz has been imprisoned by imperial forces: 
ELIZABETH In this moody melancholy I know thee no longer. 
GOETZ If thou seekest Goetz, he is long since gone! – One by one have they  
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robbed me of all I held dear – my hand, my property, my freedom, 
my renown! (197) 
Goetz’s line is a strange one, and it is not difficult to imagine why Rose d’Aguilar, whose 
translation Gortz of Berlingen was also published in 1799, chose to translate the first object 
Goetz names – in Goethe’s German, “meine Hand” – less literally, as “my sword.”162  For in 
lamenting his missing hand, Goetz claims that paramount among those things whose 
absence make Goetz no longer Goetz – that would make him any seeking after him futile – 
is his hand; yet of course it had all along been precisely that absence that had made Goetz 
himself, and that allowed him to be recognized.   
 Goetz’s hand, then, seems to be a version of what Jacques Lacan refers to in a 
famous phrase as “the structuring function of a lack” in his account of the subject: 
constituted by its lack, Lacan writes, the subject is thus of necessity both desiring and 
social.163  And indeed the play brings the two functions of the hand – as identity and 
identification – into relation in precisely this way.  This is how Goetz interprets a dream that 
he has had when Weislingen and Maria have pledged hands and declared their intention to 
marry: 
GOETZ Well, then, Weislingen, join hands, and I say Amen! – My friend and 
brother! … I am fully happy.  What I but hoped in a dream, I now 
see with my eyes, and feel as if I still dreamed.  Now my vision is out 
– I thought to-night, that, in token of reconciliation, I gave thee this 
                                                          
162 Gortz of Berlingen, with the iron hand (Dublin: Stockdale, 1799), 151.  For (a very little) more on this 
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iron hand; and that you held it so fast that it broke away from my 
arm: – I started, and awoke.  Had I but dreamed a little longer, I 
should have seen how thou didst make me a new living hand. (51-2) 
In Goetz’s dream, identification – as the process by which a pledge of hands makes one into 
the hand of another – works to stabilize the dynamics of identity, its basis in constitutive 
lack: in successful identification, detaching the right hand (as Weislingen both takes it and 
becomes it) paradoxically creates a “new living hand” (no longer an artificial prosthesis) and 
reconstitutes the body as whole.  This vision of marriage is of a successful transmission of an 
identity, one that retrospectively affirms its original stability by duplicating it.  
Weislingen swiftly reneges on his pledge of hands, however, abandoning Maria for 
the beautiful widow Adela von Walldorf, and Goetz for the pro-imperial Bishop of 
Bamberg.  After the betrayal, Goetz is on the verge of open combat against the  Empire – a 
chain of events that will lead to his imprisonment and, eventually, to his death.  At this point, 
he thinks again of his strange dream, prompted by the seemingly accidental use of a figure of 
speech by his ally Seckingen: 
SECKINGEN …The towns of Triers and Pfalz as soon expect that the sky should 
fall, as that I should come down upon their heads – But I will come 
like a storm of hail on the unsuspecting traveler; and if I am 
successful, thou shalt soon be brother to a prince.  – I had hoped for 
thy hand in this undertaking. 
GOETZ  [Looks at his hand.] O! that explains to me the dream I had the 
morning that I promised Maria to Weislingen. – I thought he 
professed eternal fidelity, and held my iron hand so fast that it 
loosened from the arm. – Alas! I am at this moment more helpless, 
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and senseless, than when it was shot from me. – Weislingen!  
Weislingen!  (152) 
If identity can be secured only in its transmission, then it is always subject to going awry, as 
transmission is a loss rather than a gain – or is rather first a loss before it potentially returns 
as gain.  And indeed, at this moment Goetz is not so much reinterpreting his dream of giving 
away or breaking off his iron hand as he is simply reiterating its literal level: by losing a hand, 
he has lost a hand; he is himself, handless, and Weislingen remains Weislingen. 
 The detachable hand that should guarantee, in its circulation, the recuperating return 
of an original identity, but is instead always subject to being revealed as mere loss: there will 
surely be little surprise in suggesting that, at this point, Goethe’s play is building towards an 
account of the necessary failures of writing as a mode of transmitting identity, or culture.  
Locked away in his castle, physically defeated, Goetz turns towards autobiography to achieve 
what he could not with Weislingen: his self-perpetuation.  But as a labor of the hand, writing 
is subject to a now-predictable set of problems.  Goetz is attempting, as his wife Elizabeth 
says, to create “evidence under [his] hand” which will make others “acquainted with [his] real 
character” (159).  But for Goetz the process of representing his character means that he no 
longer is his character: “When I write what I have done, I lament the misspent time in which 
I might do more” (160, emphasis mine).  Writing appears to threaten being, and Goetz’s fear 
proves well-founded: having attempted to pass over into writing, Goetz at this point does 
fade away from the play, whose final act unfolds mostly without him.   
Moreover, this attempted trade – of doing for writing – is in fact no trade at all.  As 
Kenneth D. Weisinger notes, Goetz’s final scene “is constituted in words not his own” – as 
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he dies, Goetz speaks entirely in “a pastiche of literary allusions, mostly from the Bible.”164  
Weisinger notes five lines in the play’s two brief closing scenes that have direct biblical 
sources, and Wilhelm Große’s commentary to the recent Suhrkamp edition adds four more: 
Goetz’s dialogue is a patchwork of citation.165  (Scott clearly understood the effect, on 
multiple occasions borrowing phrases directly from the King James Bible in his translation.)  
Here, precisely where Goetz appears to be making the most effort to speak in a memorable 
and rhetorically organized fashion, he loses himself; to enter into writing, Goetz must repeat 
what has already been written in, as it were, another hand. 
In its extended play with the hand, then, Götz von Berlichingen both works through and 
ultimately rejects the possibilities for successful cultural inheritance offered by techniques of 
circulation and identification. Scott’s extends this thread of the play’s rhetoric, twice adding 
references to hands where Goethe’s German alludes to more innocuous body parts.   
In Goetz’s relationship to Karl, his son, however, the play offers a quite different 
model for inheritance, one predicated not on the circulation of signs of identity, but instead 
on a specifically pre-linguistic belonging to a place, a connection based upon everyday 
familiarity that the play registers as a form of hearing.  This model is expressed most clearly 
– albeit as failed – early on in the play, in a conversation in which Goetz quizzes Karl on 
what he knows about the family castle.  As I will argue, Scott modifies this passage in subtle 
but important ways in his translation, and I therefore first quote Goethe’s German (Scott’s 
translation may be found below, on pages 94-95):  
KARL  Ich hab viel gelernt… Ich weiß noch was. 
GÖTZ  Was wird das sein? 
                                                          
164 “Götz von Berlichingen: History Writing Itself” in German Studies Review 9:2 (May 1986), 211-232, at 
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KARL  Jaxthausen ist ein Dorf und Schloß an der Jaxt, gehört seit 
zweihundert Jahren den Herrn von Berlichingen erb- und 
eigenthümlich zu. 
GÖTZ  Kennst du den Herrn von Berlichingen? 
KARL   (Sieht ihn starr an). 
GÖTZ  (vor sich) Er kennt wohl vor lauter Gelehrsamkeit seinen Vater nicht. – 
Wem gehört Jaxthausen? 
KARL  Jaxthausen ist ein Dorf und Schloß an der Jaxt. 
GÖTZ  Das frag’ ich nicht. – Ich kannte alle Pfade, Weg und Furten, eh ich  
wußte wie Fluß, Dorf und Burg hieß.166  
In this conversation, two kinds of knowledge face off against each other: on the one hand, 
abstract knowledge; on the other, knowledge tied to experience.  Goetz has learned “all the 
trails, roads, and fords” as things rather than as names; Karl, however, possesses only a set 
of facts that he has learned from his aunt Maria, whose primary pedagogical method – as we 
have seen in an earlier scene – is the repetitive training of memory.  Karl’s memory, 
however, is precisely the problem: he knows that Jaxthausen belongs to the Lord of 
Berlichingen, but he knows that as a fact equally meaningful to all; Karl lacks the sense of his 
own situatedness in the place he describes that would enable him to link that name to his 
own father.  And, as later developments suggest, Karl’s merely factual knowledge of 
Jaxthausen cannot become attachment to Jaxthausen: three acts later, Karl will abandon the 
castle for a monastery, leaving Goetz to die without an heir.  James Chandler writes that in 
Scott’s later fiction, “the medium where cultural difference is registered tends to be the 
conversation” – specifically, that in pauses and gaps in conversation, Scott’s novels register 
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vol. 8, 27.   
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the uneven development of cultures as moments of mutual incomprehension.167  This 
moment in Götz is an extreme example of the same technique: a moment in which the basic 
rhythm of conversation breaks down entirely into silence and repetition. 
Cultural difference here appears specifically as a split in what it means to belong: 
Karl knows all about one kind of belonging, the “belonging” of property and law, but has no 
knowledge of the other: the belonging of what is proper, of what fits together naturally.  
Both forms of belonging, in Goethe’s German, are senses of gehören, a verb that is also linked 
etymologically to the act of hearing (hören).  Martin Heidegger makes a great deal of this 
etymology in his extended reflections, in Being and Time and elsewhere, on the sense in which 
Dasein “belongs” in the world; as he puts it, Dasein “obeys and listens to the world.”168  
Heidegger expands upon the same line of thinking in a rather troubling page: that we do not 
hear “noises and complexes of sound” but instead “initially hear motorcycles and wagons,” 
he argues, “is … the phenomenal proof that Dasein, as being-in-the-world, always already 
maintains itself together with innerworldly things at hand and initially not at all with 
‘sensations.’” Here Heidegger’s end run around “onto-theology” – around Platonic or 
Kantian metaphysics – is based on the primariness of hearing: as “essentially understanding,” 
Heidegger continues, Dasein as it hears the motorcycle engine rather than mere sound is 
“initially together with what is understood” (§164).  Hearing, in other words, is the proof of 
belonging; or, as Heidegger put it programmatically in his essay on Heraclitus, “We have 
heard when we belong to that which has been spoken.”169    
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There is much to resist in Heidegger’s etymological thinking here.  Yet the 
etymological connections within gehören have a clear hold on Goethe’s scene nevertheless, as 
the scene renders Karl’s difficulty with belonging as a kind of hearing problem: he cannot 
hear the question his father his really wants answered (“Do you know the lord of 
Berlichingen?”) but answers a different one; moreover, he does not even hear the right 
answer that Goetz mutters under his breath to himself (“seinen Vater”).  Karl does not belong 
and thus cannot hear. 
Taken as a whole, then, Götz von Berlichingen rejects writing as a form of cultural 
transmission, and suggests that true cultural belonging must be rooted in a pre-linguistic 
(indeed, anti-linguistic) attachment to places rather than names – to places known before and 
almost in spite of their names.  Yet in Karl’s apparent deafness, and his repetitions, the play 
also suggests that the era of the ear is over: belonging as such is no longer possible.    
 The relationship between hearing and belonging is one that will preoccupy Scott – a 
ballad collector as well as a poet and novelist – throughout his career.  Yet I will argue that 
Scott in fact does not imagine hearing or the oral in the way suggested in Götz : as part of a  
primordial rootedness in place, fundamentally unrecoverable by writing.  Rather, in writing 
about listening, Scott attempts to create a kind of self-aware belonging that works through – 
in both senses – its difference from listening.  And indeed, even at this earliest moment of 
his career, Scott’s translation of the scene between Goetz and Karl introduces a number of 
somewhat unlikely readings of Goethe’s German that, while maintaining the effect of a 
broken conversation, subtly shift its cause: 
CHARLES I have learned a great deal… And I know something else. 
GOETZ What may that be? – 
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CHARLES  “Jaxthausen is a village and castle upon the Jaxt, which has 
appertained in property and heritage for two hundred years to the 
Lords of Berlichingen – ” 
GOETZ Do you know the Lord of Berlichingen? – [Charles stares at him.] With 
all his extensive learning he does not know his own father. – Whom 
does Jaxthausen belong to? 
CHARLES “Jaxthausen is a village and castle upon the Jaxt – ” 
GOETZ I did not ask about that – I knew every path, pass, and ford about the 
place, before ever I knew the name of a village, castle, or river. (29-
30) 
The etymological resources of gehören are, of course, unavailable to Scott – yet it is still 
striking how much Scott’s translation has worked to play down the importance of 
(mis)hearing in the passage.  In Scott’s translation, the failure of conversation does not occur 
because of a hearing problem; rather, Charles fails to answer his father because he 
mechanically repeats his reading: Scott adds quotation marks around Charles’s repeated line, 
which appear nowhere in the original, marking his words – particularly – for the reader as 
coming from elsewhere, as indeed they do.170  Goetz, also, no longer speaks to himself; 
Charles’s obtuseness thus seems less a product of mishearing than the result of a sheerly 
mechanical repetition.   
Most importantly, despite the easy availability of the English “belonging,” Scott 
instead splits gehören into two verbs, the colloquial “belong” and the legal jargon of 
“appertain to.”  Goetz asks about belonging, but Charles answers with appertaining – the 
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bookish quality of the latter verb suggesting that young Charles may not even understand 
what he himself is saying, and that, certainly, he has been doing the wrong kind of reading.   
A problem that in Goethe’s German is an absolute one of medium – one cannot 
learn belonging from a book – becomes, in Scott’s English, a relative problem of style: one 
cannot learn belonging from that kind of book, the book written in a technical language and 
learned by rote.  But what kind of book could teach belonging, given the book’s necessary 
participation in the supplementary logic of the prosthetic, in the processes of circulation 








Romances for General Circulation: Scott and the structure of reading 
  
I argue in my previous chapter that Friedrich Schlegel’s “systematic reader” is 
created, in Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, in the moment at which Wilhelm learns to re-
interpret Mignon’s songs as documents – as fragmentary but (and, also, therefore) 
characteristic traces of their singer – rather than as songs.  Mignon’s questions can no longer 
speak to a reader of this type, but rather can only be interpreted by him.   
In his book Disorienting Fictions, James Buzard argues that Walter Scott’s achievement 
as a novelist was to have done to Scotland what Goethe’s novel does to Mignon: that is, 
constitute it as “a culture sealed off from history, susceptible to holistic representation.”171   
Just as, under the doctor’s tutelage, Mignon’s songs become documents of her case, so too 
in Scott particular cultural practices become definitely part of a master category: Scottishness.  
In his argument, Buzard draws upon a central claim of twentieth-century anthropology’s 
self-critical turn: that the mode of ethnographic observation works to assure me, the writer-
reader-observer, of my location in modernity, a cosmopolitan and progressive modernity 
defined in its observation of – and therefore differentiation from – the cultural fragments it 
observes.172  In reading Scott, Buzard claims, I learn to “press diverse and even internally 
inconsistent elements of a living society into service as symbols for the purported whole of a 
culture” (86).  Like Wilhelm, or like Schlegel’s reader of Wilhelm Meister, I stop interacting with 
those I see before me, and instead aim at “proper apprehension of the whole” (71).  
Buzard’s cultural whole is one explicitly conceived on the model of the Romantic artwork, or 
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at least on Romanticism as it was received in the middle of the twentieth century: the 
traditional culture in Scott is “[l]ike a poem as understood by the New Criticism” (87), a 
whole made up of “interrupted” fragments whose “achieved harmony” – here Buzard 
quotes Cleanth Brooks – can only be recognized through a patient labor of interpretation 
(98).  Schlegel’s “systematic” reader thus becomes, in Buzard’s account of Scott, the 
“English or Englished one” (81): the systematic reading of Scott’s novels, insofar as this 
reading teaches me to identify with the activity of assembling Scottish fragments, becomes a 
specific marker of a form of cultural belonging whose cosmopolitanism is created in the act 
of observing the local.  
 Buzard’s claims are a late and comprehensive articulation of what critics have long 
recognized about Scott’s novels: their double perspective.  As David Daiches writes, Scott 
was both “the prudent Briton and the passionate Scot”173; for Harry Levin, Scott had “a dual 
role: the last minstrel and the first best-seller”174; as George Levine puts it, Scott’s novels 
articulate a “characteristic doubleness of vision.”175  The relationship between these doubles 
– “prudent Briton” and “passionate Scott,” culturally authentic minstrel and brashly 
entrepreneurial author – is characteristically expressed as one of framing, in which a Scottish 
content is framed within a British (or, for Buzard, English) formal whole and thereby 
mastered by it.  Thus, for Buzard, the culture of a Scotland “sealed off from history” is one 
that has been “framed in time and space” (74), or “rendered ‘spatial’ … by being treated as 
finished and available to the gaze” (85).  Katie Trumpener has influentially read Scott’s 
editorial frames – his proliferation of endless explanatory notes and prefatory essays – as 
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treating Scotland in much the same way: as Trumpener argues, Scott’s editorial frames work 
to consolidate his own voice into an “unobtrusive” one, both “magisterial” and “politically 
quietistic,” by isolating and distancing the Scottish materials they relay.176   
That the vocabulary for this gesture – framing – is insistently visual is hardly 
accidental. The chief example for Scott criticism of this vein is a painting viewed at the close 
of Scott’s first novel, Waverley, in which realism appears quite literally as a successful framing 
of romance.  The painting appears in Tully-Veolan, the estate of the Jacobite Baron 
Bradwardine, which – as restored by the novel’s hero – represents the compromises required 
by a stable, modern, British future.  Waverley has by this point given up the temptations of 
life amongst the Highlanders and rebellion against the Hanoverian crown, and learned, as the 
novel’s narrator puts it, that “the romance of his life was ended, and that its real history had 
now commenced.”177  That this decision involves not a rejection but rather a dialectical 
preservation of romance, however, is made clear in the painting itself:      
There was one new addition to this fine old apartment…  It was a large and spirited 
painting, representing Fergus Mac-Ivor and Waverley in their Highland dress; the 
scene a wild, rocky, and mountainous pass, down which the clan were descending in 
the background.  It was taken from a spirited sketch, drawn while they were in 
Edinburgh by a young man of high genius, and had been painted on a full-length 
scale by an eminent London artist… Beside this painting hung the arms which 
Waverley had borne in the unfortunate civil war.  The whole piece was beheld with 
admiration, and deeper feelings. (489) 
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Understandably – given its position on nearly the last page of Scott’s first novel – the 
passage has struck many commentators as a self-conscious reflection of Scott’s own 
representational practice.  Rendered into art, the past (and for Waverley at least, the 
extremely recent past) is separated off from the world of causes and effects and made into 
an object of aesthetic contemplation (“admiration”) and sentiment (“deeper feelings”).   
George Levine writes that this scene of looking is thus perfectly representative of  
Scott’s double perspective.  In the painting, as in Scott’s novels, “experience has been 
removed from practical reality into a past that can now be safely admired and that can bring 
satisfying feelings to the breast” (105).  The message seems clear: as Homer Obed Brown 
claims, “[w]hile the novels preserve romance on another level or in another form, what they 
represent is its death.”178  For Levine, as for Brown, this framing gesture is a way of 
achieving a comfortable relationship to a dangerous past: hung on the wall, romance can be 
safely “beheld” while never threatening to overtake the modern “fine old apartment” in 
which, as the novel’s narrator then continues, “Men must, however, eat, in spite of both 
sentiment and virtu” (489).  The marked cordoning-off of the picture frame, in this account, 
is precisely what makes the real space apparently natural – by looking at romance, I assure 
myself of the familiar reality of my own everyday, one filled with the comforting 
commonplace, as Levine puts it, that come what may, at least “dinner is dinner” (105).     
 This is a powerful reading of Scott, in part because it rhymes conceptually with 
highly influential accounts of the operations of the novel – or, indeed, of bourgeois 
modernity in general.  In Waverley’s placement of Fergus and Waverley on the wall, we seem 
to have a classic instance of why “the novel gets on poorly with other genres,” as Bakhtin 
                                                          




puts it, by parodying them “precisely in their role as genres.”179   Realism becomes itself and 
establishes its claim to the real by framing romance; by placing the mark of genre upon a 
now-romantic history, the novel allows us to enjoy its glamorous appeal safely as a realm 
outside the “practical reality” that we, and the novel itself, now share.  This gesture is also a 
characteristic technique of what Barthes refers to as the “anonymity” of bourgeois ideology, 
or its “ex-nominating” function:  “the process through which the bourgeoisie transforms the 
reality of the world into an image of the world, History into Nature.”180  After 1789, as 
Barthes sees it, class dominance takes the form of invisibility, and spreads by marking others 
– originally the aristocracy; later, communists – as unnatural or, even, merely noticeable (138).  
For Barthes, the success of bourgeois ideology lies in its ability to disappear, to become the 
unmarked, natural norm: so, as in the painting at Tully-Veolan, Scott’s novel as a whole in 
effect tells the reader, “Look over there!” – and as we are distracted invisibly builds up the self-
evident everyday of the real around us, in which dinner is dinner.  Following Bakhtin and 
Barthes, one might see – and the received understanding of Scott has seen – in this gesture 
of self-obscuring framing the ideological practice of novelistic modernity. 
 
 The essentially visual terms of this account of Scott’s – and the novel’s – doubleness, 
however, seems to have difficulty accounting for the strange persistence of the oral in Scott’s 
Waverley novels: song in Scott’s fiction is paradigmatically what cannot be securely framed 
by the novel that surrounds it.  Take, for example, Elspeth Mucklebackit (of his 1816 The 
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Antiquary) and Madge Wildfire (of the 1818 Heart of Mid-Lothian).181  Each of these women is 
a figure of mystery from the novel’s periphery; each represents a shadowy past; and each 
possesses a voice that seems to outrun her visual presence.  So Madge Wildfire can be heard 
singing before she enters visually into the novel she inhabits, while Elspeth Mucklebackit is 
“like a mummy animated by some wandering spirit into a temporary resurrection” 
(Antiquary, 266): a voice who sings folk songs to an empty room (377).   At first glance, these 
singing women invite interpretation along Buzard’s lines: as representing “genuine 
Scottishness,” they immerse “the protagonist and reader in traditional Scottish folk culture 
and dialect,” as Tom Bragg argues182; they are, as Kathryn Sutherland suggests, the 
“unreadable core” of the Waverley novels, reliant upon “the myth of an unlettered, pre-
contractual golden age” which is wrapped in a “framework of explanatory notes.”183 
Yet in each case, the strong opposition this style of reading sets up – between the 
touristic vehicle of the novel’s narration and the “genuine Scottishness” of the singing 
eccentrics it surveys, or between the readable novel and its unreadable core – ignores the 
extent to which each of these characters behave in ways that cannot be captured in the visual 
language of framing.  Madge Wildfire, it is true, appears in The Heart of Mid-Lothian as a 
disembodied voice singing “one of those wild and monotonous strains… to which the 
natives of [Scotland] chaunt their old ballads” (161). Yet we soon learn that her singing is no 
“genuine” folk culture, but rather a maneuver carefully stage-managed by the convict 
Ratcliffe to alert, through its sheer noisiness, the criminal known as Robertson to the 
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impending approach of a search party; Ratcliffe prompts Madge to sing by humming “in a 
very low and suppressed tone” the “first stanza of a favorite ballad,” and “trusting [in] the 
power of association”(181) – a kick-starting of the memory that recalls nothing so much as 
Charles of Berlichingen’s mechanical repetition of words from books.  And while Elspeth 
Mucklebackit can be heard in The Antiquary singing an old song, this moment is part of a 
strange joke on the novel’s title character, who attempts to transcribe her song as an 
“‘undoubted fragment of minstrelsy’”  – apparently unaware that, as the beggar Edie 
Ochiltree observes, when Elspeth is “‘hersell, or ony thing like hersell… [she] gets to her 
English, and speaks as if she were a prent book’” (375, 374).  In each case Scott seems to be 
after not the nostalgic representation of the fragments of a bygone community, but rather an 
expression of the mediations of modernity, a movement whose very endlessness is perhaps 
best captured in the Oxford English Dictionary’s note on this usage of “print” or “prent” (to 
mean the adjective printed): “chiefly in similative expressions as the type of something 
authoritative.”184  Complexities like these suggest that song, in Scott, cannot quite be 
understood as the fragments of a culture, framed and sealed off from history.  Song keeps 
turning into print, the outburst of authentic tradition into the manufactured response of 
modernity.   
 
I will argue here that Scott’s novels – and I too will ultimately turn to Waverley to 
make this case – turn to singing, not to cordon off the print observer from the fragmentary 
culture he observes, but rather to create an experience of reading in which the reader is 
displaced, imagines himself to exist virtually in two places at once.   In making this argument, 
I join a set of scholars who, seeking after more flexible historical or theoretical models to 
                                                          




account for Scott, have sought to actively connect Scott’s work as a ballad-collector to later 
developments in his career.  Penny Fielding argues in Writing and Orality that the oral, in the 
era of Scott, is not merely the object of a Rousseauvian “nostalgia for a lost primitive” 
culture, but also a resource for the voice of self-avowedly modern works.185  As Fielding sees 
it, Scottish literature around 1800 balanced “a sense of the difficulties of entering into the 
oral word” with “the possibilities of modifying oral transmission for print circulation” (15).  
Celeste Langan and Maureen McLane have recently focused attention on the complex roles 
the oral minstrel plays in the immensely popular verse romances Scott published mostly 
before his career as a novelist.186  The key words – and in some ways the key disciplinary turn 
– for Langan and McLane both are media and mediation.  Langan draws upon an oft-quoted 
dictum of Marshall McLuhan’s: that  “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another 
medium.”187  McLane, meanwhile, turns to Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s discussion 
of the “double logic of remediation,” in which media function in “a constant dialectic with 
earlier media.”188  But for both McLane and Langan, what media theory offers to the 
interpretation of Scott is a resistance to the totalizing force of the gesture of framing – in 
particular the suggestion that, in framing the figure of the Scottish minstrel, Scott was 
thereby making his own forms invisible, or natural.  As Langan sees it, thinking through 
Scott’s romances as exercises in mediation reveals that in them “the medium of print 
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becomes recognizable as a medium… by its attempt to ‘deliver’ audiovisual information” 
(70); as McLane argues, the ballad collection in fact attempted “to bridge [the] chasm, the 
split between observing, theorizing, writing subjects and the objects of their cultural and 
historical inquiry” (75).    
My aim here is to extend this account of Scott to his novels, and in particular to his 
techniques for hailing the reader’s attention.  I proceed in three stages.  I begin with an 
examination of the resolutely visual language of Scott’s verse romances, focusing on his 
under-read 1808 poem Marmion: A Tale of Flodden Field.  The verse romances typically hail the 
reader’s interest by insistently demanding a visual attention.  In doing so, however, they run 
afoul of Coleridgean critiques of mass reading; more specifically, both Marmion’s harshest 
critic, Francis Jeffrey, and the poem itself suggest that these insistent attempts to blot out the 
real visual field of the reader amount to a self-deluding forgetting.  I then articulate Scott’s 
alternative model for readerly interest, one that he practiced as a ballad-collector, in which 
the reading of song is imagined as a layered experience, one rooted both in the real world and 
in the imagined one of the represented minstrel.  What song offers to Scott that the visual 
could not, I argue, is precisely a way of imagining reading as it interacts with cultural 
belonging in ways that resist description in terms of the schematic oppositions of framing. 
This argument closes with an account of Scott’s style in the Waverley novels, and of 
his representation of musical listening in Waverley itself.  I turn to a specifically stylistic 
question here because Scott’s style remains one of the weakest points of the received 
account of him – as a writer who enforces the naturalness of the everyday.  Scott’s style is 
above all clunky, noticeable, unnatural – everything that Barthes’ bourgeois ideology should 
not be.  I do not believe that any amount of revisionary criticism can entirely displace the 
exemplary force of the painting at Tully-Veolan.  But in focusing on Scott’s style, and in 
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linking that style to his practices as a ballad collector, I hope to put alongside that moment 
of framing another way in which generic spaces interact with each other in Scott.  
 
Attention!: Marmion, verse romance, and the impossibility of visual enchantment 
Garrett Stewart argues, in Dear Reader, that in the “laboratories of his verse 
narratives,” Scott develops the techniques for the “stationing… of the audience which his 
historical novels would shortly help orchestrate for the evolving genre of prose fiction.”189  
With specific reference to Marmion, Stewart claims that Scott’s apostrophes to his reader 
work to “place the new readership just where the Victorian novel will want it: alert and on 
call, always potentially at attention” (46).  I argue here almost exactly the reverse of this.  
Marmion does indeed represent the most explicit form of Scott’s attempt, in the verse 
romances generally, at a direct hailing of attention – a practice that was mocked in parodies, 
roundly attacked in the Edinburgh press, and undermined by the work’s own internal 
dynamics.  Yet this is precisely the kind of direct appeal for attention that Scott’s prose 
fiction rejects.  After all, if the verse romances are forever asking for our attention, Scott’s 
novels are far more likely – as in the epigraph to Peveril of the Peak – to ostentatiously 
proclaim how little they deserve it: “If my readers should at any time remark that I am 
particularly dull, they may be assured there is a design under it.”190  Marmion’s significance, 
and that of Scott’s verse romances in general, for a narrative about Scott’s novels is as an 
object lesson in how not to ask readers to read; it was from the always-excited Marmion, I 
suggest, that Scott learned the virtues of being boring. 
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Scott’s first verse romance, the 1805 Lay of the Last Minstrel, begins by representing a 
mode of absorptive attention. 191  The work consists of the six-canto lay of the title, set 
during a border dispute on the Scottish-English border around 1550, and the frame story of 
the “last minstrel” who sings that lay, set around 1700. In his original introductory note to 
the poem, Scott provides a one-sentence summary of the work’s aim as a whole: “The poem 
now offered to the Public is intended to illustrate the customs and manners which anciently 
prevailed on the Borders of England and Scotland” (i).  Scott further positions the frame, in 
which “the last of all the bards” sings for the Duchess of Buccleuch and her ladies-in-waiting 
at the beginning and end of each canto, as an accessory to this ethnographic purpose; Scott 
writes that he has inserted the frame in order to encourage the reader’s interest in “the 
description of scenery and manners” rather than “a combined and regular narrative” (3).192  
As we will find out, the minstrel is transmitting an oral tradition, “recal[ling] an ancient 
strain” (7) as he was taught it by his own master, “the jovial Harper” (121); because he is not 
a modern poet, Scott suggests, he is (or should be) given “greater latitude” in the 
construction of his plots than Scott would receive in his own voice (i).  For these reasons, 
Scott will refer to this last minstrel in his 1830 introduction as his “appropriate prolocutor,” 
a “sort of pitch-pipe” through whom Scott could speak more effectively than he could in his 
own poetic voice.193 
Within the frame, the minstrel repeatedly demonstrates a concern for his audience 
which (for both eighteenth-century antiquaries and modern scholars) is a hallmark of oral 
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poetry.  As Scott would write in his “Essay on Romance” twenty years later, the minstrel 
sought above all to “request [the] attention” of his audience and hold it: “hence, the 
perpetual ‘Lythe and listen, lordings free.’”194  Thus, the last minstrel introduces his lay as 
one especially suited to the noble audience in front of him – “It was not framed for village 
churls, / But for high dames and mighty earls” (7) – and regularly checks on the reception of 
his work through the techniques available to him as an oral performer: at the end of the first 
canto, “He seemed to seek, in every eye, / If they approved his minstrelsy” (30); later on, at 
various points, he will explicitly tailor his tale to his all-female audience.  The minstrel thus 
serves as a kind of double pivot for the relationship between audience and work: within the 
frame, he manages that relationship through an improvisatory practice that directly shapes 
the work in its audience’s image, both promising and attempting to actually create a work 
made, like Goldilocks’ porridge, just right for those who consume it in person; outside of the 
frame, he is used to mark and mediate the ways in which the work at hand – fixed in print – 
was (allegedly) not “framed for” those who read.    
Despite this double gesture, however, the minstrel in one crucial way nevertheless 
works upon both his audience and Scott’s readers in precisely the same fashion – as an 
exemplar of absorbed attention.  As he begins his narrative, the minstrel at first sings only 
hesitantly, producing an “uncertain warbling,” but then achieves “all a poet’s ecstasy”:  
The present scene, the future lot;  
His toils, his wants, were all forgot: 
Cold diffidence, and age’s frost, 
In the full tide of song were lost; 
Each blank, in faithless memory void, 
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The poet’s glowing thought supplied… (8)   
The effect of these lines, at the gateway of the romance proper, is much like that of those 
ostentatiously self-forgetting figures of Greuze’s that Michael Fried discusses in Absorption 
and Theatricality.195   In Fried’s account of eighteenth-century French painting, Greuze plays 
the sentimental to Chardin’s naïve artist.  Chardin’s figures of absorption – the boy blowing 
soap bubbles, or the one building a castle out of cards – belong to a world in which “the 
most ordinary states and activities” can become an object of an absorptive state of mind 
(51), or in which “the persuasive representation of absorption is the result simply of an 
objective representation of ordinary absorptive states and activities” (61); Chardin’s genre 
paintings thereby persuade us, standing before the canvas, to be absorbed viewers of art 
precisely as those absorptive figures are absorbed: in the world.  In Greuze, however, people  
must make an effort to become absorbed in something apart from the everyday.  He paints 
figures who convey the impression “of not being at home” in the world (61), and who seem 
uncannily aware of the beholder lurking on the other side of the picture frame.  Fried’s most 
striking example is Greuze’s 1765 painting Le baiser envoyée (Blowing a Kiss), in which a young 
girl, apparently lost in the self-abandonment of longing, appears to blow a kiss to her lover 
precisely through the canvas’s observer.  As Fried argues, Greuze’s paintings take “whatever 
measures proved necessary to absorb, or reabsorb, those personae in the world of the 
painting” (68), thus enacting a fall away from Chardin’s absorption in the everyday that 
represents “one of the first in the series of losses that together constitute the ontological 
basis of modern art” (61).  Scott’s singer, like Greuze’s figures of absorption, is not at home 
in the world, and like them he must laboriously forget his surroundings in order to enter into 
the tale.   In doing so, the last minstrel is also demonstrating precisely what the poem 
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requires of its readers: as Scott would write in his 1830 introduction to the Magnum Opus 
edition, the framing device was required “to place the mind of the hearers in the situation” – 
in other words, it appeared in order to efface itself all the more fully.196   
This precise situation – in which the “full presence” of a heightened fictional mode 
depends upon a forgetting of the present scene – becomes an explicit topic in Marmion, a 
poem that explicitly addresses itself to its readers’ contemporary political reality (the 
Napoleonic Wars, in this case) as does no other of Scott’s works.  Herbert Tucker has 
recently read Marmion as a considerable poetico-ideological achievement, one that succeeds 
in creating “a tone and an ethos addressing the national trouble” of the times.197  The poem 
succeeds, Tucker claims, because it manages to incorporate the reader in the production of 
its own fiction, setting up a “narrative economy of loss and again” in which “reader’s 
speculative investment in such a narrative economy might redound to the national interest” 
(137).  As Tucker sees it, Marmion ushered in a new era of European epic – one that no 
longer imagined poetic narrative to have a role in correcting political reality in the aftermath 
of the Revolution, but instead viewed the long poem as a way of coming to terms with 
historical guilt: by fashioning “a progress narrative painstakingly aware of, and responsible 
for, the pains that progress takes” (146), as he puts it. Marmion is thus the poem of getting used 
to bad historical conditions, and one’s involvement in them, representing “the guilty way we 
believe now” (144).   
Yet Tucker’s view is hampered by a clear mis-reading: in arguing that the epic is a 
masterpiece of acknowledgement, a taking-on of historical guilt, Tucker identifies the reader 
entirely with a particular character in the work, Clara de Clare, who (as he imagines) has 
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played a role in betraying her lover (138), and who therefore views the battle of Flodden 
Field with “divided loyalties” and a consciousness of overcoming her own shadowed past 
(146).  Tucker has, however, conflated two characters, for there are in fact two nuns in the 
work: Clare and Constance de Beverley.  Constance is the “perjured nun” who has betrayed 
the good Ralph De Wilton, Clare’s lover and Marmion’s rival; Clare, who does indeed view 
Flodden from a hilltop, and over whose shoulder the reader observes the climactic events of 
the poem, is entirely guiltless and quite uncomplicatedly loyal.198  Scott’s poem is in fact quite 
far from being interested in (or capable of) creating the kind of resiliently national self-
consciousness which would acknowledge guilt, allow for lapses, and even admit to bad faith; 
rather, it is almost the opposite of what Tucker considers it to be: a work of and about 
avoidance in which past and present are each continually being used – futilely – to suppress 
consciousness of the other.  In Marmion, the necessity of effacing the “present scene” is not 
the prerequisite but rather the explicit goal of both writing and reading romance: specifically, 
Marmion argues that only in forgetting one’s surroundings by deliberately absorbing oneself 
in visual fictions can political faction be overcome.  
Unlike virtually all of Scott’s other works, Marmion includes a narrative frame 
delivered not by a pitch-pipe or prolocutor, but rather by Scott himself, in the form of a 
series of verse epistles written in his own voice, and addressed to his friends.  The effect is 
unsettling, as each of the epistles suggests, in different ways, that the narrative Scott has 
written has been produced at a moment of national crisis, both as a means of coming to 
terms with that crisis but also – more importantly – as a means of simply avoiding it.   
The first of these epistles is addressed to William Stewart Rose, a translator of 
romance who had prefaced his Amadis de Gaul with a promise to the reader of “wonder and 
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delight.”199  Instead of wonder, though, Scott instead begins with by setting a rather bleak 
scene: the valley of the Tweed, as autumn (presumably autumn 1806) passes into winter, as 
viewed from the Scott family’s residence at Ashestiel.  In another poem, the scene might 
prompt conventional reflections on the reassuring cycle of the seasons, but instead the poem 
deliberately considers that potential response – “The daisy’s flower / Again shall paint your 
summer bower” – as a set of clichés worthy only for quieting the fears of the speaker’s 
“prattl[ing]” children.200  These commonplaces are empty for the speaker’s more mature 
sensibilities because the comforts of cyclical time cannot respond to the historical 
catastrophe that, as it turns out, that the visual scene recalls – the recent deaths of Horatio 
Nelson, the Tory William Pitt, and the Whig Charles James Fox, and the impending threat of 
French invasion: “To mute and to material things / New life revolving summer brings… / 
But Oh! my country’s wintry state / What second spring shall renovate?” (6).  The thin 
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abstraction of the pathetic fallacy here – there is no attempt to link winter any more 
meaningfully to history than this – is itself symptomatic: the speaker’s mind is in a state 
where any involvement in the real present leads to this over-arching anxiety.  
In then turning to this figurative national winter, the speaker deliberately attempts to 
cast aside party feeling.  The speaker imagines both politicians (somewhat implausibly) as 
magicians of nationalist rhetoric, able to “soar above” the “common party race” and join the 
entire “British world” with “Spells of such force no wizard grave / E’er framed in dark 
Thessalian cave” (12).  Their deaths therefore appear as both national losses and losses to 
the language of nationalism, one that must be overcome by this Tory poet: 
Here, where the fretted aisles prolong 
The distant notes of holy song, 
As if some angel spoke agen, 
All peace on earth, good-will to men;  
If ever from an English heart, 
O here let prejudice depart, 
And, partial feeling cast aside,  
Record, that Fox a Briton died! (11)201 
Yet how might this simultaneous acknowledgment of political faction and transcendence of 
it in nationalism be achieved?  One approach might be the composition of a poem on the 
recent past – an epic accounting of English heroism – yet this possibility is something Scott 
rejects again and again in these epistles.  Though the task of putting “our later time” into 
“classic rhyme” is obviously of great import, Scott nevertheless disclaims the poetic 
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“powers” necessary to do so: as he puts it in a later epistle, in a wonderfully appropriate bit 
of doggerel, he has “no elegiac verse / For Brunswick’s venerable hearse” (119, 123).  
The very language in which the speaker imagines the funeral at Westminster suggests 
a different solution: the insistent deixis of the repeated here, as well as the intrusion of 
specifically romance features like minstrel and harp at the center of this imagined funeral, 
suggests that while Pitt and Fox can be mourned and memorialized at Westminster, they can 
also be simply forgotten for a period in the time of reading.202   Thus the speaker attempts to 
conjure up a visual presence, a “vision of enchantment” (14), to replace the too-resonant real 
space around the poet, the “lonely down” and “silent pastures bleak and brown” (15); 
instead of facing reminders of loss, the speaker’s imagination will instead buildup a “Gothic 
arch, memorial stone, / And long, dim, lofty aisle” (15).   Here again, as in The Lay of the Last 
Minstrel, a fictive experience blots out the visual field and requires that the “present scene” 
be forgotten.  In Marmion, however, this forgetting is explicitly posed as a response to the 
historical situation of the speaker and the reader alike: visual reality threateningly reminds the 
speaker of a national trauma; this abstract loss can only be successfully memorialized in 
Gothic trappings if, in turn, the visual reminder of it in what is actually present is forgotten. 
In perhaps surprisingly explicit terms, the poem claims that instead of solving the problem 
of political faction by crafting a language of transcendent nationalism, we can instead merely 
put aside those problems by concentrating on enchanted visions of the past.  The poem is an 
attempt to prove the speaker’s – and the reader’s – ability to forget: to demonstrate that 
despite the pressure of the present, “still the legendary lay / O’er poet’s bosom holds its 
sway” (16). 
                                                          




Marmion is thus less a case of what Susan Stewart terms the “distressed genre” – her 
term for the epics, ballads and folk tales that proliferated in the late eighteenth century – 
than a deliberate working-through of what Stewart calls the genre’s “mode of production in 
conflict with itself”: 
The rejection of the present in the distressed genre operates on the level of form, 
theme, and intention, yet it can never surmount the present’s control over the 
influence of context… [T]he distressed genre is characterized by a struggle against 
history as it impinges upon the thematics of meaning.203 
Marmion is crystal clear about what that struggle against history means: paying attention to 
fiction.  Reading romance means lending the speaker our full attention, as he reminds us at 
the end of each verse epistle: “Hear then, attentive to my lay” (20); “[L]ist to me” (73); “as is 
thy wont, attend” (129); “Come, listen!” (236), etc.  Yet though these are all verbs of hearing, 
our attention within the poem proper is actually drawn to the visual conjuring-up of page 
after page of sixteenth-century objects.  The poem provides a full accounting of the various 
weapons carried by the soldiers of James IV; it also describes the minutiae of how each of 
the characters is dressed.  And indeed, we are often explicitly held to attention before these 
catalogues: in one remarkable passage, the poem’s speaker introduces pages of description of 
precisely how Marmion’s soldiers stood at attention while waiting for him to arrive with a 
disclaimer that is almost a protest: “‘Tis meet that I should tell you now, / How fairly armed, 
and ordered how, / The soldiers of the guard…” (30).  Just as in the opening epistle, new 
scenes are constantly conjured up for us in this poem so that we may forget the present. 
Scott’s insistence upon a reading experience in which we attend – and in which the 
visual present is thereby forgotten – depends upon a phenomenological description of 
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reading as a kind of total experience, one that blots out the visual field.  In his 1762 Elements 
of Criticism, Kames supplies a perspicuous outline of that description in his account of 
reading as an encounter with “ideal presence”: 
The reader’s passions are never sensibly moved, till he is thrown into a kind of 
reverie; in which state, losing the consciousness of self, and of reading, his present 
occupation, he conceives every incident as passing in his presence, precisely as if he 
were an eye-witness.204  
Reading and reality are in a zero-sum relation: to be involved in reading is to “lose the 
consciousness of self, and of reading.”  This is a not uncommon account of reading, and one 
with a transhistorical  appeal – it is one that Plotinus supplies in the Enneads (“A reader will 
often be quite unconscious when he is most intent”), and one that Georges Poulet rehearses 
in similar terms two centuries later: “the extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the falling 
away of the barriers between you and it.”205  What Kames brings out in particularly clear 
relief, however, is the antagonism this position implies within the visual field between the 
reverie of reading and what he calls “reflection”: when involved in reading, “the mind, totally 
occupied with an interesting event, finds no leisure for reflection of any sort” – reflection 
thus of necessity “comes afterward, when we have the scene no longer before our eyes” 
(114).   
For many of Scott’s contemporaries, however, this kind of wholly absorptive reading 
threatened to subject the reader to the phantasmagoric visual control so memorably depicted 
in a footnote to the Biographia Literaria: 
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For as to the devotees of the circulating libraries, I dare not compliment their pass-
time, or rather kill-time, with the name of reading.  Call it rather a sort of beggarly 
daydreaming, during which the mind of the dreamer furnishes for itself nothing but 
laziness and a little mawkish sensibility; while the whole materiel and imagery of the 
doze is supplied ab extra by a sort of mental camera obscura manufactured at the 
printing office, which pro tempore fixes, reflects and transmits the moving phantasms 
of one man’s delirium, so as to people the barrenness of an hundred other brains 
afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite 
purpose…206 
The Biographia was, of course, published a decade after Marmion – but as Jochen Schulte-
Sasse and Jon Klancher, among others, have observed, the post-Revolutionary era in British 
cultural theory generally saw a turn towards an intellectualized private reading of a newly 
self-promoting set of literary works.207  Coleridge’s footnote is in fact a belated – and 
particularly exaggerated – entry of an entire literature condemning mass reading as passive 
consumption; as Margaret Russett puts it, Coleridge’s image of the phantasmagoric camera 
obscura voices “a tropology now standard for critiques of mass culture,” and widespread in 
Scott’s own time.208  
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Princeton UP, 1983), 48fn.  This footnote has received a great deal of critical attention; see especially 
the volume in the Romantic Circles Praxis Series titled Gothic Technologies: Visuality in the Romantic Era 
(Dec. 2005), ed. Robert Miles, at http://romantic.arhu.umd.edu/praxis/gothic/.  
 
207 Schulte-Sasse, “Can the Disempowered Read Mass-Produced Narratives in Their Own Voice?” in 
Cultural Critique 10, Popular Narrative, Popular Images (Autumn 1988), 171-199, at 192; Klancher, 
The Making of English Reading Audiences, 1790-1830 (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987).   
 
208 Russett, “Narrative as Enchantment in The Mysteries of Udolpho,” in ELH 65:1 (Spring 1998), 159-
186, at 161.   
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 Marmion – like all of Scott’s verse romances – was quite successful, in terms of sales.  
But it quickly came under attack for its incessant demands upon the reader’s visual attention.  
The poem’s almost unbearable richness of descriptive detail provoked a great deal of 
amusement from its reviewers, particularly the narrator’s self-justificatory “‘Tis meet that I 
should tell you…”  “Peter Pry, Esq.” made good work of the lines in his parody Marmion 
Travestied: A Tale of Modern Times: 
‘Tis meet that I should tell you now 
How richly stor’d and order’d how 
   The house at Gloucester Place: 
Magnificent, superb the plate, 
Displaying more than usual state, 
   Which did the sideboard grace; 
E’en the wine-glasses that were there 
Cost each two guineas, they declare, 
   In none was there a flaw: 
And the pier glasses too were such, 
(They cost, oh, heaven knows how much) 
   No mortal ever saw!209 
It fell to Francis Jeffrey, however, the editor of the Whig Edinburgh Review, to link the 
excessiveness of the poem’s demand for visual attention – “our patience is really exhausted, 
                                                          
209 Marmion Travestied: A Tale of Modern Times (London: Tegg, 1809), 11.  The work is primarily a 
misogynist attack on Frederick, Duke of York’s relationship with Mary Anne Clarke, who had just 
told the Commons that she had been using her influence with the duke to sell military commissions.  
Tegg published Clarke’s Authentic Memoirs that same year.  See Anna Clark, Scandal: The Sexual Politics 
of the British Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), and Iain McCalman, Radical 
Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries, and Pornographers in London, 1795-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
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when we are forced to attend to the black stockings and blue jerkins of the inferior persons 
in the train,” as he put it – to a critique of the poem’s aims as a whole.210  Jeffrey seems to 
speak both for himself and Pry’s parody, as yet unwritten, when he comments that 
“Nobody, we believe, would be bold enough to introduce into a serious poem a description 
of the hussar boots and gold epaulets of a commander in chief” (30).  As Jeffrey saw it, 
Marmion represented a dishonest attempt to interest the reader in antiquarian details precisely 
because they were antiquarian.  Scott had therefore learned precisely the wrong lesson from 
the old romances that had formed his models: the “little details in old books… are there 
authentic and valuable documents,” speaking not only of the “usages and modes of life of 
our ancestors,” but also of the “familiarity and naiveté” of their literary style: the bards of old 
“transcribed with a slovenly and hasty hand from what they saw daily before them” (30-1).   
If Scott truly wished to “sincerely follow [the] example” of medieval romance, “he should 
describe the manners of his own time, and not of theirs” (31).   
Most damningly, Jeffrey argued that such incessant interest in the old detail as old 
detail necessarily cut off Scott’s poem from any attachment to Scottish reality; moreover, the 
poem thereby acted to transform Scotland itself into an archaism.  The terms of Jeffrey’s 
criticisms thus look forward to Levine and Buzard:  
 [W]e nowhere find any adequate expressions of those melancholy and patriotic 
sentiments which are still all over Scotland the accompaniment of those… 
recollections [of the battle of Flodden Field].  No picture is drawn of the national 
feelings before or after that fatal encounter; and the day that broke for ever the pride 
and splendor of his country, is only commemorated by a Scotish poet as the period 
when an English warrior was beaten to the ground.  There is scarcely one trait of 
                                                          
210 “Scott’s Marmion: A Poem,” in Edinburgh Review 12:23 (April 1808) 1-35, at 29. 
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true Scotish nationality or patriotism introduced into the whole poem; and Mr. 
Scott’s only expression of admiration or love for the beautiful country to which he 
belongs, is put, if we rightly remember, into the mouth of one of his Southern 
favourites. (13)   
For Jeffrey, Scott’s Marmion was guilty of effacing actually existing Scottish national feeling – 
“those melancholy and patriotic sentiments which are still all over Scotland” – in favor of 
representing a vanished Scottish past for an English audience.  To Jeffrey, the attempt to 
forget the present scene by attending to past events was only another way of acting – 
despicably – in the present; and indeed, Jeffrey read the poem’s deliberate attempt at 
transcendence of party politics as a partisan attack on Fox (35). 
Most interestingly, Jeffrey’s argument – that the effort to become visually absorbed 
in fiction is a way of remaining mired in the real present – is something Marmion already 
knows.   If there is one clear lesson in the poem’s narrative, it is that the project of escapist 
forgetting is always subject to collapse.  The plot of the romance, revealed in fits and starts, 
is in itself a poor fit for the creation of the “vision of enchantment,” being a rather sordid 
tale of betrayal and forgery: the title character is an English knight who, long before the 
poem starts, seduced a nun, Constance de Beverley.  Marmion then falls in love with Clara 
de Clare, who is engaged to Ralph de Wilton; to eliminate him as a rival, Marmion forges a 
letter implicating de Wilton in treason and uses Constance to plant the letter.  When accused 
of treason, de Wilton denies the charge, and fights Marmion in judicial combat; de Wilton 
loses and is left for dead on the field.  Constance, having realized that her actions have lost 
her her lover, then hires a monk to assassinate Clara, but her plot is cut short when Marmion 
betrays her; Clara, meanwhile, has hidden herself away in the convent of St. Hilda at Whitby, 
while de Wilton, who – surprise! – isn’t dead after all, has taken on the guise of a palmer.  
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The story opens as both Marmion stops at Norham castle on his way to the court of James 
IV of Scotland, where he has been sent by Henry VIII to attempt to prevent the Scottish 
invasion of Northumberland.  This rather bewildering story of plots and counter-plots – all 
of which have taken place before the poem even opens – is hardly an obvious topic for a 
poet-citizen who is attempting to overcome differences of faction in the present. 
The only clear link, in fact, between the romance narrative and the outside reality of 
the Napoleonic Wars that it is meant to annul is a decidedly unhelpful one: within the 
narrative, absorption in either a visual scene or in recalling relics of bygone eras turns out to 
be a distraction from the hidden, real action of the poem.  When the nuns of St. Hilda’s view 
the coast from on board ship, everything they see, even the “rippling surge” of the waves, is 
“strange and new,” and they respond with “wonderment” (79).  Clare, however, only 
… seemed to mark the waves below; 
Nay seemed, so fixed her look and eye, 
To count them as they glided by. 
She saw them not – ‘twas seeming all – 
Far other scene her thoughts recal –  
A sun-scorched desart, waste and bare, 
Nor wave, nor breezes murmured there; 
There saw she, where some careless hand 
O’er a dead corpse had heaped the sand… (83) 
The enchantment of the a visual scene cannot suppress, for Clare, the memory of the past 
and her anxious imaginings of what might by happening to Marmion in the moment.  A few 
pages later, a similar opposition presents itself: the nuns are passing time by telling each 
other stories of glorious sainthood; literally beneath them, however, Clare and the abbess are 
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conducting a “council… of life and death” (95).  And still later, Marmion, after being 
questioned about his strange behavior by his squire, claims that he had been lost in a reverie 
inspired by intense attention to a Gothic tale; the truth is rather different, as the narrator 
informs us: 
 Nought of the Palmer says he there, 
 And nought of Constance, or of Clare: 
 The thoughts, which broke his sleep, he seems  
 To mention but as feverish dreams. (206) 
Again and again, visual or verbal wonder is unable to cover up a swiftly moving plot lying 
beneath it; the attempt to blot out the historical situation of the present with “dreams” only 
hides the “thoughts” of reality which continue to run.   
But this hard lesson is not one that the speaker of the verse epistles learns.  Even as 
the poem is nearing its conclusion, he attempts the same kind of deliberate visual fantasizing 
with which he began. This time the ekphrasis is of Edinburgh – “So thou, fair City!” – and 
the passage begins promisingly enough, noting when contemplating the town that “Not here 
need my desponding rhyme/ Lament the ravages of time” (229).  Yet as though compelled, 
the speaker finds himself contemplating the city’s role in more recent dynastic struggles, as a 
refuge for “great Bourbon’s reliques” (233). Here, again, the speaker must interrupt himself: 
Truce to these thoughts! – for, as they rise, 
How gladly I avert mine eyes, 
Bodings, or true or false, to change, 
For Fiction’s fair romantic range, 
Or for Tradition’s dubious light, 
That hovers ‘twixt the day and night… (233-4) 
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“Dubious” indeed: the speaker is caught in a hopeless cycle of repetition, for both in the 
epistles and in the narrative poem he produces, every visual escape from a history of violent 
conflict turns out to open out again onto history.  Yet even his attempt to interrupt this 
oscillation only begins it all over again.  For Jeffrey, this endless cycle of re- and dis-
enchantment resembled the exhaustion of the literary Gothic, which “puzzles the reader 
instead of interesting him, and fatigues instead of excit[es] his curiosity” (8-9). 
 
 As can be seen in his letters, Scott took Jeffrey’s criticisms seriously – he protested 
repeatedly, to several correspondents, that he bore his antagonist no ill will; at the same time, 
however, he complained to his publisher Ballantyne of his “very sharp” treatment; Scott also 
wrote to his brother Thomas that he owed “Jeffrey a flap with a fox-tail on account of his 
review,” and to Joanna Baillie that the review “contained needless asperities.”211  And though 
it would be false to claim that Scott’s role in creating the Quarterly Review as the Edinburgh’s 
Tory rival came about merely as a response to this personal quarrel, it is nonetheless striking 
how often Scott discussed plans for the new journal and Jeffrey’s hostile review of Marmion 
in the same letters.212  Scott wrote to George Ellis in November 1808, asking him to join the 
Quarterly, adding that while the Edinburgh had brought “plenty of acid” to reviewing, one of 
the tasks of the Quarterly would be to teach “men not to abuse books only but to read and 
judge them” (L 128).  And even as he was telling Thomas Scott that he owed Jeffrey a 
                                                          
211 Letters of April 22, 19 November, and 23 November 1810; all in The Letters of Walter Scott, ed. 
Herbert Grierson (London: Constable, 1932-37), vol. 2, at 48, 131, and 116.  Cited hereafter by page 
as L. 
 
212 The immediate cause was the Edinburgh Review’s article (written mostly by Jeffrey) on Spain in 
October of 1808, in which the Edinburgh attacked the Spanish aristocracy in terms that seemed, to 
many Tories, to recall the anathematized Common Sense. The Quarterly’s founding, however, seems to 
have had as much to do with a perceived hole in the periodical market as with either politics or 
poetic pride.  
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“flap,” he was also suggesting that his brother could play a role in the plot “to countermine 
the Edinburgh Review” by reviewing novels (L 130).   
 Scott’s response to the failure of enchantment in Marmion took two forms.  The first 
– a properly escapist theory and practice of literature – can be seen in the verse romances 
written after Marmion, and in the editorial stance of the Quarterly Review.  Ian Duncan suggests 
that the Edinburgh was founded, in part, to grapple with what it might mean to review 
literature in the aftermath of the political crisis of the 1790s.213  The Quarterly’s approach, 
however, as Scott envisioned it, would be to pretend that literature could continue as a 
blithely apolitical affair.  The Quarterly would need to work on “the literary articles with as 
much pains as the political,” he suggested to William Gifford (who was to be its first editor), 
in order to “give to the review a decided character independent of the latter department,” 
thereby impressing the public with “the impartiality of our criticism” (L 109); he wrote to his 
antiquarian friend George Ellis in almost precisely the same terms, suggesting that it could 
only be the Quarterly’s “maintenance of a high reputation in literature” that could grant the 
review a “character of impartiality” – something, he added conspiratorially, “of as great 
consequence to such of our friends as are in the Ministry, as our more direct efforts in their 
favour” (L 127).   Marmion had attempted to antagonistically conjoin present politics and 
fictional enchantments; Scott’s primary contribution to the founding of the Quarterly was to 
suggest that the two realms could be persuasively and absolutely divorced.  
And the same gesture can be read in the verse romances that Scott published after 
Marmion, which lose the mediating devices of both that work and the Lay, and in turn 
introject the demands for enchanted attention that both formed and disrupted Marmion’s link 
to the historical present. The Lady of the Lake, Scott’s next romance, was a spectacularly 
                                                          
213 Duncan, Scott’s Shadow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 51. 
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popular work, even by Scott’s standards, and sets the pattern for what follows.214  And it was 
one that Jeffrey himself found intensely absorptive: in it, he wrote, Scott “seems, indeed, 
never to think, either of himself or his reader, but to be completely identified and lost in the 
personages with whom he is occupied; and the attention of the reader is consequently… 
transferred, unbroken, to their adventures.”215  Deprived of outside narrators, the poem 
proceeds to model both visual and auditory absorption for the reader inside the narrative 
itself, especially in the poem’s opening encounter between the as-yet-unnamed Huntsman 
and Lady (characters who turn out to be “James Fitz-James,” i.e. James V of Scotland, and 
Ellen Douglas).  The first action of the poem – in which James, having lost his companions 
and ridden his horse to death, walks over a hill near Stirling Castle and views the sunset – 
sets the pattern for what follows: 
And on the hunter hied his way,  
To join some comrades of the day; 
Yet often paused, so strange the road, 
So wondrous were the scenes it show’d. (13) 
Six pages of description are then followed by this couplet: “From the steep promontory 
gazed/ The Stranger, raptured and amazed” (19).  (Little wonder that The Lady of the Lake 
started a tourism craze to the Scottish Highlands.)  But couplets pairing “gazed” with 
“amazed” return repeatedly in this poem: so the speaker describes Ellen as she pauses to 
look at James – “safe, though fluttered and amazed, / She paused, and on the Stranger 
gazed” (24); near the end of the poem, James’s mercenary guards will view Ellen in precisely 
the same way: “The savage soldiery, amazed / As on descended angel gazed” (252); and so 
                                                          
214 The Lady of the Lake: A Poem (Edinburgh: Ballantyne, 1810).   
 
215 “The Lady of the Lake: A Poem,” in Edinburgh Review 16:32 (August 1810), at 263-293, at 272. 
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will Ellen look on the court in wonder: “On many a splendid garb she gazed, —/ Then 
turned bewildered and amazed” (283).  Similar moments appear in other words: when James 
blows his hunting horn, Ellen “paused… / With head up-raised, and look intent, / And eye 
and ear attentive bent” (22) to listen.  This is, in fact, the template for major moments in this 
poem: characters stop their activity and stand, wide-eyed and stock-still, as the narrator 
describes events.   
The reader of Marmion, like the speaker of Marmion, lives in history and must turn to 
fiction as a response to historical events that have come to overwhelm the everyday; the 
reader of the Lady of the Lake, however, has no particular history, or any particular reason to 
read.  The painful dissonance between literature and life that Marmion attempts to address is 
silently passed over.  The Lady of the Lake abandons the attempt to speak into a historical 
situation of any kind; instead, it models for its readers the passivity of awe-struck looking 
that it requires from them.  The poem has in a sense responded to Jeffrey’s criticism – that 
visual absorption in fiction cannot be meaningfully linked to the present moment – by 
entirely dropping any claim, even Marmion’s negative one, to a connection between the two.  
Instead, The Lady of the Lake is happy to invite readers to gaze, “bewildered and amazed,” on 
wonders that no longer have anything at all to do with us.   
 
 Scott’s other response to the failures of Marmion can be seen in a series of essays he 
published in the years immediately following the work’s publication – also the years in which 
he completed much of the work on Waverley216 – which directly address the Gothic and the 
                                                          
216 On the composition of Waverley, see  Peter Garside, “Popular Fiction and National Tale: Hidden 
Origins of Scott’s Waverley,” in Nineteenth-Century Literature 46:1 (June 1991), 30-53. 
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exhaustion of readerly interest.217  In 1810, Scott wrote for the Quarterly an essay on 
Maturin’s Fatal Revenge that disdained its Radcliffean “machinery” and compared the effect of 
horrifying events to “the cruel punishment of breaking alive upon the wheel”: “the sufferer’s 
nerves are so much jarred by the first blow, that he feels comparatively little pain from those 
which follow.”218  Scott’s anxiety about the exhaustion of the reader’s nerves extend beyond 
fear and pain: “the finest and deepest feelings,” as he says, “ are those which are most easily 
exhausted” (346).  The next year, Scott’s “Introduction” to the Ballantyne Castle of Otranto 
made a related point about repetition: “The apparition of the skeleton hermit to the prince 
of Vicenza was long accounted a master-piece of the horrible; but of late the valley of 
Jehosophat [sic] could hardly supply the dry bones necessary for the exhibition of similar 
spectres, so that injudicious and repeated imitation has, in some degree, injured the effect of 
its original model.”219   
Even Scott’s famous essay on Austen’s Emma, from 1814, sees Austen’s technical 
advances as a novelist as primarily a solution to the problem of maintaining readerly interest 
in a market saturated with novels, and novelistic conventions.220  Older novels – “more 
nearly nearly assimilated to the old romances,” Scott writes – elicited the reader’s interest 
precisely by directing his attention to the spectacular: “In all these dread contingencies the 
mind of the reader was expected to sympathize, since by incidents so much beyond the 
bounds of his ordinary experience, his wonder and interest ought at once to be excited.”  
                                                          
217 Fiona Robertson argues persuasively about the formative impact of Scott’s engagement with the 
Gothic upon his novels.  See Robertson, Legitimate Histories: Scott, Gothic, and the Authorities of Fiction 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). 
 
218 In Quarterly Review 3:6 (May 1810), 339-347 , 344 and 346.   
 
219 “Introduction” to The Castle of Otranto; A Gothic Story (Edinburgh: Ballantyne, 1811), xxix-xxx. 
 
220 “Emma,” in Quarterly Review 14: 27 (October 1815), 188-201. 
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But over time – as more and more fictions of this type were written and read – the reader 
“became familiar with the land of fiction, the adventures of which he assimilated not with 
those of real life, but with each other” (190).  “Curiosity,” Scott continued, is “capable of 
being exhausted by habit”; its materials “become stale and familiar” (192).  The question for 
Scott was thus one of yoking interest to the everyday in a way that did not demand the direct 
appeal for visual attention found in his own verse romances.  
 
The anthology and layered reading 
Scott had already explored a quite different model for the role reading could play in 
life, however, in his work as a ballad collector, and it would be this model – rather than that 
of The Lady of the Lake – to which he would return in the Waverley novels.   Scott’s collection 
Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border was published in 1802, but it was in an 1806 review of his friend 
George Ellis’s Specimens of Early English Metrical Romances that he most fully articulated a 
phenomenology of the anthology.221  In this review, Scott praised Ellis’s book for adapting 
its strange, old materials, gleaned from manuscript copies, “for general circulation.”222  
Scott’s review positioned Ellis’s editorial style – in particular, his willingness to abridge the 
narrative – against the editorial practice of Joseph Ritson, who was first and foremost 
concerned with authenticity, taking every step to ensure that “the poems published are most 
strictly and literally genuine” (390).  What Scott found noteworthy about Ellis’s approach is 
                                                          
221 My thinking in this section has benefited greatly from engagement with that of Sarah Kerman, 
whose dissertation Speaking for Americans: Modernist Voices and Political Representation, 1910-1940 (Ph.D 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2010) includes a sustained discussion of the song anthologies of 
Alan Lomax.  
 
222 Scott, “Ellis’s Specimens of English Romance,” in Edinburgh Review 7:14 (Jan. 1806), 387-413, at 396.  
(The page is incorrectly numbered as 496, but follows 395.) 
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that he had avoided “literal transcription,” and had been willing to sacrifice the authenticity 
of his fourteenth-century poems to the “general interest”: 
With this view, the editor has analyzed each romance in prose, introducing, at the 
same time, occasionally, as a continuation of the narrative, such parts of the original 
as seemed to possess either peculiarities of expression or poetical beauty, sufficient 
to render their preservation desirable, as fair or favourable specimens of the whole 
composition.  (396) 
As Scott noted, the result of this mixture of “analysis” (that is, paraphrase) and quotation 
was a decidedly heterogeneous page: Ellis’s own English prose formed the bulk of the text, 
but interspersed in it were also fragments of Ellis’s verse sources; these Ellis had kept largely 
unchanged, apart from “discard[ing] the antique orthography, preserving, however, carefully, 
every ancient word.”  Ellis’s mixed practice, Scott wrote, would likely cause antiquarians of 
Ritson’s type to “censure the liberties which Mr. Ellis has taken with his materials, and 
deprecate his scouring the shield of ancient chivalry” (396).223   
In his own collection of metrical romances, Ritson had been careful to justify his 
editorial emphasis on authenticity by hypothesizing that the romances themselves were more 
likely than not “actually composed by writers at their desk [or] by a priest in his closet.”224  In 
an important discussion of the origins of romance, Ritson carefully separated out the 
composition of his materials from their subsequent transmission, insisting that the 
“minstrels were too ignorant, and too vulgar” to have either composed or translated such 
                                                          
223 The reference here is to a passage early on in the story of Martinus Scriblerus: see The Memoirs of 
the Extraordinary Life, Works, and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus, ed. Charles Kerby-Miller (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 102-4.  
 
224 Joseph Ritson, Ancient Engleish Metrical Romanceës, vol 1 (London: Nicol, 1802), cvi; emphasis 
original.  In Ellisian rather than Ritsonian style, I have standardized Ritson’s spelling in my 
quotations (e.g., “composed” and “writers” for Ritson’s “compose’d” and “writeërs”). 
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works but were rather mere performers (cvi).  Where manuscript copies did need 
emendation, this was to eliminate the mistakes of an inattentive copyist, or the ignorance of 
generations of minstrels.   
For Scott, however, this entire approach was a fundamental misapprehension of 
both the value and the nature of the materials themselves.  Ritson’s treatment of minstrels, in 
particular, seemed to have been motivated by “a special malice”: as minstrels depended on 
having a “stock of tales and songs,” Scott wrote, “it must have been as natural for them to 
have composed the romances which they sung, as for a modern musician to compose the 
pieces which he performs” (394).  Ellis had gone even further, envisioning the minstrel 
composing as he performed in a discussion that looks forward to Milman Parry on Homer: 
the minstrels, Ellis found, were talented “in extemporaneous compositions… like the 
improvisatori of Italy” (22); the romances these minstrels performed were not likely to have 
been composed at desks, but rather were the result of a bricolage-like practice in which 
minstrels formed “a variety of new combinations [made] from the numerous materials in 
their possession,” thereby bringing “our most popular romances … to the state in which we 
now see them” (22).225  And this improvisational practice, rooted in an attempt to speak to 
the “public at large” (21), was precisely what made minstrelsy valuable to Ellis: minstrels 
were “everywhere welcomed” and could perform to all levels of society; they were thus 
“superior to more learned writers [as] judges of the public taste”; their improvisations thus 
spoke to all, and spoke out of “nearly all the knowledge of the age, which was committed to 
their memory” (22).   
                                                          
225 It should be noted that Scott’s own statements on the subject are never quite as sanguine about 
improvisation as Ellis’s, and become far less so later in his career.  In the “Introductory Remarks on 
Popular Poetry” which Scott appended to the 1830 edition of Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, he 
describes the passing-down of ballads and romances not as a gradual process of accretion, but as a 
process of degradation: the “rugged sense” of the original has been “generally smoothed down and 
destroyed by a process similar to that by which a coin, passing from hand to hand, loses in circulation 
all the finer marks of the impress.” In Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, ed. TF Henderson (Edinburgh 
and London: Blackwood, 1902), vol. 1, at 12.  
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The standard accounts of the orality/literacy binary would perhaps suggest that, 
under the sway of a fetishized orality, it would be Ellis, rather than Ritson, who would 
emphasize authenticity in his editorial practice.  But the case was exactly the reverse: Ritson 
positioned himself as both the advocate of “the original text” (cix) and its author and as the 
defender of the concerned purchaser of the modern edition: he protected the former from 
“unfairness and dishonesty,” and the latter from being “deceived and imposed upon” when 
seeking after “[a]uthenticity” (cxli-cxlii).  Ellis, meanwhile, implicitly modeled himself after 
what he imagined as the practices of his originals: 
The mode of translation adopted by these early romancers was indeed rather 
licentious, as they were satisfied with giving the substance of the story as intelligibly 
as they could, reserving to themselves the liberty of contracting what they thought 
too diffuse, of omitting what they considered as unnecessary, and of enlarging such 
passages as appeared most important.  But they were generally attentive to the style 
of their original, and seldom lost an opportunity of enriching their work by an exact 
imitation… (25) 
Like his “romancers,” Ellis aimed first and foremost at intelligibility, but also precisely 
reproduced passages that “appeared to him worth preserving” (iv).  For these reasons, Scott 
praised the “wit and elegance with which [Ellis] abridged and analyzed” his sources: like the 
minstrels themselves, Ellis was engaged in a “popular labor” (396).   
 Yet this popular editorial voice was not – as Katie Trumpener and others have 
argued– a consolidating one, effacing the work that had been done in synthesizing materials, 
but rather a deliberately obtrusive one, full of “liberties” that enforced a separation between 
reader and the original romance material.226   In preferring this form of editing, Scott departs 
                                                          
226 Katie Trumpener’s Bardic Nationalism, despite its involvement in an anti-Lukácsian polemic, 
nevertheless reads Scott’s work as a ballad collector along highly Lukácsian lines: as a period in which 
he trained himself in modes of synthetic, retrospective representation.  This style, Trumpener argues, 
would then be employed in his historical fiction, which consolidated its sources into an 
“unobtrusive” narrative unity, as discussed above, tending towards both the “magisterial historical 
survey” and a politically “quietistic realism” (151, 156-7).   
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significantly from established models of antiquarian practice, particularly that of Thomas 
Percy’s 1765 Reliques of Ancient English Poetry, which along with Macpherson’s Ossian poems 
of the 1760s and Herder’s 1778 Volkslieder, is widely understood to have played a key role in 
forming the concept of a natural literature.  In the frontispiece to the work and the vignette 
on the facing title page, both by Samuel Wale, Percy’s Reliques also attempted to imagine how 
old songs might circulate in a modern society – but offered  an account of the role of the 
















These two illustrations are provocative enough to have been the subject of multiple 
interpretations; one recent commentator has even used them as a case study to demonstrate 
                                                          
227 Thomas [later Bishop] Percy, ed., Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (London: Dodsley, 1765). 
 
    Fig. 1: Reliques of Ancient English Poetry, frontispiece. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Reliques of Ancient English Poetry, title page. 
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that, without a rigorous examination of a synchronic cross-section of title-page paratextual 
illustrations, any attempt at an interpretation of stylistic meaning (e.g., are these illustrations 
in a “Gothic” style?) will of necessity beg the question, as any detail that might be used as 
evidence for an answer could only find meaning “within some grand récit of literary 
history.”228  Yet these illustrations themselves emphatically do supply a petit récit, a brief but 
pointed narrative whose main character is the minstrel’s harp.  Percy famously writes in his 
dedication to Elizabeth of Northumberland that these songs are not “labors of art, but 
[rather] effusions of nature” (vi); the work’s first pages suggest that as natural, the songs are 
directly available to any reader.  Faithful to the illustrations’ Latin tags from Horace and 
Ovid, the harp endures through time: the structures around it may lie in ruins, but its form 
persists virtually unchanged.  There is no bard, of course, to play that harp (can the wind 
play it? does it await an unseen human player?); more strikingly, there is no audience 
gathered around to hear it.  Instead, there is only writing: a large codex lies in front of the 
harp, opened in such a way as to invite perusal, and various sheets are scattered nearby.  The 
harp is waiting to be stumbled upon, it seems – as are books, ready to be accessed.  Percy’s 
own editorial practice is, at times, as deliberately mediating as Ellis’s – but Percy certainly 
never reflects on his mediations as Ellis does, asking the reader to consider his distance from 
the songs’ “proper” audience.  That neither the harp nor the books of Percy’s title vignette 
have any obvious audience is thus in a way precisely the point: we are that audience. 
Compared to the disappearance of reception in Percy, then, what seems remarkable 
in the editorial style Scott championed in Ellis is not its consolidating unobtrusiveness and 
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2011), 73-76.  See also Christine Baatz, “ ‘A Strange Collection of Trash’?: The Re-Evaluation of 
Medieval Literature in Thomas Percy’s Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765), in Anthologies of British 
Poetry: Critical Perspectives from Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. Barbara Korte, Ralf Schneider and 
Stefanie Lethbridge (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001). 
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the unified view of history that it offers, but rather its insistence on marking its own 
mediations of its sources.  Simon Dentith has recently argued that Scott, if anything, grew 
only more enthusiastic about the role of an active editor throughout his career: Scott’s 1830 
preface to Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border emphasizes the role of Pisistratus, not Homer, in 
producing the Iliad.229  Andrew Piper, in his Dreaming in Books, points to Scott’s account of 
Ellis’s Specimens as an articulation of a set of editorial values, widely held in both English and 
German writing around 1800, in which the antiquary did not simply consolidate his 
materials, but consciously interposed himself between them and his readers.  In these years, 
Piper writes, works like Ludwig Tieck’s 1803 collection of Minnelieder consciously attempted 
to reach as many readers as possible, and therefore altered the originals freely to give them 
what Piper calls a “more universal feel”; Tieck asked only “that the reader should meet him 
halfway, just as he too approaches the reader halfway as well.”230  These collections and 
anthologies, known in German as Erneuungen, attempted to make the old new through a 
process that “hovered between the various modes of translation, paraphrase, and imitation” 
(89).  
The distinction between Trumpener’s image of Scott (as “foregrounding” the 
consolidation of a “myriad” into a single “magisterial” voice) and Piper’s (as attempting to 
“meet the reader halfway” by interposing himself between them and his materials) may at 
first glance appear a distinction without a difference.  Yet these two accounts in fact describe 
different authors producing quite different kinds of pages, and resulting in different reading 
experiences – something Scott was always aware of, and keen to structure.  An edited 
collection like Ellis’s Specimens presented its readers with a composite work and a composite 
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230 Quoted in Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books: The Making of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic 
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authorial voice.  By alternately paraphrasing and quoting, the book did much the same work 
to a pre-existing manuscript (in Ellis’s case, for example, a manuscript about Merlin held in 
the library of Lincoln’s Inn) that Leah Price suggests the nineteenth-century periodical press 
tended to do to the works it discussed: both the Price’s review and Piper’s Erneuung 
“encourage readers and writers to think of texts as accumulations of self-contained 
anthology-pieces connected by longer passages of information or padding.”231  Yet the fact 
of excerpting is less interesting in this case than the mixture of techniques the two authors 
use in quoting: on the one hand, both Scott and Ellis cite selected passages via the colon, 
that scholarly mark of distanced examination.  But both also incorporate verse into their 
own syntax, weaving centuries-old poetry into their own prose in a manner common in 
antiquity and widely practiced well into the nineteenth century.  Particularly of note are the 
multiple occasions on which Scott and Ellis both use the latter practice to reflect on their 
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Fig. 3: From page 397 of Scott’s review of Ellis’s Specimens.  Scott’s quotation 
is of Milton’s Il Penseroso, ll. 117-120. 
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In Scott’s quotation of Milton (Fig. 3), two centuries of English-language letters collapse into 
a single musing on the possibility of a book that does not yet exist, a universal edition of 
bardic romance; an actual conflation of authorial voices contemplates a possible collection of 
voices. Ellis creates similar effects of textual layering repeatedly in his Specimens, typically at 
moments of narrative transition.  So, at the conclusion of a section of the narrative of Merlin 
in which the magician dictates a “book of prophecies” to the scribe Blaise (Fig. 4 below), 
Ellis caps the passage with an incorporated phrase referring to the opacity of Blaise’s 
book.232  By moving to the “concluding events of Vortigern’s reign” in this way, Ellis creates 
a brief moment in which three possible authors and three possible books are layered atop 
each other: who is it that “now passes,” who marks his decision to address a new topic – 
Blaise, the author of the romance, or Ellis?    
                                                          





Fig. 4: From page 230 of Ellis’s Specimens of  




Fig. 5: From pages304-5 of Ellis’s Specimens, 
vol. 1.  
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Similarly, near the conclusion of the entire narrative (Fig. 5 above), Ellis apparently 
interrupts himself in order to quote the original’s promise to tell more. Ellis’s is a highly self-
conscious editorial practice: here his quotation interrupts narrative momentum with a 
promise to continue the story; at the same time, the lines both seem to refer to the book we 
have in our hands (“this write”) while also bearing the markers of an oral storytelling.  
Confusions like these were not merely accidental, but for Ellis and Scott alike were a vital 
part of a larger cultural project that took place both within and outside the book’s limits.  As 
Piper argues,  the goal of the editorial practice of the Erneuungen was a kind of literal 
translation: the “mutual crossing over (über-setzen) between languages and time by both 
reader and writer” (90).   
Ellis’s interpolated quotations were a vital means of such crossing over, because they 
brought the reader into contact with the minstrel tradition precisely without forcing him to 
encounter it as a self-enclosed whole: that is, the ballad collection was a way of relaying a 
tradition without framing it as such.  Such techniques, Scott wrote in his review, might not 
be to the taste of the “severe student of our national antiquities.”  But, on the other hand, 
even he who would “before have as soon thought of wearing the dress, as of studying the 
poems of his ancestors” would, by reading Ellis’s mixed form, find himself doing exactly 
that – and without needing to play dress-up.  Metrical romances, presented through 
paraphrase and quotation, would no longer seem alienatingly foreign, marked by either the 
“cobwebs and rust” of historical distance, or the cultural barriers signaled by ancient “dress.”  
Yet the book was not important merely as a single work, or a single reading experience – for 
Scott and Ellis alike, the aim of the Specimens was to point readers to other books.  “We 
doubt not,” Scott wrote, that “the wit and elegance with which [Ellis] has abridged and 
analyzed” his materials “will encourage many a gentle reader to attempt the originals” (396).  
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Ellis, similarly, wrote in his prefatory “Advertisement” that while he hoped his work had 
“been instrumental in rendering accessible to common readers no inconsiderable portion of 
our early national literature,” there was still much work left for the reader to do.  Specifically, 
his preface encourages its readers to consider themselves potential correspondents, as there 
were no doubt more manuscripts “both of the miscellaneous and romantic kind… 
remain[ing] in various libraries” (iv), waiting to be found.  The book thus becomes a means 
of transport – not of ecstatic transport, but rather literal movement, sending the reader to 
libraries and archives in search of manuscripts.   
This kind of communal sharing of materials had been an important part of 
antiquarian song-collecting for some time, particularly in the long-running project the Scots 
Musical Museum, published between 1787 and 1803 under the guidance of the Edinburgh 
publisher James Johnson and Robert Burns. The first volume of James Johnson’s Scots 
Musical Museum asked the “true lovers of Caledonian music and song” to whom it was 
addressed to assist in the project of collection: 
[I]t is humbly requested, if any Lady or Gentleman have any Song of Merit with the 
Music (never hitherto Published) of the Ancient Caledonian strain, that they would 
be pleased to transmit the same to the Publishers, that it may be submitted to the 
proper Judges, and so be preserved in this Repository of our National Music and 
Song…233 
Antiquarianism and ballad collecting in the eighteenth century is often imagined as a kind of 
coterie activity: an endless series of disputes about authenticity, fought in footnotes and 
prefaces, between a confined number of gentleman scholars.  In the Museum, however, as in 
Ellis’s implicit call for his readers to seek out more manuscripts, the activity of song 
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collecting is deliberately pushed towards a more democratic mode.  In a different context, 
Jon Klancher writes of the capacity of certain parts of the pre-Revolutionary periodical press 
to function like a print form of the Habermasian coffee house: by collectively corresponding 
with a monthly miscellany like the Gentleman’s Magazine, readers constituted themselves as “a 
tightly knit community of readers and writers who revolve between reading roles and writing 
roles.”234  Johnson’s project aims at a similar collaboration: the readership Ellis’s Specimens, 
like that of the Scots Musical Museum, is a collective on the basis of a shared, hobbyistic 
activity, one routed through a central organizing agency of “proper Judges,” certainly, but 
nevertheless an activity in which hidden materials – the manuscript in the attic or the library 
– are uncovered, authenticated, and placed into the public sphere.   
 Even as it sent readers to the library, however, Ellis’s volume brought strangers into 
the house: “Mr. Ellis,” Scott wrote, “has brought the minstrels of old into the boudoirs and 
drawing rooms, which have replaced the sounding halls and tapestried bowers in which they 
were once familiar” (396). Scott captures the strangeness of the reading experience he finds 
in Ellis’s Specimens in the twists and turns of this rather extraordinary sentence.  The minstrel 
appears in the drawing room, and surprises us there: the “old” in a new place.  Yet the next 
clause does not stick with that surprise by emphasizing the minstrel’s strangeness in this 
environment, but instead turns the encounter around: it is not the minstrel who is out of 
place (imagine a sentence continuing with “… into the drawing room, standing his harp 
where we had left the fortepiano”).  Instead, the drawing room and boudoir itself now 
appear – as though from the minstrel’s eyes – as an unlikely replacement for hall and bower, 
as though our present were only one possible future of the past.  But again the sentence does 
not stay there, enforcing a second change in perspective: “…bowers in which they were once 
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familiar.”  Not “with which,” the preposition we might have expected, and that would have 
continued to view the room with the minstrel’s eyes, but “in which”: we are now again 
viewers of the minstrel, but instead of seeing him as our nineteenth-century selves, we are 
instead implicitly taking the place of a hypothetical fourteenth-century viewer for whom the 
minstrel in the tapestried bower is an everyday sight.235  To read Ellis’s Specimens, then, is to 
suddenly have access to “our early national literature” – but it is not simply to let that 
literature speak directly to oneself, as Percy’s Reliques seemed to imagine: I remain an audience 
for the minstrel; to the extent that I have taken on a role in reading that is not simply my 
own, it is the role of a past listener to the bard. The work thus brings the minstrel into the 
drawing-room, while still preserving a sense of his dislocation there; just as the book itself is 
layered (Ellis’s prosaic paraphrase enveloping the verse which I know is a modification of an 
original), so too my experience of it involves holding both the drawing room in which I sit 
and the sounding hall in which the minstrel once sang together in my head.   
 In Ellis, Scott finds a way past the conceptual impasse set up by Marmion and The 
Lady of the Lake.  The former work had set up a relentlessly repetitive scenario, in which 
fictions – most importantly for the poet, the fiction of a unified national audience – are 
continually being created for escapist purposes and then dissolving under the pressure of 
interpretation; the latter had attempted to duck the problems of a real audience altogether.  
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   Scott’s reading of Ellis’s Romances is, as I have suggested above, one that accords both with Ellis’s 
techniques and with Ellis’s statement of his intentions in his preface.  But his emphasis on what I am 
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What opens up in the anthology – precisely because it implicitly represents a scene of sung 
poetry that it cannot possibly replicate – is the possibility of an account of reading as a 
shared fantasy that does not disappear into the everyday, but remains clearly grounded in the 
medium of the book itself, and which can therefore coordinate the hallucination of reading 
together with a kind of critical self-consciousness.   
 
The mediation of national music in Waverley and the style of the Waverley novels 
What might this account  of Scott’s aims as a ballad collector mean about his novels?  
As I have suggested, the received account of the work of Scott’s fiction finds its major 
stumbling-block in the notable thickness of Scott’s style.  Katie Trumpener’s description of 
Scott’s “unobtrusive” voice, or James Chandler’s remark that his style “means to be 
invisible,” seems ill-equipped to grapple with the insistent presence of Scott’s narratorial voice 
in the act of description: Scott’s page never seems to want to go away.236  I argue here that 
Scott’s novelistic style is rooted in the layered experience of reading that the ballad collector 
strives for – an experience entirely distinct from the simpler, absorbed wonder demanded by 
Scott’s verse romances.  Specifically, this style relays musical listening and national to the 
readers of Waverley in a way that closely resembles the experience of Ellis’s reader, situated at 
once in the drawing room and the sounding hall.  And, as I will suggest in closing, this same 
layered reading experience can be found in the Waverley novels more generally.  
I will keep my comments about Waverley confined to a single chapter, the twentieth, 
entitled “A Highland Feast.”  The chapter comes roughly a third of the way through the 
novel, and represents the furthest point of Waverley’s (and the novel’s own) journey from 
England into Highland Scotland.  It comes as part of a sequence in which Waverley crosses 
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into the Highlands, stays at Glennaquoich, attends a Highland banquet, and meets both 
Fergus Mac-Ivor and Flora Mac-Ivor.  At the beginning of the sequence, Waverley is a 
captain in the British army, and by the end of it he has resigned his commission and finds 
himself considering taking up the Jacobite cause, a movement that “the majority of the 
kingdom esteemed rebellion” (207).  These chapters, then, narrate a loss – or a temporary 
change – in belonging; in their description of Highland life, these chapters are also about 
belonging.  How does this change come about?  What does it mean to be a Highlander in 
Waverley, and what is appealing (to Waverley, to us) about it? 
Yoon Sun Lee’s book Nationalism and Irony provides one answer in her reading of the 
Highland feast in the first half of the chapter.237  At the opening of the feast, the narrator 
describes how the banquet maintains a sense of order and plenty for all, even though the 
food offered to those present is determined entirely by their social standing:   
Excellent claret and champagne were liberally distributed among the Chief’s 
immediate neighbours; whisky, plain or diluted, and strong beer, refreshed those who 
sat near the lower end.  Nor did this inequality of distribution appear to give the least 
offense.  Every one present understood that his taste was to be formed according to 
the rank which he held at table; and, consequently, the tacksmen and their 
dependents always professed the wine was too cold for their stomachs, and called, 
apparently out of choice, for the liquor which was assigned to them from economy. 
(164)238 
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This scene, Lee writes, suggests “how Scott lays the groundwork of an ironic nationalism” 
(20).  As Lee notes, the banquet scene is a model of a community in which the fulfillment of 
taste assures social harmony: everybody gets what he wants.  That the taste is artificial – that 
each individual knows how his taste “was to be formed” – is hardly disruptive to that 
harmony: this artificiality is already known, and each subject plays a role in creating an 
“illusion of free and equal fellowship” (22).  The illusions of social unity are formed here 
neither through an immediate, spontaneous sentiment of national belonging, nor through 
ideological obfuscation, but as consciously generated fictions: “[The] illusion of having 
chosen,” as Lee puts it, “is indeed all that they have in common, all being equally under the 
command of prescribed roles and straitened circumstances” (22).   
 Lee’s is a persuasive reading.  And it comes as part of a wave of commentary on 
Scott that has turned, explicitly or otherwise, to Slavoj Žižek’s account of the operation of 
ideology – as contained in the knowing wink of the subject who says “I know very well, but 
still”239 – in order to come to terms with Scott’s strange ability to demystify without undoing.  
Lee’s book quite literally gives Žižek the last word, and in it she finds in Scott an exemplary 
instance of Tory irony in the nineteenth century to create a “Romantic Britain” that could 
“conceive of itself less as a perfect unity than as a tense, tactful convergence of opposing 
tendencies” (7).  Writers like Scott, Lee argues, saw the “ironic production of feeling as a 
necessary supplement to and sometimes even substitute for spontaneous emotion” (9).  
 Lee’s reading of this scene in Waverley is, as she herself admits, a partial one, and it is 
striking that though her reading ends with a strong claim about the novel’s aims and effects 
– “Scott promotes the fellowship of incompatible things and unequal entities” (24) – it is 
difficult to know what model of ideological capture or rhetorical suasion allows for the shift 
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in her account from a novel that describes an illusion to one that promotes it.  For if we 
think about the novel as a persuasive structure, our first, and surely more obvious, answer to 
the question of what it means to be a Highlander in the novel is likely to be a scene more 
closely related to orality and even something like “spontaneous emotion” than to self-
conscious irony.  This scene arrives later in the same chapter, immediately following the 
feast; it is, as P.D. Garside suggests, a moment of ideological “temptation” for both 
Waverley and for us240:  
Mac-Murrough, the family bhairdh, an aged man, immediately took the hint, and 
began to chant, with low and rapid utterance, a profusion of Celtic verses, which 
were received by the audience with all the applause of enthusiasm.  As he advanced 
in his declamation, his ardour seemed to increase.  He had at first spoken with his 
eyes fixed on the ground; he now cast them around as if beseeching, and anon as if 
commanding, and his tones rose into wild and impassioned notes, accompanied with 
appropriate gestures.  He seemed to Edward, who attended him with much interest, 
to recite many proper names, to lament the dead, to apostrophize the absent, to 
exhort, and entreat, and animate those who were present.  Waverley thought he even 
discerned his own name, and was convinced he was right, from the eyes of the 
company being at that moment turned towards him simultaneously.  The ardour of 
the poet appeared to communicate itself to the audience. Their wind and sun-burnt 
countenances assumed a fiercer and more animated expression; all bent forward 
towards the reciter, many sprung up and waved their arms in ecstasy, and some laid 
their hands on their swords.  When the song ceased, there was a deep pause, while 
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the aroused feelings of the poet and of the hearers gradually subsided into their usual 
channel. (165-6)  
If the collectivity of the nation is figured in the feast scene as based on “an illusion of having 
chosen,” here it appears instead the product of a joint aesthetic experience that produces 
shared feeling (communicated ardor), which in turn prompts shared action (facial 
expressions, changes in bodily posture, etc.).  And the passage pulls out all the rhetorical 
stops to create feeling in the reader too: it is a description of a powerfully affecting musical 
performance that mimes those effects in a grand style.  The sentences here are rich in 
anaphora, particularly in that lengthy catalogue of infinitive verbs that list the actions the 
bard seems to be taking – anaphora being, conventionally, a figure of force that (as Scott’s 
classical and legal studies at Edinburgh would likely have informed him) was best suited in 
the more psychologically-interested classical and Renaissance rhetorical manuals for the 
creation of vividness: one repeats words for “emotional impact,” as Demetrius puts it; to 
create “a disturbance and movement of the mind,” as Longinus says: to bully one’s hearers, 
“hitting the jury in the mind with blow after blow.”241  Or, in the words of the sixteenth-
century rhetorician John Hoskins, a writer “beats upon one thing to cause the quicker feeling 
in the audience.”242 
 Being a Highlander, then, means two quite different things in chapter twenty of 
Waverley: the ironic self-creation of desire after the image of convention, and the production 
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of feeling in collective aesthetic experience.  And these two forms of belonging receive quite 
different forms of narration: on the one hand, the key moment of ironic self-consciousness 
– “Every one present understood that his taste was to be formed…” – is rendered by an 
omniscient narrator who fully comprehends the interior states of others, and who can not 
only account for the scene at hand but place it within a context of repeated action: 
“consequently, the tacksmen and their dependents always professed…”  Collective aesthetic 
experience, on the other hand, is rendered in a rhetorically suasive style, but one that lacks an 
ability to fully know the effects that it attempts to mime: both the meaning and the effects of 
Mac-Murrough’s song are placed behind a scrim of inference, rendered in two seemings, two 
as ifs, and one appearing.  Reading song is like listening to song: this is reading as metonym 
rather than metaphor. 
To be sure, there is no actual enigma here – all of the narrator’s inferences are the 
right ones.  When Flora Mac-Ivor later describes Mac-Murrough’s song, her account of its 
contents will echo Waverley’s in virtually every detail: “The song is little more than a 
catalogue of names of the Highland clans under their distinctive peculiarities, and an 
exhortation to them to remember and to emulate the actions of their forefathers” (173).  
And though the enthusiasm of the bhairdh only appears to infect the audience, the very next 
paragraph in chapter twenty – surveying the now completed performance with an eye 
located elsewhere – confirms the fact of that “communication”: “The Chieftain, who during 
this scene had appeared rather to watch the emotions which were excited, than to partake 
their high tone of enthusiasm, filled with claret a small silver cup which stood by him” (166).  
No more are the emotions merely apparently excited; from the retrospective and detached 
view of Fergus Mac-Ivor, the causal link is clear. 
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It will be noted, from the cool retrospective view of the scene afforded by Fergus, 
that Mac-Murrough’s singing appears to be precisely the kind of ironically framed aesthetic 
experience that will later get placed on the wall of Tully-Veolan: here, too, the claims of 
national feeling are placed within a social setting. Yet Scott makes it spectacularly difficult to 
know that Fergus’s view should be the final one, or that it should be assimilated to the 
novel’s own: the song, after all, is then repeated in Flora’s translation. To determine whether 
the emphasis should be placed on Fergus’s view of the scene or Flora’s is to be placed in 
what James Chandler calls the dialectical relationship in Scott between the scene and the 
captioning, exterior “explanatory word” that gives it shape – a motion of thought that, as 
Chandler writes, is always potentially endless: Scott “recognized… that the effort to capture 
a scene can always be construed as occurring in the setting of another scene” (England in 
1819, 329-30).   
I would like to leave this potentially infinite regress suspended, then, and instead 
note how much the language of uncertain inference and tentative interpretation – deployed 
to such great effect in the narration of Mac-Murrough’s song – pops up around the effects 
of song generally in Waverley, even when they are far more mundane: “The party preserved 
silence, interrupted only by the monotonous and murmured chant of a Gaelic song, sung in 
a kind of low recitative by the steersman, and by the dash of the oars, which the notes 
seemed to regulate” (139).  Song’s effect on the world, we might say, is always only indirect.   
And in much the same way, Scott’s prose style works to serve as a noticeable, visible 
analogue of what it represents.  In the near-apophasis of its account of Mac-Murrough’s 
song, Waverley reminds us that we are not present in the scene and could not understand it if 
we were, while simultaneously using its own rhetorical means to make us feel “as if” we 
were.  Reading Mac-Murrough’s singing, I, like the reader of Ellis’s condensed metrical 
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romances, encounter the page as present in its own right, and am thereby reminded that I am 
a particular audience for this old song of national belonging – an audience that does not 
listen, that is not located in a (linguistic, cultural, historical) position to listen.  Scott’s style, of 
course, is hardly an invisible one; nor is it one that points to itself in service to detached 
irony as its own end.  Rather, his style works to bring reader and represented experience into 
convergence – but this convergence is always explicitly mediated through the form of the 
novel’s page itself. 
And this same mediated, separate-but-similar style runs throughout the Waverley 
novels.  Consider, first, a brief look at Fenella, Scott’s reworking of Mignon in the 1823 
novel Peveril of the Peak.243   Fenella enters Peveril as a deaf-mute in whom “the expression of 
her passion, unable to display itself in language” (163) instead takes alternate, strangely 
charismatic forms.  Critics, especially after the publication of Carlyle’s translation of Wilhelm 
Meister’s Apprenticeship in 1824, noted the extent to which Fenella seemed modeled upon 
Mignon – the Edinburgh Review found that Fenella “is borrowed almost entire from… 
Mignon,” while Blackwood’s suggested that both fit the pattern of a “silent, mysterious, 
infantine thing, with… passions so much beyond her years and stature.”244  And just as 
Mignon impresses herself on Wilhelm and the novel’s readers alike in “Kennst du das 
Land,” so too does Fenella enter Scott’s novel with a series of questions: 
On the present occasion, planting herself in the very midst of the narrow descent, so 
as to make it impossible for Peveril to pass by her, [Fenella] proceeded to put him to 
the question by a series of gestures, which we will endeavor to describe.  She 
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commenced by extending her hand slightly, accompanied with a sharp inquisitive 
look which served her as a note of interrogation.  This was meant as an inquiry if he 
was going to a distance.  Julian, in reply, extended his arm more than half, to intimate 
that the distance was considerable.  Fenella looked grave, shook her head, and 
pointed to the Countess’s window, which was visible from the spot where they 
stood.  Peveril smiled, and nodded, to intimate there was no danger in quitting her 
mistress for a short space.  The little maiden next touched an eagle’s feather which 
she wore in her hair, a sign which she usually employed to designate the Earl, and 
then looked inquisitively at Julian once more, as if to say, “Goes he with you?” 
Peveril shook his head, and, somewhat wearied by these interrogatories, smiled, and 
made an effort to pass…  (164-5) 
If this is a translation of sorts out of Goethe, it is translation as reversal: the questions of 
“Kennst du das Land” seem to speak out of the page directly, to me.  Here, though, Fenella’s 
questions establish a rhythm of reading and re-reading: the narrator first supplies a gesture, 
and then its meaning, enforcing on the reader a forward-and-back motion of the eye.   This 
motion of explanatory interpretation seems, at times, almost to overwhelm its reason for 
existence: Fenella’s opening look is initially “inquisitive,” then “a note of interrogation,” and 
then finally “an inquiry.”  A tiresome process, then – Peveril’s weariness might seem to 
double our own – but as the novel’s epigraph suggests, boredom has a function.  Here we 
might say, borrowing a phrase from Clement Greenberg, that this style emphasizes the 
flatness of the narrative’s material support; “Kennst du das Land” points out from the page, 
while Fenella’s “series of gestures” operates like a network of arrows criss-crossing the page 
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itself.245  Greenberg claims that “one sees a Modernist picture as a picture first” (87); in 
Scott, we read less Fenella’s questions than the “endeavor to describe” them.   
Why write like this?  Consider a second example, a single sentence drawn from The 
Antiquary.  The sentence arrives at the height of one of the few moments of genuine 
narrative suspense in the novel, in which Isabella and Arthur Wardour, stuck between a cliff 
and the sea at high tide, are in danger of drowning: 
As they thus pressed forward, longing doubtless to exchange the easy curving line, 
which the sinuosities of the bay compelled them to adopt, for a straighter and more 
expeditious path, though less conformable to the line of beauty, Sir Arthur observed 
a human figure on the beach advancing to meet them. (72)  
Reader and character both long for a straighter path here: the Wardours are frustrated by the 
curve of the bay, while the reader is hemmed in by commas and an ostentatiously ill-timed, 
jokey reference to William Hogarth’s aesthetico-philosophical reflections on the “line of 
beauty.”   
Ian Duncan, in a perceptive account of Scott’s style, has suggested that readers after 
1900 reject Scott in large part because they have become accustomed to a “naturalization at 
the level of style.” Such naturalization, Duncan writes, is made normative in Austen’s free 
indirect discourse, which creates a “homological bonding of speaking, writing, and 
consciousness” (Scott’s Shadow 278).  The comparison is particularly apt in the face of a 
sentence like this one – which, though hardly pursuing a homologically naturalized bond, 
obviously does aim at a kind of analogical modeling of written style on represented 
experience.  Here, like Austen, Scott seeks to model his readers’ thoughts on those of his 
characters, writing in a style that is deliberately mimetic of the state of consciousness it 
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describes.  Unlike Austen, though, Scott does not combine the two on the page.  If, in the 
paradigmatic examples of free indirect discourse, the “wrong” deictic markers stretch syntax 
to fuse reader and characters, to make (in Dorrit Cohn’s phrase) the thinking of a 
represented mind effortlessly transparent to reading (e.g., Elizabeth Bennet about to 
interrupt Mr. Collins: “It was absolutely necessary to interrupt him now”), Scott in fact goes 
out of his way here – “longing doubtless” suggesting, by denying, the necessary intervention of 
a process of inference between knower and known – to signal the inaccessibility of his 
characters’ consciousnesses.246  Instead of merging the reading with the represented 
consciousness, then, Scott leaves the two states of “longing” separated but parallel, 
isomorphic but causally unrelated: the characters’ frustration with the curves of the bay, and 
the reader’s frustration with the sinuosities of the sentence.   
To take this sentence in Kames’s terms, the presence of incidents or things is hardly at 
stake here; rather, the book at every point insists upon my “consciousness of self, and of 
reading, [my] present occupation.”  Scott’s sentence insists upon the reader’s reflection in the 
moment of reading (rather than after it).  Yet, strangest of all, the reader’s mental state 
comes to converge on the characters’ precisely because of the thickness of the novel’s style: 
the novel’s reminders that I am, after all, a reader – faced with a book made up of commas 
and clauses rather than bay, cliffs, and tide – are what make my experience like the 
experience I read about.  In Scott’s style, then, the book neither becomes an invisible relay of 
a represented experience, nor frames it: instead, Scott’s style asks its reader to behave much 
like the reader of Ellis’s romance, simultaneously conscious of his reading while recognizing 
in that reading a metonymic resemblance to what he reads about. 
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Interchapter 2: The Victorians read Scott 
  
I have stressed, in the previous chapter, that Scott’s novelistic style enforces upon its 
reader a double awareness: Scott deploys in his novels a model for layered reading that he 
first developed in his work as an antiquarian.  Through a style that emphasizes its own 
opacity, Scott’s style works to create a resemblance between the experience of reading and 
what is represented – one that presupposes a distance between the two, rather than attempts 
to collapse it. 
 Consider, however, Maggie Tulliver’s reading, in George Eliot’s novel The Mill on the 
Floss, published in 1860:  
Sometimes Maggie thought she could have been contented with absorbing fancies: if 
she could have had all Scott’s novels and all Byron’s poems! – then perhaps she 
might have found happiness enough to dull her sensibility to her actual daily life.  
And yet… they were hardly what she wanted.  She could make dream-worlds of her 
own – but no dream-world would satisfy her now.  She wanted some explanation of 
this hard, real life.247 
This is Eliot the realist at perhaps her most doctrinaire.  Scott’s novels and Byron’s poems 
take Maggie out of the “actual”: they can only cover over, rather than explain, the “hard, real 
life” – a near repetition of the situation Marmion fails to address.  Scott has become where 
you go to run away from the real – as though Scott had not affirmed that one also had to 
come back home: “her brain would be busy with wild romances of a flight from home in 
search of something less sordid and dreary: – she would go to some great man – Walter 
Scott, perhaps…” (300).   
                                                          




As Fiona Robertson puts it in her Legitimate Histories, Scott was transformed after his 
death “into the Victorian icon of normality.”248  Maggie’s reading suggests that by the 1850s, 
the experience of reading Scott – and, I will suggest, that of listening to the minstrel – this 
normality had taken a specific form, as a kind of invisibility.  Reading Scott, to Eliot 
narrating Maggie, is described in those totalizing terms which Scott himself worked to avoid: 
as a way of denying any separation between the reading subject and the book, and by 
implication offering an escapist fantasy of pre-critical cultural belonging.  And indeed this 
image of Scott extended far beyond such explicitly anti-Romantic moments as this one.  
There is a wide range of support for the claim of Scott’s huge influence upon 
nineteenth-century fiction.  William St. Clair has persuasively argued that Scott’s readership 
so far outstripped other authors in the Victorian period that if “there are links between texts, 
books, reading, cultural formation, and mentalities, then Scott is the author to whom, above 
all, we should look.”249  The case has also been bolstered by recent quantitative work in the 
digital humanities: so Matthew Jockers has claimed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that stylistic 
analysis shows Scott and Austen to have been the century’s most influential authors – the 
nineteenth-century novel’s “equivalent of Homo erectus.”250  That these quantifiable facts 
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produced a qualitative “normality” is of course trickier to demonstrate – but certainly there 
is no shortage of contemporary report to attest to exactly this claim.  For David Masson it 
was perfectly evident, in speaking of the Waverley novels in 1859, that “[w]e all know them, 
and we all enjoy them” 251; for Julia Wedgwood in 1878, Scott’s achievement as “the 
interpreter of English life” was unparalleled – a plant perfectly “characteristic of the soil.”252 
 Like Robertson, I am struck by this achievement of normality precisely because it 
seems to fly in the face of stylistic facts that are recognizable to us now and were also 
apparent to Scott’s own contemporaries.  Robertson provides an account of Scott’s 
Victorian normality as a carefully crafted forgetting – already begun in Lockhart’s Life of Scott 
– of the Wizard of the North’s engagement with the Gothic.  I would like to focus here on 
another aspect of the Victorian reception of Scott: the unlikely forgetting of the thickness of 
his style.   
 Scott’s own contemporaries recognized his heavy style.  Maria Edgeworth, for 
example, wrote to Scott in 1814 that 
[w]e have this moment finished Waverley… the interest is kept up to the last moment.  
We were so possessed with the belief that the whole story and every character in it 
was real, that we could not endure the occasional addresses from the author to the 
reader.  They are like Fielding; but for that reason we cannot bear them, we cannot 
bear that an author of such high powers, of such original genius, should for a 
                                                          
251 British Novelists and Their Styles (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1859), 194.  
 




moment stoop to imitation.  This is the only thing we dislike, these are the only 
passages we wish omitted in the whole work…253  
Harriet Martineau, writing shortly after his death, found a similarly lamentable feature in 
Scott’s ill-timed jokes and his clumsiness: they broke the texture of reading and signaled an 
unfortunate aristocratic distaste for the serious labor of writing.  This habit of speaking 
“lightly of literature,” Martineau continued, was a basically Tory tendency, one that would 
age very poorly now that “the serious temper of the times requires a new direction.”254  In 
both Edgeworth and Martineau, Scott appears much as he does now, to us – as a writer 
whose signature stylistic trait was an incessant interposition of the page between reader and 
the fiction of story and character. 
It can seem jarring, then, to recall that by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Scott could be attacked by E.M. Forster as the very image of the natural storyteller.  The 
transformation in the image of Scott can be seen in William Hazlitt’s remarkable 1824 essay 
on the author. 255   Hazlitt claims that Scott in effect trains his reader to forget the book he 
reads, to forget that he is reading: Scott’s turn from verse romance to novels is, for Hazlitt, a 
turn away from a style of narrative that marks itself as written into a new “natural” mode of 
representation, in which the agency of representation effaces itself.  Writing three decades 
before “realism” had much currency as a theoretical term, Hazlitt writes of Scott’s novels as 
therefore able to produce readerly absorption in a way his metrical romances had not been.   
The reader of Scott’s metrical romances, Hazlitt observed, was constantly aware that he was 
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reading because of Scott’s (poor) style: the poetry was a compound of “the tagging of 
rhymes, the eking out of syllables, the supplying of epithets, the colors of style” (129-130).  
In the novels, however, Scott “has completely got rid of the trammels of authorship” (130) 
to the extent that the writtenness of the novels is entirely invisible: “It is impossible to say 
how fine his writing in consequence are, unless we could describe how fine nature is” (134).  
Or, as Hazlitt put it in another essay,  
His style is clear, flowing, and transparent: his sentiments, of which his style is an 
easy and natural medium, are common to him with his readers… He never obtrudes 
himself on your notice to prevent your seeing the object… The author has little or 
nothing to do with it.256 
And, indeed, this is how the Victorians largely read Scott – as an author whom it was 
virtually impossible to notice.     
In part this account of Scott as “natural medium” relied upon a certain image of the 
man himself as merely one of the crowd.  Late in his career, Scott described himself – 
inaccurately, of course – as a writer who had decided to eschew “what is called literary 
society” and instead maintain a “place in general company” and a “general interest in what 
was going on around [him].”257  Scott sets up here an opposition here between the 
specifically, narrowly literary and the reiterated adjective general – one that he lends a class 
valence by analogizing the rarefied pleasures of literary company to drinking “cordial and 
luscious draughts,” and the wholesome pleasures of general company to  quaffing 
“wholesome bitters.”  This opposition is picked up on by many mid-Victorian retrospective 
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essays.  In his 1859 British Novelists David Masson described Scott as “a modest, hearty man, 
with as little of the cant of authorship about him as any author that ever lived” (194).  Five 
years later Henry James would name him “the inventor of a new style” by virtue of his being 
“the first fictitious writer who addressed the public from its own level”; ten years after that, 
Julia Wedgwood portrayed him as one who “moves unencumbered by his own 
personality.”258  
This image of Scott as the “general” or “public” man went hand in hand with a 
description of his narration as exemplary in its natural, unnoticeable storytelling.  Again, 
Scott’s comments on himself, here in the form of an anonymous self-review published in the 
Quarterly Review in 1817, helped establish the image, painting a picture of Scott as an author 
who “errs chiefly from carelessness” – whose lack of skill in plotting, therefore, made the 
individual parts of his works all the more immediate: 
[H]e has avoided the common language of narrative, and thrown his story, as much 
as possible, into a dramatic shape.  In many cases this has added greatly to the effect, 
by keeping both the actors and the action continually before the reader, and placing 
him, in some measure, in the situation of the audience at a theatre, who are 
compelled to gather the meaning of the scene from what the dramatis personae say 
to each other, and not from any explanation addressed immediately to themselves.  
But though the author gain this advantage, and thereby compel the reader to think of 
the personages of the novel and not of the writer, yet the practice, especially pushed 
to the extent we have noticed, is a principle cause of the flimsiness and incoherent 
texture… (SCH 115) 
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The Scott novel here is a drama, but precisely an anti-theatrical one.  This drama “compels” 
the close attention of its viewers and entirely absorbs them into the fiction, forcing them “to 
think of the personages” rather than the performance of the writer, or indeed of the writing 
itself.    
The disappearance of the writer in Scott would become a Victorian critical cliché.  
Walter Bagehot – writing in 1858, for the self-consciously moderate National Review, what is 
often called the best and most representative Victorian essay on Scott – closed his 
consideration of the Waverley novels with the observation that 
[t]he style of Scott would deserve the highest praise if M. Thiers could establish his 
theory of narrative language.  He maintains that an historian’s language approaches 
perfection in proportion as it aptly communicates what is meant to be narrated 
without drawing any attention to itself.  Scott’s style fulfills this condition. Nobody 
rises from his works without a most vivid idea of what is related, and no one is able 
to quote a single phrase in which it has been narrated. (SCH 420)259  
As a written presence, Scott is, at least in memory, entirely transparent: a perfect lens 
precisely because he is never seen, at least not consciously or in ways that could be 
remembered.  The words on the pages of his novels were merely “the first sufficient words 
which came uppermost,” Bagehot continued (421) – not perhaps providing the greatest 
“excitement,” but never, he repeats, “attract[ing] our attention” (420).  
 Bagehot, it is true, had at this point made a habit of advocating for the bland: his 
essay in the first number of the National Review was a defense of Cowper as English national 
poet precisely because of his specialization in “the trivial course of slowly-moving 
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pleasures,” ideally suited for a “settled and practical people… distinctly in favour of heavy 
relaxations.”260  Yet Bagehot was hardly alone in praising Scott for how easy it was to forget 
his words; two years later, “M—M” writes for Fraser’s a surprisingly similar evaluation of 
Scott’s style: 
Digressions and illustrations may be permitted in a novel or essay, which would be 
out of place in a scientific or logical treatise.  But such digressions should never be 
allowed to carry the author out of sight of his original goal.  The universally 
acknowledged beauty of Sir Walter Scott’s style is mainly owing to its perfect 
simplicity and directness; his illustrations arise naturally out of the subject before 
him, and he condenses into a few sentences, descriptions of scenes and events which 
in the hands of our novelists would occupy many pages.261 
Again, Scott as a storyteller is above all not noticeable: simple, direct, natural, to the point.  
Similar observations, linking Scott’s public persona to the naturalness – or praiseworthy 
invisibility – of his style, are made throughout the Victorian periodical press, with only slight 
variations.  Writing of the “Liberal Movement in English Literature” in 1885, W. J. 
Courthope virtually repeats Hazlitt’s sixty-year-old understanding of Scott’s career.  
Courthope, too, finds that Scott’s verse romances bore the marks of their making – the 
reader of Marmion, particularly, “cannot help feeling that it has been put together”; 
Courthope, too, finds that in the novels, however, we “breathe in the story” as it flits past 
“in the language of real life.”262   
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Perhaps most strikingly, in the late Victorian essays in which the decline of Scott’s 
reputation is readily apparent, the basic account of Scott’s style remains unchanged.  E.M. 
Forster’s famous assault on Scott in Aspects of the Novel – as a novelist who, more than any 
other, is merely the nineteenth-century’s version of the cave-dwelling storyteller who pacified 
“an audience of shock-heads” through the spell of “wondering what would happen next”263 
– is merely a repetition of Victorian commonplaces with a new set of evaluations attached, 
the development of Leslie Stephen’s description of Scott’s storytelling, “as natural as the talk 
by firesides” (284).264  Forster condemns Scott as creating in the audience nothing more than 
the desire “to know what happens next”; in reading Scott, we learn to submit to mere 
succession: when something different happens, the reader’s “attention reawakens… then his 
attention is diverted to something else, and the time-sequences goes on.”  Our interest, 
Forster claims, is held only locally, point-to-point, through the simplistic logic implied by the 
questions “And then? … And then?” (131).  Mere consecution must be rejected by the 
novelist in part for reasons of mimetic faithfulness – as Virginia Woolf claimed that “life is 
not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged,” so Forster too insists that life, at least as it 
is remembered, is no mere sequence but rather forms itself into “a few notable pinnacles.”265  
The logic of the series must also be set aside in order to draw the novel closer to less 
“atavistic” forms of expression that can be remembered, that remain themselves in the mind 
– like “melody, or perception of truth.”  Yet, again, Forster’s discussion of Scott as the 
consummate storyteller is remarkable only as a newly negative version of Victorian 
commonplaces.  Forster’s principal observations – that Scott’s readers are absorbed into 
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following a chain of events in sequence; that Scott’s works are “instinctive” rather than 
artificial; even that Scott novels cannot be remembered as novels apart from the events they 
describe: these are precisely the qualities that Scott’s Victorian critics found praiseworthy.   
It is not my intention here to trace a history of a “natural” or “simple” style in 
discussions of English-language narrative.  Nor do I mean, exactly, to compose a history of 
these words  and their shifting uses.  My observation here is somewhat more confined and 
literal-minded. To us, now, Scott’s style of storytelling is notably circumlocutory and 
insistently written; for the Victorians it was quite otherwise: direct, natural, simple, and a 
recollection of oral storytelling.  Moreover, “our” Scott is also the Scott of Scott’s peers:  the 
mid-Victorian image of Scott as a stylist is the abnormality here, differing from both the 
criticisms of his contemporaries and those of the present day.   During the decades in which 
Scott was universally read, he was also (as stylist) invisible.   
The German motto of the Oldbuck family in The Antiquary – whose head, Jonathan 
Oldbuck, has long been read as a double for Scott himself – is “Kunst macht Gunst”: “skill 
wins favor,” as the novel translates it, but also, surely, “art makes favor.”  Not perhaps 
precisely Wordsworth’s motto, that the poet creates his own taste, but surely close enough.  
This was an ability that Hazlitt denied to Scott, arguing that while “a great mind is one that 
moulds the minds of others,” Scott was “only entertaining” (“On the Living Poets,” 308-9).  
But if we are searching for what Scott gave the nineteenth century, where better to start than 
here – with how Scott trained the nineteenth century to consider his mode of narration 
impersonal, simple, and direct where both his contemporaries and ours find it digressive and 
intrusively jocular?    
At the same time as Scott would serve as a figure for the continuity of attention over 
time, he was also often pressed into duty in discussions of the organization of collective 
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attention in space.  Scott’s favored mode – the romance – and his frequent poetic double, 
the minstrel performer of ballads or romances, was often cited by the Victorian press as 
epitomizing collective aesthetic experience across social strata.  Thus, Dickens’s reading 
tours in the 1850s were often figured as the return of the art of minstrelsy: as a writer in the 
Examiner put it in 1858, Dickens had revived the art of “the old Scalds and bards,” and in 
doing so, had gained an ability to unite his audience as a feeling body and thus as the object 
of rhetorical appeal: “Every passage speaks home to the heart, and there is one purpose in 
all… [W]e have heard the living voice of one who has the right to close his fable, as he does, 
with a direct appeal to us as workers in the world.”266  W.E. Aytoun made much the same 
point in an essay on ballads from the same year: 
[Listening to ballads] was a pleasant and a wholesome amusement for the people – 
better, I venture to think, than the perusal of political or sectarian tracts, falsified 
representations of society as it exists in this world, and bigoted exhortations to the 
renunciation of Christian charity as a fit preparative for the next.  It is curious to 
remark how ancient customs ever and anon force themselves, despite of what is 
called progress, into new existence.  At the very time when I am preparing these 
sheets for the press, no entertainments are so popular as those given by Mr. Charles 
Dickens, who reads or recites his own admirable compositions to delighted 
audiences.  Once again, and in an age when such a contact might have been deemed 
least likely to occur, the minstrel (for such he truly is who can touch every chord of 
                                                          




emotion) and the audience have been brought together face to face, and the charm 
of delivery has been superadded to that of skilful composition. (xxxiv) 267 
For Aytoun, Dickens and the minstrel both created a true popular culture, a mass yet “face 
to face” experience of shared emotion.  Helen Small writes of Dickens’s public readings in 
the 1850s as a liberal fantasy of the power of culture to transcend social (especially, class) 
difference.  As Small describes it, listening to the novelist (at least as Dickens and his friends 
imagined it) was a “public acknowledgment of a shared private experience”: one went to 
hear Dickens read scenes that one knew, quite possibly, by heart already – to be moved 
among other people precisely as one had already been moved by oneself, or in the company 
of family or a reading society.268  What the joint experience of Dickens’s reading offered, 
then, was an “authoritative experience of being a reading public” (277).  As Aytoun saw it, 
Dickens’s readings resembled the voice of the bard insofar as his readings were unifying 
experiences, in which audiences are put into “contact,” or “touched.” 
Yet the minstrel could also serve in the 1850s as a figure for absolute disruptions of 
the attention that could make such collectivity possible.  So, the Westminster Review described 
modern romance compositions – including Scott’s – as a series of surprising events that 
shocked readers out of absorbed attention: thus the reader “finds his interest scattered by 
the feeling of amusement and annoyance with which he listens to some not ungraceful fancy 
or turn of words, which end, or descend, into a puff direct on Warren’s blacking, or Moses’ 
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vests.”269  Far from uniting an audience in attention, then, the minstrel might instead turn his 
audience into skeptical individuals, perusing a narrative with the alienated examination with 
which one reads ad copy: the reader as resistantly self-aware of the rhetorical demands her 
reading makes.  
The two positions on romance effectively place it at opposite ends of the 
absorption/disruption dyad; both positions assume that the experience of reading should be a 
wholly absorptive one.  The development of the Victorian account of Scott thus seems to be 
a double movement, in which, on the one hand, Scott’s intensely mediated style was 
increasingly remembered as immediate and natural, while on the other, the minstrel music that, 
I have argued, provided Scott with models for a mediated practice of narration became a 
conventional way of referring to the collapse of distance between the reader and the book.   
Corresponding to this development, I would suggest, is a certain uncanniness to the 
terms in which mid-Victorian novels think about the effects of reading.  Certainly this is true 
of the Mill on the Floss.  Maggie Tulliver, of course, eventually does find a book that speaks to 
her “hard, real life”: Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ.  Though the novel’s narration 
emphasizes the strange control exerted over Maggie by the physical structure of the page – 
her eye follows the markings of a prior reader, “long since browned by time” (301), for 
Maggie the book is all sound:  
A strange thrill of awe passed through Maggie while she read, as if she had been 
wakened in the night by a strain of solemn music, telling of beings whose souls had 
been astir while hers was in stupor.  She went on from one brown mark to another, 
where the quiet hand seemed to point, hardly conscious that she was reading – 
seeming rather to listen while a low voice said… (302) 
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Sound – music, the voice – penetrates the interior of the self, but thereby isolates it, 
promising “a secret of life”; as Neil Hertz observes, “[t]hat the secret is in this case deemed 
benign… is less important than that a space of secrecy has been hollowed out within the 
self.”270  And how might one overcome that secrecy of the interior?  When Philip Wakem – 
Maggie’s childhood companion – reappears in the novel (and tries to convince her to give 
Scott another look), the call both the friendship and Scott make to Maggie, that she “‘love… 
this world again”’ (318), is itself figured as a “voice that… made sweet music, … like chimes 
borne onward by a recurrent breeze” (315).  Maggie’s choice between Philip and Thomas à 
Kempis is thus, bizarrely, a choice between the compulsive force of two musics. 
 “‘Certain strains of music,’” Philip says, “‘affect me so strangely – I can never hear 
them without their changing my whole attitude of mind’” (317).  And no wonder: in The Mill 
on the Floss, reading, like music, isolates the self; reading, like music, connects the self to the 
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“Beyond the Occasion”: Daniel Deronda after Wagner 
 
Like any conversion experience – any turning, however small, of a cheek, of a mood 
– the effect is apt to seem out of proportion to what you might think to call its cause. 
      – Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy271  
 
 In the space of a single chapter in its fourth book, Daniel Deronda presents its readers 
with two strikingly similar scenes of musical listening.272  First, in Frankfurt, Daniel attends a 
synagogue service and is deeply moved by the music of the liturgy, sung in a Hebrew that he 
does not know; the service has on him something “like the effect of an Allegri’s Miserere or a 
Palestrina’s Magnificat” (367).  A few pages (and, in the novel’s complex storytelling, months) 
later, Daniel again hears music whose words he does not understand, this time in a Hebrew 
hymn sung by Mirah Lapidoth, who learned the hymn from her mother.   Mirah does not 
know any real words to the song, but its “lisped syllables” nevertheless seem to Daniel “very 
full of meaning” (374).  Song is thus twice heard as incomprehensible in this chapter; it also 
twice offers a kind of ecstasy, absorbing the listening self into a community constituted in 
shared musical experience: Mirah, reminiscing earlier in the novel, states that hearing her 
mother sing those Hebrew hymns made her feel their shared “love and happiness”; in the 
synagogue,  Daniel enters into a “sense of communion [with] long generations of struggling 
fellow-men” (210, 368).    
Translating Feuerbach, Eliot had written in 1854 of the “overwhelming power of 
melody” in human experience: “And what else is the power of melody but the power of 
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feeling?”273  Yet it is not melody that is powerful here; neither Daniel nor Mirah experience 
expressivity as the immediate effect of melody per se, or of the materiality of the voice.274  
Mirah, remembering how her mother sang to her years before, recalls that “because I never 
knew the meaning of the words they seemed full of nothing but our love and happiness” 
(210).  In her careful account, the song is full of affect, but that plenitude resides neither in 
the voice nor in the melody, but instead in the (unknown) words (“they seemed full”), and 
only because those words are unknown.  What is contingent in Mirah’s listening is Daniel’s 
choice: he displays a deliberate lack of care for linguistic meaning in Frankfurt, putting aside 
the “German translation of the Hebrew in the book before him” in order to “g[i]ve himself 
up to that strongest effect of chanted liturgies which is independent of detailed verbal 
meaning” (367).  This approach to song is, in fact, something like a tic for Daniel: even 
when, later in the novel, he hears Mirah sing a song whose words he actually knows, Daniel 
will nonetheless have only “[c]ertain words not included within the song… ring within” him 
(559, my emphasis).  What moves in these moments is not a Feuerbachian presence of 
feeling, but rather an absence of meaning – music is meaning’s trace, or even its negation; as 
Mladen Dolar argues, “singing is bad communication,” offering “expression which is more 
than meaning, yet expression which functions only in tension with meaning.”275  As James 
Sully, the psychologist and acquaintance of both George Eliot and George Henry Lewes, put 
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it in an essay published three years before Deronda, “In enjoying a song by Schubert, one 
must not care to know all its verbal details.”276  The meaning of a song resides in the words 
you do not hear – an uneasy structure that gives Daniel himself pause: “He wondered at the 
strength of his own feeling; it seemed beyond the occasion” (368).    
For both Daniel and Mirah, what is at stake in listening to the musical articulation of 
unknown words is not merely enjoyment but also identification.  Mirah’s memory of her 
mother’s voice gives her the independence to flee from the life her father has planned for 
her, one of a theatricality so debased it begins to resemble prostitution; years later, her 
mother’s voice is also what causes her to want to be “‘a good Jewess’” (370).277  As for 
Deronda, one possible explanation for the excessiveness of his response is offered when a 
then-anonymous Jew approaches him, after the service, to ask after his family: “‘Excuse me, 
young gentleman – allow me – what is your parentage – your mother’s family – her maiden 
name?’” (368).  When Daniel recounts the story to Mirah, she too wonders about him: “‘I 
thought none but our people would feel that’” (374).  As the novel will eventually reveal, 
Mirah was right to wonder: Deronda does, indeed, turn out to be Jewish.  In one reading of 
the novel, then, responding to song is both what makes one identify – and be identified – as 
a Jew. 
What does Daniel Deronda think about this excessiveness in Daniel’s response, about 
the way in which feeling seems to be independent – or even demand the suppression – of 
meaning?  In surpassing its occasion, Deronda’s listening shares in what Stanley Cavell 
claims is the structure of all conversion experiences – and like Michael Ragussis, I believe 
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that indeed “we must read Deronda’s story as a conversion story.”278  The novel, however, 
does a great deal to suggest the potential inauthenticity of what happens to Daniel in the 
synagogue, especially through its invocation of Allegri and Palestrina.  A bit of historical 
background is helpful here, and warranted by Eliot’s own careful research into both the 
music of the synagogue and into Counter-Reformation musical style: Eliot’s choice of these 
composers, we know, was anything but arbitrary.279  Though critics have generally tended to 
read Eliot’s musical allusions as a direct attempt to bring the music of the past to bear on the 
present, making Deronda’s spiritual ecstasy available to Eliot’s non-Jewish readers, those 
same allusions also emphasize the difficulties of precisely that kind of cultural translation in 
two ways.280  Firstly, Deronda is attending services at a Frankfurt synagogue – not “the fine 
new building of the Reformed but the old Rabbinical school of the orthodox” (366) – whose 
liturgical reforms had included a concerted effort to do away with borrowings from Counter-
Reformation Catholic style.  Though it is of course not clear that Deronda is aware of the 
significance of his surroundings, he is attending the services of what was then, in the novel’s 
1865 setting, the epicenter of Jewish orthodoxy in Germany: the Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft, 
or IRG.281   The very features that give rise to Deronda’s rapturous experience – “the chant 
                                                          
278 Ragussis, Figures of Conversion: “The Jewish Question” & English National Identity (Durham and 
London: Duke UP, 1995), 286. 
 
279 In her notebooks, Eliot transcribed large chunks of the entry on Palestrina in what was then a 
leading reference work, François-Joseph Fétis’s Biographie Universelle des Musiciens; she also reviewed 
most of John Pyke Hullah’s History of Modern Music, a series of lectures covering music history from 
fourth-century chant to Wagner. Eliot’s notes on Fétis and Hullah are both in Pforzheimer notebook 
707; see George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda notebooks, especially 440-44 and 477-483. 
 
280 See Gray, 117 and Irwin, 441.   
 
281 See Robert Liberles, Religious Conflict in Social Context: The Resurgence of Orthodox Judaism in Frankfurt 
am Main, 1838-1877 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985) and Moshe Samet, “The Beginnings 
of Orthodoxy,” in Modern Judaism 8:3 (1988), 249-269.  Deronda is visiting the IRG in the fall of 
1865, a period in which the IRG was attempting to secede from the Reform community in Frankfurt 
170 
 
of the Chazan or Reader’s grand wide-ranging voice with its passage from monotony to 
sudden cries, the sweet boys’ voices from the little quire,” even the use of Hebrew rather 
than German texts (367) – were all the product of quite recent reforms on the part of the 
synagogue’s rabbi, Samson Raphael Hirsch, and his choirmaster, Israel Meyer Japhet.  
Though Japhet did adopt the style of some German folk-songs, A.Z. Idelsohn writes, he 
consistently shunned the Catholic style first adopted by many German Jewish congregations 
in the eighteenth century; for congregations like the IRG, that was a purely “European 
expression of music” that had to be avoided in favor of more traditionally Jewish forms.282  
As Japhet put it, his aim was “to give the traditional tunes as well as his own compositions 
the impress of chazzanuth, the character of which is entirely different from that of Church 
song.”283  Eliot thus places Deronda, hearing an effect like that of Allegri and Palestrina, in 
perhaps the synagogue in all of Germany where explicit musical references to Counter-
Reformation Catholic style would have been least welcome.   
Moreover, for English readers in the 1870s, allusions to Palestrina and Allegri would 
have evoked not only an imaginary experience of musico-religious rapture, but also the self-
defeating nature of any attempt to have this experience.  Nineteenth-century discussions of 
Palestrina directly addressed the difficulties of how audiences might, as James Garratt puts it, 
“use… the music of the past.”284  Eliot provides a phrase for the central difficulty in the next 
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chapter of Book IV, when, in the midst of his search for Mirah’s family, Deronda’s 
“attention [is] caught by some fine old clasps in chased silver” displayed in a shop window: 
“His first thought was that Lady Mallinger, who had a strictly Protestant taste for such 
Catholic spoils, might like to have these missal-clasps turned into a bracelet” (382).  The 
phrase neatly captures the nineteenth century’s difficulty in hearing sixteenth-century 
Catholic music – an effort that, as Carl Dahlhaus writes, was consistently plagued by “a bad 
conscience”285 – specifically, the bad conscience of tourism.  Palestrina and Allegri were, in 
the 1870s, closely associated with the Pope’s Sistine Chapel choir.  Since the late eighteenth 
century, a visit to the Sistine Chapel during Holy Week had been a standard part of an 
Englishman’s Italian tour and a common literary topos in travelers’ accounts; the high point 
of the visit was typically the performance of Allegri and Palestrina during the Good Friday 
service.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sistine Chapel visit was an occasion for 
farce, a stop on what Thackeray’s The Newcomes refers to as a Rome “all mapped out and 
arranged for English diversion”: “on Wednesday there will be music and Vespers at the 
Sistine chapel: on Thursday, the Pope will bless the animals…”286  Dickens describes a 
performance of Allegri’s Miserere  in a virtuosic passage in Pictures From Italy, one in which the 
touristic frame has made any reception of the music itself literally impossible: “hanging in 
the doorway of the chapel,” Dickens can only hear tourists frantically shushing each other 
and ensuring the stability of a nearby curtain, so “that it might not fall down and stifle the 
sound of the voices.”287   
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Yet the problem Dickens encountered in Rome – that the touristic surround of the 
Sistine Chapel kept getting in way of the real thing – was in a way necessary to any modern 
encounter with Palestrina or Allegri.  In Charles Burney’s 1771 Present State of Music in France 
and Italy, the music of the papal chapel is valuable because it contrasts with the “vanity and 
folly” of modern operatic practice.288  E.T.A. Hoffmann’s celebrated 1814 essay “Old and 
New Church Music,” similarly, engaged in an anti-theatrical polemic aimed at modern music 
which “striv[es] for so-called effect” through ornamentation.289  But at the same time 
nineteenth century accounts of the music at the Sistine Chapel were plagued by the problem 
of the music’s liturgical frame, because the significance of the music was understood as 
dependent upon the music’s highly ornate liturgical setting.  Upon returning to England, 
Burney published transcriptions of the Miserere together with three compositions of 
Palestrina’s; at the same time as he offered the works for domestic consumption, however, 
he emphasized that the music would likely suffer because it had been transplanted out of the 
Sistine Chapel: “some of the great effects produced” could “be justly attributed to the time, 
place, and solemnity of the ceremonials, used during the performance.”290   
The problem of Palestrina and Allegri was thus the problem of the parergon, the 
frame around aesthetic experience which Kant describes, in the Critique of Judgment, as “what 
does not belong to the whole presentation of the object as an intrinsic constituent,” but that 
“does indeed increase our taste’s liking, and yet… only by its form, as in the case of picture 
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frames.”291  Or, as Derrida glosses it: “an outside which is called to the inside of the inside in 
order to constitute it as an inside.”292  To “really” hear Palestrina was an exercise in 
impossibility: one heard his music as speaking to the present, as a model of anti-theatrical 
practice and naïve simplicity; at the same time, one recognized that this naïveté was a 
product of the highly theatrical ritual that served as the music’s frame.  Dickens, in a sharp 
inversion of Hoffmann’s terms, describes the altar at St. Peter’s as “fitted up with boxes, 
shaped like those at the Italian Opera in England, but in their decoration much more gaudy” 
(368), but this reversal was in fact interior to the attempt to hear Palestrina from the 
beginning.  Ragussis claims that Daniel, in the synagogue, stands “in the historical position 
of the Christian who co-opts Judaism for his own purposes” (276) – yet in fact Daniel’s 
position is less specific, that described within the novel as “strictly Protestant taste for 
Catholic spoils”: Daniel stands in the more general historical position of the cosmopolitan 
tourist, who co-opts religious music for his own purposes. 
The strange and provocative thing about Daniel Deronda, of course, is that it is 
perfectly well aware of these difficulties.  Daniel’s mother, hearing of his love for Mirah, will 
dismiss her with a peremptory but not inaccurate judgment: “‘Ah! like you. She is attached to 
the Judaism she knows nothing of… That is poetry – fit to last through an opera night’” 
(665).  This reading – in which Daniel and Mirah both are ignorant dreamers whose operatic 
dreams, somehow, are never reprimanded – is not unsupported by the novel itself.  Looking 
back on the novel’s plotting, it becomes apparent that what is decisive in the unfolding of 
Daniel’s conversion story is not the depth of his response to music, but rather a chance 
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event that occurs as Daniel leaves the synagogue: the anonymous Jew with a question about 
Daniel’s parentage turns out to be Joseph Kalonymos, an old friend of his grandfather’s, 
who will eventually arrange to have Daniel’s mother reveal the secret of his identity to him.  
From this retrospective vantage point, it seems that the processes of individual identification 
figured in musical listening are mere masks that attempt to give meaning to what are in fact 
the underlying, unalterable facts of identity.293 
The precise nature of the connection Daniel finds to Jewishness – whether and in 
what way it matters that he might “feel Jewish,” as Mirah seems to think, when he listens to 
Jewish music – has, of course, been a central concern to much recent criticism of the novel.  
Critics have in recent years read Daniel Deronda as both an articulation of the claims of 
nation, against that of a cosmopolitan modernity, and as itself invested in a form of 
cosmopolitan ethics.294   Perhaps most influentially, Amanda Anderson argues in The Powers 
of Distance that the novel represents a successful attempt to synthesize the two positions: in 
Daniel Deronda, Anderson claims, Eliot fashions a cosmopolitanism that might be flexible 
enough to unite the competing claims of cultural belonging and the detachment of 
modernity.  As Anderson writes, Eliot’s novel advocates for a “reflective return to the 
cultural origins that one can no longer inhabit in any unthinking manner.”295  Like Anderson, 
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I understand Eliot’s novel to be advocating something more complex than Deronda’s own 
longing to become an “organic part of social life” (365).   
In this chapter, however, I step aside somewhat from the relationship between 
nation and ethics central to so much of this criticism, and instead focus on music’s role in 
the relationship between nation and novelistic style.  Eliot is, of course, an extremely self-
aware writer, and part of the role music plays in Daniel Deronda, as I have suggested with a 
brief look at Palestrina and Allegri, is to import wholesale into her fiction the entire problem 
of a self-consciously cosmopolitan modernity’s longing for a cultural rootedness: Heinrich 
Heine, who provides two of Deronda’s epigraphs, satirizes that longing in the figure of a 
narrator who submits to “the mass of Palestrina” for a night, only to awake the next 
morning and “rub away sleep and Catholicism from [his] eyes.”296  Yet the role music plays 
in Daniel Deronda is much like that which it plays, as I have argued, in Scott: in attending to 
musical listening, Eliot attempts to find a way past the self-enforcing opposition between the 
touristic, ironizing observer and the fragmentary past that he longs for, precisely at the point 
at which that opposition seems to be most rigorously enforced.  
My argument here is that music in Daniel Deronda allows Eliot to think outside the 
homology between novelistic style and national boundary that tends to pervade much of her 
earlier fiction.  As Raymond Williams argues in The Country and the City, Eliot’s Englishness, 
especially by the time of Deronda, is an attachment shared, uneasily, between narrator and 
reader that works through an achieved stylistic distance – through what Slavoj Žižek calls 
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“the self-distance of the dominant culture.”297  For much of her novelistic career, Eliot 
regards music as a threat to that distance, and thus tends to place it outside the bounds of 
what the novel can properly represent.  In Daniel Deronda, however, Eliot explicitly revises 
her earlier writings on the relationship between novelistic genre and national boundary; 
specifically, through a discussion of the most accomplished musician in the novel, Julius 
Klesmer, I argue that music’s force to disrupt the interrelation between Englishness and 
narration comes about not because music forces an involuntary attachment, but rather 
because it is always experienced as an intended, importunate claim on the attention. 
I then turn to the theoretical writings of Richard Wagner, and to Eliot’s engagement 
with those writings in a set of essays from the 1850s.  Wagner’s operas, of course, were in 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century the prime contemporary example of how music 
could hold a listener’s attention; what Eliot rejected in Wagner was the deliberate attempt to 
give that attention a particular, meaningful content – an argument she makes explicitly in her 
essays, and that I will argue also underlies her narrative poem of 1870, “The Legend of 
Jubal.” 
I close by returning to the way in which both Mirah and Daniel listen.  By resisting 
Wagnerian aesthetics – that is, by refusing to ground the socially binding feelings music 
provides in any particular affect or meaning – Daniel Deronda articulates a strangely indefinite 
model of cultural attachment: music’s effects can only operate outside knowledge, yet those 
same effects prompt the listener to seek after the knowledge he or she lacks.  
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Palpitating life: Eliot’s anti-musical fiction 
Daniel Deronda, like all of Eliot’s later novels, is about the possibility of social 
belonging; more specifically, it – again, like the novels preceding it – takes as its primary 
concern the “possibility of human and interior community among men” that Georg Lukács 
defines as the telos of the novel.298  Where Eliot’s final novel departs from both Romola and 
Middlemarch, however, is in the role it reserves for music in creating that possibility. 
Lukács, it will be recalled, finds in the novel a specifically modern attempt at 
community in which the novel takes an individual alienated from society and educates him 
to play a role within it: while epic could rely on the “natural solidarity of kinship” to create 
that union, the Bildungsroman instead represents a process by which the liberal subject 
“comprehends and affirms the structures of social life as necessary forms of human 
community” (133).  Lukács suggests that the novelistic hero’s accommodation to the forms 
of social life is made possible, formally, by the “relativation of [the novel’]s central 
character.”  In Hegel’s famous quip, the Bildungsroman sends its central character off to 
“quarrel with the world,” only so that it may then make her into “as good a Philistine as 
others.”299  What Lukács means by relativation is something slightly different: the central 
character’s recognition that she is already like the others, and that the others are like her – 
something like Hegel’s negation of the negation by which the isolated self, finding in itself 
the only opposition to the way of the world, instead realizes that the “dead authority” of 
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convention that rules the world is “animated by the consciousness of all” – that “reality is a 
vivified ordinance.”300   
 Romola and Middlemarch begin from the eminently Lukácsian problem of life lived 
after the disappearance of epic.  Dorothea Brooke, famously, is one of those who seeks after 
an epic life, but who lacks the “national idea” – the “coherent social faith and order which 
could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul.”301   Living in the 
conditions of modernity, however, means that Dorothea’s life must, at least initially, take the 
form of mistakes.  Romola de Bardi, similarly, lives in a society without stable norms, one 
experiencing “the unrest of a new growth,” and seeks after a way of attaching herself to 
life.302  E.S. Dallas wrote in a review of Romola that for George Eliot “passion and direct 
action lie strangled in thought, and deeds present themselves to her rather as problems than 
as facts”;303 more precisely, one might say that both of these novels are about characters for 
whom action has become a problem.  Daniel Deronda also takes up this problem, and quite 
explicitly: Daniel, the narrator tells us, longs to become “an organic part of social life, instead 
of roaming in it like a yearning disembodied spirit” (365).   
Daniel’s musical listening is the first step in that process, and indeed music is, 
throughout Eliot’s fiction, a figure for forms of social connection. 304  Yet a look back at 
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Eliot’s earlier novels suggests the extent to which Daniel Deronda represents a departure: in 
both Romola and Middlemarch, it is the disappearance of music that allows for forms of 
Lukácsian relativation.   When music appears as a force upon its hearers in Middlemarch or 
Romola, it tends to produce wrong decisions based on illusion: Lydgate listens to Rosamond 
Vincy, is “taken possession of” (145), and marries the wrong woman; Romola, under the 
sway of Girolamo Savonarola’s voice, finds that she “care[s] a great deal for [the] music” of 
the “faint chorus” of religious life (387), and for a time gives herself over to a religious 
severity of principle she cannot, ultimately, support.   Musical performance in these novels 
may offer the possibility of authentic expression, but listening tends to be nearly as dangerous 
in George Eliot as it is in Plato.305   
When Middlemarch and Romola arrive at a statement of Lukács’s “possibility of human 
and interior community among men” – that is, at their endings, as Dorothea and Romola 
both find a place for themselves – the novels again turn to sound.  But emphatically not to 
music – to a sound that one is aware of hearing, and of being moved by.  Instead, both 
novels represent the realization that the world is animated by the consciousness of others in 
a vocabulary of basic pulsation – the same set of words that, as Neil Hertz writes, are 
generally Eliot’s way of effecting “a contraction of lived experience into some more 
elementary, particle-like form.”306  Dorothea, reflecting on having interrupted Rosamond 
Vincy and Will Ladislaw, asks herself, “Was she alone in that scene? Was it her event only?” 
(704); having thus relativized herself, conceived of the events of her life as someone else’s, 
she turns to the window and recognizes her “part [in] that involuntary, palpitating life” of 
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“labor and endurance” (705).  Romola, similarly, finds herself in a fishing village and 
discovers an “impulse to share the life around her” (560), having been “freed from the 
burden of choice,” like Dorothea, by the beat: by the, again, “palpitating life” of the stars 
(503).   
In Narrative and its Discontents, D. A. Miller describes four “great scenes” – including 
Dorothea at the window – at the close of Middlemarch as that novel’s attempts to close down 
its own textual energies in favor of a “wholly present word” in which “the moral imagination 
finds its voice”: the great scene is where author and reader, sign and meaning come together 
in what Miller calls a “transcendent experience of fellowship whose transparent signs no 
longer require interpretation.”307  One might say also that for Eliot the “transcendent 
experience of fellowship” ideally requires no words, and no literal voice.  Becoming organic, 
for Dorothea and Romola, is not a musical experience but a rhythmic one: involuntary, 
palpitating life.  The phrase suggests the “steady cadence” of Wordsworth’s Derwent.  It also 
brings to mind the “systole and diastole of blissful companionship” that is Eliot’s image of a 
happy marriage – one like that, within Daniel Deronda, between the English heiress Catherine 
Arrowpoint and the Jewish musician Julius Klesmer, in which the basic requirements of 
narrative movement have shrunk into a mere oscillation, “raising not only a continual 
expectation but a continual sense of fulfillment” (240).308  Palpitating life is thus that which 
needs and supports no narration; as these large novels wind down, they return both their 
central characters and their readers to a life imagined always as mere life – the “unhistoric,” as 
Middlemarch puts it (747); the simple thump-thump of the heart.   
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Rhythm is for ends, music is for middles: this is the law of Eliot’s later fiction.  Music 
is a part of how a character, like Romola, imagines herself to be capable of transcending the 
everyday.  The work of the narrative middles, however, is to show that transcendence to be 
illusory; when Romola and Dorothea return to social life at the close of these novels, this life 
sounds like a pervasive, constant pulsation.  In this context, the strangeness of Daniel Deronda 
is clear, and only more troubling.  The novel’s ending, of course, lacks the characteristic 
reduction into mere palpitation – in part because the everyday life that Deronda and Mirah 
will live is one that they, as Zionists, must build rather than rejoin.  But more troublingly, 
given Eliot’s own prior fiction, the novel appears to want Deronda’s feeling “beyond the 
occasion” to be a way of leading to truth rather than the illusion we, as good readers of 
Eliot, would have expected.    
 
Style and the English gentleman pure 
Little wonder, then, that from the beginning of Deronda’s reception, readers have 
recognized the chapter in which both Deronda and Mirah respond to music as beginning a 
new and somehow troubling phase of the novel.  The scenes come at almost the precise 
center of Deronda, near the end of its fourth book of eight; this book, menacingly titled 
“Gwendolen Gets Her Choice,” focuses until this point almost entirely on the marriage of 
the novel’s other central character, Gwendolen Harleth, to the aristocrat Henleigh 
Grandcourt.  Immediately before the novel turns to Deronda in the synagogue, Gwendolen 
has received from Lydia Glasher, Grandcourt’s former lover, the Medea-like gift of a 
necklace, complete with written curse, and has fallen to the floor “shrieking as it seemed 
with terror, the jewels scattered around her on the floor” (359).  A page later, and after an 
almost shockingly over-written epigraph, complete with archaic diction (“In all ages it hath 
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been a favourite text that a potent love hath the nature of an isolated fatality…”), we are 
following Deronda to Frankfurt (360).  The transition is a difficult one: “It seemed hard,” 
John Blackwood wrote to Eliot upon reading the proofs, “to be torn away from 
[Gwendolen] after she read that ‘horrible’ letter.”309  After the publication of the fourth 
book, at the end of April of 1876, the public at large seemed to echo Blackwood’s response.  
The Athenaeum found that the “plan of publication in parts” had begun to ruin “the 
effectiveness of the story, for when the end of the startling scenes of ‘Gwendolen Gets Her 
Choice’ is reached, the attention of the reader cannot be properly fixed upon the quieter 
Jewish episode which follows.”310  Blackwood himself wrote to his nephew William in the 
middle of May that Eliot had found the reception of this installment particularly difficult: she 
“remarked that it was hard upon her that people should be angry with her for not doing 
what they expected with her characters.”311   
What the fourth book did to its readers, however, was not merely alter their 
expectations for the book’s characters, but alter the nature of their expectant reading.  
Blackwood wrote to Eliot, “[a]t home we have constant discussions as to what is going to 
happen and who Deronda is”: his language suggests that the Blackwood family circle had 
realized that the novel was interested in a fact of identity, rather than in a course of action.312  
As the Edinburgh Review described the effect of the novel’s fourth book, “[t]he reader is more 
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quick-witted than Deronda, and sees from the first that he too must have something to do 
with the mysterious people who are so instantly attracted by him.”313  Later criticisms of the 
novel, as somehow suspiciously intentional, begin from this very moment: Henry James’s 
Pulcheria’s claim that the novel displays a “want of tact”; Sidney Colvin’s claim that the 
novel is written “with too little ease and too much insistence”; F.R. Leavis’s famous 
association of the novel’s strange “insistence,” its “element of the tacitly voulu,” with the 
novel’s “Jewish part” – these criticisms, centering around the claim that Deronda seems pre-
shaped for a destiny, begin from Deronda and Mirah listening to words they cannot 
understand.314  
 The vocabulary of these statements – tactlessness, over-insistence, the “tacitly voulu” 
– can make them seem uninteresting to us now: worthy of attention only as critical asides.  
Conceptually, the objections rely upon the wider concern in Victorian criticism with what 
Richard Stang refers to as “the disappearing author” – that is, the “idea that the novelist 
should completely efface himself from his creation.”315  E.S. Dallas called the principle “the 
law of unconsciousness” in his Poetics, borrowing his dictum from Horace: “the greatest art is 
to conceal art.”316  Yet what makes this strand of writing on Daniel Deronda so interesting, 
however, is precisely what makes them embarrassing: that they are about embarrassment – 
that is, that they rely upon a specifically social, class-based language to make their generic 
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arguments.  As James’s Constantius puts it, Gwendolen “finds Deronda pre-engaged to go 
to the East and stir up the race-feeling of the Jews”: “a wonderfully happy invention” (990).  
What is striking about this little joke, in which both Daniel’s Jewishness and his Zionism are 
imagined as an inconveniently pre-empting social engagement, is how much the slightly 
anxious tone of the joke and the social standing from which it speaks are in keeping with 
Eliot’s own. 
 The most profound comment on this element of Eliot’s style – its socially specific 
irony, and its anxiousness – remains, I believe, Raymond Williams’s in The Country and the 
City.317  As Williams sees it, Eliot’s novels confront what he calls “a contradiction in the form 
of the novel” (168).  The post-Austenian novel, Williams argues, possesses a “technical 
strategy of unified narrative and analytic tones” (168): that is, the novel’s analytic and 
narrative voice shares, by literary convention, an idiom with its characters.  As a result, 
reader, novelist, and characters all seem to belong to the same group – to a “knowable 
community” which extends over the entirety of the novel’s represented world and its 
readership as well, but which, as Williams points out, is “as an actual community very 
precisely selective,” allowing for the representation of a very narrow band of social class 
(166).  Naturally the presence of multiple idioms in the novel might not be thought of as a 
contradiction or a difficulty – Bakhtin certainly would claim the reverse.  But Williams’s 
crucial and specific claim is that while Eliot’s novels represent a broad range of society – 
they represent “other kinds of people” (166) than capital-s Society – they are able to 
represent them only as other kinds; that is, as something “‘different’ from her probable 
readers,” and who must be represented as social and linguistic types.  Eliot’s difficulty as a 
novelist is that she attempts to represent social breadth while at the same time preserving a 
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relation to “what seems a dominant image of a particular kind of reader” (172).  That reader, 
Williams, notes, is imagined to rely on the tone of “good society” – one “floated on 
gossamer wings of light irony,” as The Mill on the Floss puts it (quoted in Williams, 171).  
From within that irony, the reality of other social kinds must necessarily appear as emphasis – 
a nice term that refers both to the too-heavy tread of a laborer at a tea party and the too-
heavy hand with which a novelist might insert a laborer into a tea party.   This self-enforcing 
problem of emphasis, Williams claims, produces the self-defeating defensiveness with which 
Eliot typically points her reader to the existence of classes other than “society”: for Eliot, 
there can be no outside to the stylistic bond between narrator and reader.    
 Williams is quite right to point out that Daniel Deronda is less invested in a range of 
social class than Eliot’s earlier fiction: as Deirdre David notes, both the rural working class 
and the urban professional class of Eliot’s earlier fiction have largely disappeared in Deronda 
or become, more complicatedly, English Jews.318  Yet I would suggest that Deronda is also 
where Eliot subjects the social limitations of her own ironic style to a wide-ranging critique, 
and offers in music a figure for how the closures of irony might be productively disrupted.  
 
What is it like to be English in Daniel Deronda?  Certainly there can be no unmediated 
attachment, in this novel, to an England understood as something made up of local, 
significant particulars.  Consider the novel’s famous plea precisely for the value of the local – 
for the “prejudice in favour of milk”: 
A human life, I think, should be well rooted in some spot of a native land, where it 
may get the love of tender kinship for the face of the earth, for the labours men go 
forth to, for the sounds and accents that haunt it, for whatever will give that early 
                                                          




home a familiar unmistakable difference amidst the future widening of knowledge...  
At five years old, mortals are not prepared to be citizens of the world, to be 
stimulated by abstract nouns, to soar above preference into impartiality; and that 
prejudice in favour of milk with which we blindly begin, is a type of the way body 
and soul must get nourished at least for a time. (22) 
It is not simply that attachment to the local is imagined here chiefly as a propaedeutic, “at 
least for a time,” to a properly cosmopolitan existence rather than as an aim in itself; after all, 
in his Duties of Man Mazzini understood his conventionally rooted Italian nationalism to be 
perfectly compatible with a pan-European humanism.319  Rather, consider that the passage’s 
language is resolutely cosmopolitan or post-local in its basic perspective.  There can be no 
primary attachment to the exemplary particular here – “milk,” English strawberries and 
cream – because this passage imagines the appeal of the local not as a familiar sameness (this 
place is like me, I belong here) but only as a “familiar unmistakable difference.”  A “familiar 
difference” – family or kinship as a difference, yes, but also the familiar feeling of difference: 
I know I belong here because this place – when I come back to it – feels different to me.  The 
local particular, in other words, is a byproduct of the general; to feel a sense of belonging 
necessitates first a generalized experience in the world.   
Englishness is not a set of physical particulars, then, but rather a set of behaviors.  
To ask a question about the behaviors of the English in this novel is, as David notes, 
necessarily to ask it about the English gentleman; fortunately, about the identification of this 
figure the novel has a straightforward answer: “The strong point of the English gentleman 
pure is the easy style of his figure and clothing; he objects to marked ins and outs of his 
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costume, and he also objects to looking inspired” (102).  Style is a name here – as in D.A. 
Miller on Austen – for the work of “dematerializing the voice that speaks it.”320  If, as Miller 
argues, Austen’s style refuses all particularity, above all that of the personal pronouns, in 
order to achieve the condition of being tied to no one, so too the gentleman aims at an 
invisibility of self, the containment of intention: nothing in the Englishman’s “costume” is 
distinct enough from its surroundings to appear inspired by any particular purpose.  That the 
gentleman can be known by his style, and that this style consists of an ease, is, by Eliot’s time, 
a rather conventional observation.321  Yet Eliot’s sentence emphasizes the tension between 
the looseness of the Englishman’s dress and the purity it signals (would one judge a not-
quite-loose-enough costume to be impure?), a conceptual snag that is not so much smoothed 
over as given formal equivalent in the slightly off or at least socially determined placement of 
purity itself in the sentence: “the English gentleman pure,” as if the English code had been 
poorly translated out of an imagined French.    
This note on the style of the gentleman is contained within Eliot’s description of the 
social scene at the Brackenshaw Archery Club (“an institution framed with good taste,” 101) 
– the novel’s first large social gathering set in England.  The passage is itself an exercise in an 
easy style that is slightly uncharacteristic of Eliot, one more remarkable for what it is not 
than for what it is.  Interestingly, immediately before this passage, Eliot hails her readers for 
the only time in her entire novelistic career as “We English,” raising to consciousness 
precisely the novel’s own involvement in the stylistic routines of the gentleman: 
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Fancy an assemblage where the men had all that ordinary stamp of the well-bred 
Englishman, watching the entrance of Herr Klesmer – his mane of hair floating 
backward in massive inconsistency with the chimney-pot hat, which had the look of 
having been put on for a joke above his pronounced but well-modelled features and 
powerful clear-shaven mouth and chin; his tall thin figure clad in a way which, not 
being strictly English, was all the worse for its apparent emphasis of intention.  
Draped in a loose garment with a Florentine berretta on his head, he would have been 
fit to stand by the side of Leonardo da Vinci; but how when he presented himself in 
trousers which were not what English feeling demanded about the knees? (102-3) 
This is Englishness as what Collette Guillaumin would call an altero-referential category – 
one that “recognizes only others and not itself.”322  Englishness appears in this passage only 
when it is absent, for in a sense Englishness itself consists of an absence of oneself to one’s 
way of life: to be a well-bred Englishman is to lack “apparent emphasis of intention” – that 
is, to have so well wedded intention to achieved fact that intention itself disappears: thus, to 
escape notice, to be able to say that one merely happens to be wearing this or that shirt, this or 
that hat.  For this reason, the first sight of Grandcourt himself – “a born gentleman,” as the 
talk of the village has it, and one “not impeached with foreignness” (442) – inspires in 
Gwendolen the thought “‘He is not ridiculous’” (112).  Englishness cannot be said to be 
exemplified in this passage or indeed in any particular – it lies precisely nowhere – but only 
by the movement of the passage’s style itself: an activity of near-Austenian irony, strongest 
where the collective entity of Englishness is referred to, that mocks itself – thereby 
implicating us – precisely where it mocks others: thus the joking, nearly Wodehousean 
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excess of “what English feeling demanded about the knees” (and you know all about that, 
don’t you?), or the fancy rhetorical flourish of being commanded to fancy a fancy party.   
This scene – in which a foreign musician interrupts an English setting, against whose 
presence Englishness is defined as both what “we” are and what we ironically notice – 
returns to and revises a structure from much earlier in Eliot’s career, in her essay “Silly 
Novels by Lady Novelists.”  In this case, however, it is not the Englishness of musicians that 
is at stake, exactly; rather the Englishness of musicians is part of a larger theory of literary 
genre.  The novel under discussion is entitled The Enigma:  
Here, and throughout the story, we see that confusion of purpose which is so 
characteristic of silly novels written by women.  It is a story of quite modern drawing-
room society – a society in which polkas are played and Puseyism discussed; yet we have 
characters, and incidents, and traits of manner introduced, which are mere shreds from 
the most heterogeneous romances.  We have a blind Irish harper “relic of the 
picturesque bards of yore,” startling us at a Sunday-school festival of tea and cake in an 
English village; we have a crazy gipsy, in a scarlet cloak, singing snatches of romantic 
song…323 
Twenty years separate the Sunday-school festival of tea and cake from a day of archery at 
Brackenshaw Hall, yet it is not difficult to suppose that her earlier discussion of the 
“oracular” species of silly novel would have been much on Eliot’s mind when writing her 
own prophetically involved Daniel Deronda.  Both passages are about the insertion into an 
English – i.e., our – realist literary space something that does not belong there: foreign 
musicians.  In a way that seems suspiciously obvious, the Eliot of “Silly Novels” produces 
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our recognition of our own society in the one clause of the passage that does not use the 
plural first-person pronoun: our society is defined by its unmusicality, or rather by the not-
quite-music of the music that is played there.  I recognize my own “quite modern drawing-
room society” through the humor of alliteration (“polkas are played and Puseyism…”), all 
this attention to the sound of the plosive that reaches a comic climax in Puseyism, and then 
suddenly dissipates into what really happens in drawing rooms: discussion.  The verbal 
humor doubles and provokes the good-natured chuckle of the reader recognizing himself—
the very firmness of that self-recognition depending upon that chuckle: Yes, I say, that is me, 
that which I both see and am.   
 What I am arguing, then, is that when it comes to thinking through the nature of 
Englishness, Eliot at the beginning of her career as at the end defines (or, better, performs) 
the “we” of nationhood as a free-floating, disclaimable ironic self-regard, one that is 
specifically contrasted to the embarrassingly obvious intentionality of the musician.  Benedict 
Anderson famously ascribes the novel’s ability to create an imagined community to a very 
particular mode of reading, in which “the clumsiness and literary naivety of the text confirm 
the unselfconscious ‘sincerity’” of our identification with its first-person plural.324   The 
affect which Anderson associates with this textual sincerity is, importantly, a strong one – 
anger: I read the nationalist novel, and its anger becomes my own.  Here, however, we are 
quite certainly dealing with a different kind of textual attachment, one proper to what 
Anderson terms the “jocular-sophisticated” voice, typical of the “fiction of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Europe” (32).  In reading Eliot on Englishness, we respond not by 
adopting the text’s anger, but by being absorbed into its self-distanced irony. To identify our 
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society as one in “which polkas are played and Puseyism discussed” is thus to create an 
imagined community not of naively sincere participants, but rather of participant-observers 
who take up a particular stance towards the society they recognize as their own.  An Irish 
harper and a singing gipsy, lacking that affably self-aware chuckle that both recognizes and 
creates the “modern drawing-room,” cannot but appear out of place in it.  But, on the other 
hand, I the reader am also a bit out of place; I don’t exactly belong in my own polka-filled 
drawing room either—rather, I simply recognize it as what belongs, as what is popular, as the 
way it is: “In 1845 the polka was danced at Calcutta at a ball given by the governor-general in 
honor of Queen Victoria.  It attained extraordinary popularity, and clothes, hats, streets and 
even puddings were named after it…”325   
 Three things have changed in twenty years between “Silly Novels” and Daniel 
Deronda (or in the ten years between the date of the essay’s publication and the 1865 
Brackenshaw Archery Meeting).  The first is that the polka is perhaps no longer quite in 
fashion: to the consternation of her mother and her aunt, Gwendolen Harleth declares that 
she “‘shall not waltz or polk with any one’” (117) – a minor detail that only suggests further 
how closely these scenes are linked.   
The second is that in Daniel Deronda, ironic detachment from one’s own social 
practices has come to seem a far more widely ramified, and more troubling, affair.  At its 
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most benign, this detachment takes the form of Sir Hugo Mallinger’s cosmopolitanism.  
When Mallinger asks Deronda whether he wishes “‘to be an Englishman to the backbone,’” 
Deronda signals that he has doubts; he wishes rather “‘to understand other points of view’” 
(183).  Yet in terms of Sir Hugo’s Whig politics – his “liberal-menagerie point of view,” as 
the narrator puts it (321) – Deronda’s desires are precisely English.  When Sir Hugo sends 
Deronda off for “the education of an English gentleman,” it is in the name of a politically 
valuable transcendence of the particular: as he puts it, “‘I don’t go against our university 
system: we want a little disinterested culture to make head against cotton and capital’” (177).   
In the larger context of the Wessex gentry, however, the ethic of disinterest and self-
detachment begins to look pathological – particularly as embodied in Grandcourt and 
Gwendolen.  Eliot’s characterization of the rather terrifying Grandcourt is in an explicitly 
political register, borrowing language and concepts freely from later nineteenth-century 
British critiques of classical liberalism, particularly those, like T.H. Green’s, inspired by 
Hegel.326  Grandcourt is a portrait of what Eliot calls in an epigraph “fastidious egoism” 
(278), locked into a particular moment of Hegel’s critical account of the liberal right to do 
and be as one pleases: he is caught up in what Hegel calls the negative freedom of the will 
that “abstracts from everything” and “flees from every content as a limitation.”327  Thereby 
robbed of any relation of identity to its own desires, this form of will, Hegel says, resents the 
impingements of desires upon itself and adopts a pose of “arbitrariness” – that is, “the will 
as contradiction” (47). Thus, on the verge of proposing to Gwendolen, Grandcourt finds 
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himself holding back for precisely no cause: “to desist then, when all expectation was to the 
contrary, became another gratification of mere will, sublimely independent of definite 
motive” (150).  As Hegel writes, the will as a “pure thinking of oneself” dissolves “every 
limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, 
desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way” (37).  To be free – to be 
“sublimely independent” – is of necessity to do nothing at all; to be mired in a “do-nothing 
absolutism” (668).   
Gwendolen, meanwhile, is sometimes read as the too-active opposite for the passive 
Grandcourt.328  Yet her insistently expressed and seemingly direct rule for action – “‘to do 
what pleases me,’” as she puts it to Rex Gascoigne (69) – is in fact another form of the will 
as contradiction: “‘I do what is unlikely,’” she adds, clarifying that to do what one likes is a 
way of not being like other girls, who “‘never do what they like’” (69).  Where she most 
claims a loyalty to impulse, in other words, Gwendolen is in fact most mediated: thus the 
novel’s interest in Rex’s logical game, one that could have been borrowed from Lewis 
Carroll:  
   “Ah, there you tell me a secret.  When once I knew what people in general would 
be likely to do, I should know you would do the opposite.  So you would have come 
round to a likelihood of your own sort.  I shall be able to calculate on you.  You 
couldn’t surprise me.”      
“Yes, I could.  I should turn round and do what was likely to people in general,” 
said Gwendolen, with a musical laugh. 
“You see you can’t escape some sort of likelihood.  And contradictoriness makes 
the strongest likelihood of all.” (69) 
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Gwendolen’s contradictoriness may be directed towards defeating the expectation of others, 
rather than freeing herself from her own desires, but it nonetheless robs her of the ability to 
act coherently as surely as Grandcourt’s egoism.   
Thus she seems prone to an oscillation between passivity and seizure to which the 
novel frequently recurs; perhaps the most compressed version of this oscillation is the 
moment in which Gwendolen loses her “gold-handled whip” while speaking to Grandcourt 
in private:   
“Ha! my whip!” said Gwendolen, in a little scream of distress.  She had let it go – 
what could be more natural in a slight agitation? – and – but this seemed less natural 
in a gold-handled whip which had been left altogether by itself – it had gone with 
some force over the immediate shrubs, and had lodged itself in the branches of an 
azalea half-way down the knoll. (136)  
The moment could have read as slapstick comedy, immediately following as it does 
Grandcourt’s utterly banal love-talk – “‘You do care, then…’” (136).  By “losing” her whip, 
Gwendolen has interrupted his tiresome inanity and delayed a choice she does not want to 
make; Harpo Marx might have done the same.  Yet Eliot’s language here does not suggest a 
personality that has mastered its impulses and subordinated them to a conscious strategy; 
nor does it, like Harpo’s blank smile, imply one that has somehow cannily capitalized upon 
its own involuntary acts, following the rule of “Move, then think,” as Wayne Koestenbaum 
puts it.329  Eliot’s rather tortured sentence, in fact, less represents a personality than enacts 
the nightmarish exposure of one – everything that the style of the gentleman is meant to 
avoid.  By offering first one explanation within em-dashes whose question mark reads like 
free indirect discourse, like the excuse Gwendolen might have offered if pressed, and then 
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supplanting it with another, skeptically omniscient one, the sentence sequentially reads 
through Gwendolen and delivers her up to interpretation – not without considerable cost to 
its own elegance (“and – but”; “itself – it”).  And this scene performs this same gesture of 
sacrificing privacy to public meaning on a far larger scale, insistently prefiguring in 
Gwendolen’s lost whip her married subjugation to a man who is, as village wisdom has it, 
“more whip” (354), and whose psychological attacks on her will often be represented in 
surprisingly physical language.  In Gwendolen’s loss of her whip, abstraction from intention, 
far from producing a protecting anonymity, instead twice causes an exposure to mechanisms 
of interpretation operating far above the level of the individual. For all these reasons, then, 
the national style of the English gentleman – detachment from one’s own everyday desires 
and actions – seems, in Daniel Deronda, prone to transmute into damaging forms of self-
alienation: in Gwendolen and in Grandcourt, the desire to occlude intention reaches a 
deadening or self-defeating excess.   
The third shift that has occurred between “Silly Novels” and this novel, accordingly, 
is that in the person of Julius Klesmer Deronda offers a positive account of intention; 
specifically, the novel deploys readable intention, uncontained by the enclosure of style, as 
one way in which realist representation might accommodate the realities of a multi-national 
world.  Recall that what was silly about The Enigma was that it transgressed boundaries that 
are at once those of realist style and national content: an Irish harper at an English Sunday-
school festival belongs somewhere else in two senses – an Ireland of the past (one 
presumes), and also the genre of the romance.  This break in the surface of the form – this 
collapse of easy style – is what allows us to see through the surface of the novel and access the 
level of misguided artistic intention, i.e. what gives Eliot the means to diagnose The Enigma 
with “that confusion of purpose which is so characteristic of silly novels written by women.”   
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But Klesmer, of course, knows that he is out of place in society; in him the visibility 
of intention acquires a meaning beyond that of a stylistic mistake.  When he berates 
Gwendolen for being excessively tied to the “drawing-room standpunkt” (256), then, it is 
possible to also hear Eliot’s rebuke to herself, a suggestion that her own earlier thoughts on 
what was permissible in the representation of “quite modern drawing room society” might 
have had a certain provinciality to them.  On the one hand, Klesmer lives a life filled “with 
the light of congruous, devoted purpose” (240) that could not be more different from the 
self-alienation of Grandcourt and Gwendolen, or the self-abstraction of the gentleman – and 
if, as Catherine Arrowpoint says to her mother, “it was not quite en règle to bring one so far 
out of our own set” into the world of archery meets, Klesmer at least has the conventional 
excuse of the Romantic artist: “‘Genius itself is not en règle, it comes into the world to make 
new rules’” (104).  Yet more interestingly, this purposeful enthusiasm beyond style is not 
something that – as Middlemarch does – Daniel Deronda reserves to “certain long-haired 
German artists” (Middlemarch 169), but a privilege that it claims as its own.  For Klesmer 
himself – a Jewish musician named Klesmer! – might be said to embody the novel’s own 
willingness to break realist style, to make its intentions readable.  When Leavis comments on 
“how good Eliot’s names are” in The Great Tradition (118), he cannot have been thinking of 
Klesmer – for it is precisely here, around a figure of music, that Eliot’s novel shows its 
commitment not to the tacitly but the quite obviously voulu. 
 
“The entrancèd whole”: Eliot’s response to Wagnerian aesthetics 
As Daniel Deronda was completing its initial serialized print run in the fall of 1876, 
Friedrich Nietzsche was also considering the allure of what he called “the idea of the beyond 
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in art.” 330  He, too, would think of that “beyond” in terms of Palestrina: Palestrina, 
Nietzsche claimed, was the “[r]eligious origin of modern music” (146).  In the immediate 
aftermath of the first Bayreuth festival, in August 1876, Nietzsche retreated to Italy and 
began work on Human, All Too Human – a book of aphorisms, eventually dedicated to 
Voltaire, in which Nietzsche attacks modern music as a form of theatricalized reaction, in 
which “the feeling that has been forced out of the religious sphere by enlightenment throws 
itself into art” (116).  He perceives in Wagner – nowhere named in the published version of 
the work, but explicitly targeted in the drafts – the latest, and worst, attempt to revive the 
“old feeling” of religion, and specifically the Catholic Church’s theatrical effects: “A church 
trembling with deeply resounding tones; the… calls of a priestly troops that transmits its 
excited tension involuntarily to the congregation” (98).  What Palestrina teaches Wagner is a 
musical-theatrical language which could link “the newly awakened… inner spirit” to a 
“deeply religious change in mood”: a forcible connection of inner feeling to outer display 
that Nietzsche renders, antithetically, as a “ringing out of the most inwardly aroused 
disposition” (146). 
I juxtapose Nietzsche with Eliot here, on the one hand, to emphasize their shared 
concern with, and their shared vocabulary for, music’s apparent promise to ground modern 
European culture in a new civic experience of art – a promise made most spectacularly, in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, by Richard Wagner.  Both Nietzsche and Eliot see 
in that promise of a ground “the effect of an Allegri’s Miserere or a Palestrina’s Magnificat.”  
Yet the juxtaposition also suggests the difference in Nietzsche’s and Eliot’s responses to 
what one might do with the knowledge that one’s responses are “beyond the occasion.”  As 
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Paul Franco has recently argued, Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human rejects Wagner’s claim 
that art could “take over from religion the function of grounding, unifying, and inspiring a 
people.”331  For Nietzsche, the cultural grounding that art claimed to perform was essentially 
illusory: as Nietzsche puts it, “[h]unger does not prove that the food that would sate it exists” 
(100); to point out Wagner’s connection to Palestrina was thus a way of revealing Wagner’s 
commitment to “the religious and philosophical errors of humanity” (147).   Nietzsche’s 
response to Bayreuth was an attempt to stop being hungry – to put an end to the vestiges of 
metaphysical need for the beyond by writing a book for modern, free spirits that would 
convince us to abandon the mistakes of artists, just as we had abandoned the errors of 
religion.  As part of this, Human, All Too Human articulates a cosmopolitan demand that “we 
should simply present ourselves fearlessly as good Europeans” – rejecting an “artificial 
nationalism” based on art just as we would the “artificial Catholicism” of the Counter-
Reformation (257, emphasis original).  Nietzsche’s rejection of Wagner culminates in an 
acknowledgment of the inevitability of “a weakening and finally a destruction of nations”; 
the only response for free spirits is to “work for the melting together of nations” (257).    
Eliot, like Nietzsche, perceives the dangers of a culture grounded on musical 
listening.  Yet her response to Wagner suggests a slightly different diagnosis of the disease: 
for Eliot, the danger of Wagnerian art lay not in its re-awakening of a hunger for the beyond, 
but rather in its purported satisfaction of that hunger; her response to Wagner thus involved 
not a thorough-going Europeanism but instead a tentative nationalism.   
Nicholas Dames and Ruth Solie, among others, have recently articulated the 
sustained relationship Eliot had with Wagner over the two decades between her encounter 
with Liszt during a visit to Weimar in 1854 – a meeting that prompted both Eliot’s 
                                                          




translation, for the Leader, of Liszt’s pro-Wagnerian essay “The Romantic School of Music” 
and Eliot’s own essay “Liszt, Wagner, and Weimar.”332   In the twentieth century, and indeed 
in the twenty-first, Wagner’s operas have been omnipresent, but as Thomas S. Grey points 
out in his Wagner’s Musical Prose, his theories “succumbed to a state of near-total scholarly 
disregard.”333  For Eliot and George Henry Lewes, the case was almost the reverse: as Solie 
writes, both Eliot and George Henry Lewes were consistently sympathetic to “the [aesthetic] 
agenda involved” in Wagner’s theoretical writings, but found that “after repeated attempts 
they simply could not like the music” of his operas (164).  Lewes himself expressed their 
distaste in a letter from 1872, written from Homburg as Eliot was just beginning to gather 
material for Daniel Deronda: Wagner’s music, he wrote, “remains a language we do not 
understand.”334   
This is an intriguingly specific comment.  The heart of Wagner’s theory of music 
drama lay in an attempt to grant music content, and to enforce its understanding on listeners.  
As Jean-Luc Nancy polemically but not inaccurately puts it, Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk is the 
“specific perversion” of a music aesthetics which found in music – as I discuss in the 
introduction to this dissertation – both a meaningless and a persuasive art, and which could 
therefore imagine music’s social role as one tending towards the sharing of private 
experience.  As Nancy puts it, this aesthetics relies upon “an insurmountable and necessary – 
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even desirable – distance between sound and sense”  -- a distance that Wagner’s musical 
drama was created to eliminate.335   
As Wagner saw it, the essential disease afflicting both 19th-century opera and 19th –
century culture was an empty theatricality, a preponderance of show over meaning.  
Wagner’s anti-Semitic tract “Judaism in Music,” published under the name “K. Freigedank” 
in 1850, attacked what he termed the “Judaizing” (the Verjüdung, a word Wagner likely 
coined and which the Nazis made famous) of modern culture as both symbol and cause of 
modernity’s emptiness.336  The essay deploys a widely familiar set of tropes (Theodor 
Adorno writes, with good cause, that “Wagner’s anti-Semitism assembles all the ingredients 
of subsequent varieties”), but central to Wagner’s arguments is the claim that the Jew, as a 
stranger to European languages, is necessarily exterior to authentic meaning.337 A Jew, 
Wagner writes, has always lived “outside the pale” of European national communities; 
because language is the work “of an historical community,” the Jew encounters “the 
language of the nation in whose midst he dwells… as an alien.”  When the Jew speaks 
German or Italian, he speaks them “merely as learnt, not as mother tongues” (84).  The full 
richness of intention and association cannot be heard in language “as learnt”; therefore, we – 
and indeed it is always “we” in this essay – hear the speech of Jews first and foremost as 
sound, “a creaking, squeaking, buzzing snuffle,” rather than as expressed meaning.  In 
listening to Jewish speech, “our attention dwells involuntarily on its repulsive how, rather 
than on any meaning of its intrinsic what” (85, emphasis original).   
                                                          
335 Listening, trans. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham UP, 2007), 55 and 58. 
 
336 Richard Wagner, “Judaism in Music,” in Judaism in Music and Other Essays, trans. W. Ashton Ellis 
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).   
 




The same emptiness pervaded the mid-century musical scene, as Wagner saw it, in 
the figures of Mendelssohn and Meyerbeer.  Wagner contrasted Mendelssohn to Beethoven, 
who created a form of musical speech that “can be spoken only by a whole, entire, warm-
breathed human being”; his works are thus “the clearest, certainest expression of an 
unsayable content” (95-6).  Mendelssohn, in contrast, lacked roots in language and thus 
preferred Bach to Beethoven: Bach’s contrapuntal style submerges “its What” – its “purely 
human expression” – within a formalistic process of “shaping out the How.”  Thus 
Mendelssohn could only create ersatz “shadow-forms” (96) that never touch the “deep and 
stalwart feelings of the human heart” (94), but instead only attempt to overawe the audience 
with effects.  Such music, in one of Wagner’s most influential formulations, aims to produce 
“effect without cause.”338   
In his 1852 Opera and Drama, Wagner offered his operas as a contrast to such empty 
forms:  in the Wagnerian work, dramatic content would no longer serve as a mere means to 
produce arias, and the attention of the audience would be focused on an inner, dramatic 
meaning rather than exterior spectacle.   Wagner’s entire artistic project was one of making 
music speak.  As Thomas S. Grey argues, by the middle of the nineteenth century a pivotal 
turn was taking place against earlier Romantic portrayals of music as ideally open-ended: the 
“yearnings of most musicians and audiences… seemed to be more and more oriented to 
‘content,’ a category construed in predominantly literary or ‘material’ terms” (8).  If art music 
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could actually achieve the presentation of “material” content, it could find a way to stabilize 
the autonomous development of compositional technique, which to Eduard Hanslick in 
1854 seemed every bit as bewildering as capitalist economic change appeared to Marx and 
Engels in 1848: “There is no art which wears out so many forms so quickly as music. 
Modulations, cadences, intervallic and harmonic progressions all in this manner go stale in 
fifty, nay, thirty years, so that the gifted composer can no longer make use of them.”339  The 
particular – and immense – appeal of Wagner’s writings, despite their sometimes absurdly 
speculative prose, was to join what was in a sense a purely technical matter of musical meaning 
to his anti-Semitic account of modernity: as Grey writes, Wagner promised that by adopting 
a new style, based around content, music could recover its traditional role at the center of 
culture in general (12).   
This was precisely the intended effect of the Gesamtkunstwerk: in it, poetry and music 
both would enter into a marriage in which each supported the other; the result, a united and 
total expressivity, would “redeem” both arts (Opera and Drama, 313).  Wagner found that, 
apprehended on its own, each individual art ran the risk of losing any relation to the 
realization of an object and thus evaporating into a mere form.  As Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe writes, the “dialectical confrontation of the individual arts in the ‘total work of art’ 
is consequently a means of containing excess and safeguarding meaning.”340  In the total 
work of art, music and speech would both originate with a single poetic aim: the music of 
Wagnerian opera communicates something about the text; the text, too, is understood with 
respect to the music; thus “drama” – Wagner’s name for that which is communicated in this 
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circular relationship – would prevent open-ended interpretation and guide the audience “in 
the direction of [the composer’s] Aim” (340).  The resulting total work is a closed system, 
and would therefore do precisely what Mendelssohn’s mere effects never could: deliver a 
message.  The Wagnerian character would “speak in such a way as to determine the emotions 
roused in us” (340, emphasis original); Wagner’s operas would thus, in the tradition of 
Beethoven, say the unsayable – and Wagner’s later essay on Beethoven would expressly 
make this genealogical claim, seeing the choral outburst at the close of Beethoven’s Ninth as 
the herald of the Gesamtkunstwerk.341  As a result, the Gesamtkunstwerk would produce an 
audience united in its response: our otherwise “vaguely roused” emotions, Wagner writes, 
could be “determined by their being given a fixed point round which they may gather as 
human Fellow-feeling” (340) – precisely the fellow-feeling that the empty forms of 
Mendelssohn could never produce.    
In the 1850s, Eliot had found much to admire about Wagner’s cultural criticism: her 
essay “Liszt, Wagner, and Weimar” freely translates from Liszt’s statements on Wagner, 
repeating almost verbatim Wagner’s polemical attacks on the bad operas of Meyerbeer as 
made up of mere “spectacle… and orchestral effects.”342   Eliot further approved of 
Wagner’s attempt to create a true operatic organism, a drama that “grows up like a palm” 
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(102).  But where Eliot was far more skeptical was in considering Wagner’s attempt to 
ground artistic unity in a stably expressive meaning: 
So far as music is an art, one would think that the same rule applied to musicians as 
to other artists.  Now, the greatest painters and sculptors have surely not been those 
who have been inspired through their intellect, who have first thought and then 
chosen a plastic symbol for their thought; rather, the symbol rushes in on their 
imagination before their slower reflection has seized any abstract idea embodied in it.  
Nay, perhaps the artist himself never seizes that idea, but his picture or his statue 
stands there an immortal symbol nevertheless. (103-4) 
Eliot’s objection to Wagner closely resembles Nancy’s: in reversing the relation between the 
“plastic symbol” and idea, Wagner has in a sense technologized romantic aesthetics.  One 
who listens to Wagner can never simply listen, for the Gesamtkunstwerk always communicates 
something beyond what it says; as Carl Dahlhaus writes, in Wagner “every note has 
meaning.” 343  But as Eliot perceives, this meaning is ultimately not something that the work 
conveys. Rather, the “meaning” of the Gesamtkunstwerk is a factor solely in what the audience 
understands to have been the work’s production: “the composer” of a Gesamtkunstwerk, “in 
whom other mental elements outweigh his musical power, will be preoccupied with the idea, 
the meaning he has to convey” (104).   
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 Eliot’s fuller response to the political implications of Wagnerian aesthetics would 
wait, I would suggest, until her rarely read 1870 poem “The Legend of Jubal.”344  The poem 
– an extended riff on Genesis’s brief mention of Jubal, the son of Lamech, as “the father of 
all such as handle the harp and organ” – tells the story of the invention of music and ends, 
rather brutally, with Jubal being beaten to death by his own people (and first listeners).345  
This strange narrative has tended to be read in quite different critical contexts.  Scholars 
interested in Eliot’s thinking on music have tended to underplay the poem’s ending, instead 
finding in its first half a version of Herbert Spencer’s claim that music worked as an 
extension of speech, an unproblematic force for social unification; as Delia da Sousa Correa 
puts it, Jubal’s singing “is linked to the development of language and with the expansion of 
sympathy.”346  On the other hand, the poem has been effectively read by those concerned 
with Eliot’s portrait of the writer as a particularly bleak “allegory of the artist’s life,” as 
Rosemarie Bodenheimer puts it, doomed to “the separation of the performing body from 
the impersonal dissemination of the work.”347  Both interpretations have their appeal, but 
neither is able to satisfactorily join the poem’s two halves – to explain how a successful 
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musical performance results in the destruction of a community, or why Eliot should have 
chosen to give Jubal something closer to Orpheus’s fate.  I would like to suggest here that 
“The Legend of Jubal” is an attempt to take Wagnerian aesthetics literally: to imagine music 
as able to perform a definite and intended “fellow-feeling” to its audience.  
In the poem’s central scene, Jubal appears in the midst of his society and performs 
the world’s first music.  Eliot constructs the physical space of this concert carefully: all the 
descendants of Cain are gathered together in a “playful ring” of post-prandial ease, having 
eaten their fill of “juicy fruits,” centered on Jubal’s brother Jabal (in Genesis, “the father of 
such as dwell in tents, and of such as have cattle”).  We are told twice that this circle is made 
up of individuals of “various ages” and generations, but that even the oldest among them – 
Cain, who is prone to brood – is kept from falling into lonely reverie by a sort of 
background pastoral hum, a “pretty hubbub” of communal activities: “Tricks, prattles, nods 
… / … barks, bleats, and laughs” (386 and 397).  All this pleasant noise, this “health-bred 
merriment” goes “through the generations circling… / Leaving none sad” (390-392).  
In its emphasis on the constitution of community out of the “pretty hubbub” of 
sound, Eliot’s depiction of society in its golden age hews closely to Herbert Spencer’s 
discussion of the sound of the voice in his influential 1857 essay “The Origin and Function 
of Music.” 348 As Spencer sees it, the “vocal modifications” we make to our speech 
simultaneously signal and teach emotion; though each of us has been making such 
modifications “spontaneously” since infancy, hearing others make such sounds reinforces our 
“established association of ideas between such sound and the feeling which caused it.” 
Indeed, when we hear another’s voice raised in anger we “have a certain degree of it aroused 
in ourselves” (400).  Music, for Spencer, is simply a development of these natural “vocal 
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modifications” present in every use of language; it moves us because it is “nothing more 
than the slightly exaggerated emotional speech natural to [us], which [has grown] by frequent 
use into an organized form” (404).  Thus, by listening to music, we continue the process of 
mutual modification and sympathetic listening that we begin as infants: music, for Spencer, is 
like language, only more so: with a telos towards harmony.   
In “The Legend of Jubal,” however, music is in fact destructive of the ideal society 
of sound because it replaces mutual modification with one-way communication.  
Immediately before Jubal enters the scene, history rears its head within the “health-bred 
merriment” of this perfect society, waiting to create form out of substance: 
Yet with health’s nectar some strange thirst was blent, 
The fateful growth, the unnamed discontent, 
The inward shaping toward some unborn power, 
Some deeper-breathing act, the being’s flower. (404-407) 
This is a rather rhapsodically dialectical formulation: a lack lurks within health, but one 
which is also an “inward shaping” towards development.   The society of conversation 
proves insufficient to what the “soul had… to tell” at this moment – and at this point Jubal 
arrives with his lyre: the birth of music as the birth of romanticism.  His first action is worthy 
of the Enclosure Acts; with his arrival, he transforms what had been his society’s “common 
space” (362) into a “blank space” (413), and it is this space which serves as the stage for the 
world’s first musical concert. The description starts by naming an affect, “Joy,” that takes 
“each breathing soul” and joins them all together into an “entrancèd whole” (418-9).  And, 
in the end, the song reproduces the social unity that it initially interrupted: as Jubal finishes 
his song, the “circling tribe” has been joined back together in a ring-dance, replacing the 
“pretty hubbub” of sound.   
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 Yet this unity of “joy” is a strangely thin one: instead of narrating a collective joy, the 
poem instead represents a series of disconnected reveries: the song in fact “thrill[s] each 
varying frame to various ends” (420).  Some listeners feel “rage,” others “tenderness,” a third 
“strife” (422-3).  Why, then, might the poem claim that “Joy took the air” (418)?  One is 
tempted to read the word as a pun, linking joy to jubilare, and thence to Jubal in a speculative 
etymology commonplace among Victorians.349  In other words, to say that “joy took the air” 
is only another way of saying “Jubal sang” – yet also to imply the false unity that this 
absorbing song creates.  The community had been bound together in a single “health-bred 
merriment,” but Jubal’s song breaks into that unity and makes possible the isolated reveries 
which the communal hubbub had prevented.  Each individual thinks his own thoughts in 
silence, listening: the social community formed by the dance, then, does not in any way take 
up or address the isolating effects of song but is instead simply built on top of it.   
As the poem will later make clear, this is not a healthy formalism but rather a 
pathological one.  When Jubal, having traveled the world, returns home as an old man, he 
finds that “dread Change” (584) has wrought its work in the form of private property: a 
voice seated like “some strange heir upon the hearth” saying “‘This home is mine’” (587).  
What holds this now fully modern society together remains music: Jubal hears the approach 
of a celebratory chorus and realizes that it is calling out a single word, a word that is the 
crowd’s “common soul, / … that knits them in one whole” (629-30): his own name.  The 
problem, though, is that this unity is empty, nothing “but a name” (691); when Jubal tries to 
claim that name as his own, the devout of his own cult fall upon him and “beat him with 
their flutes” (699) – at which point Jubal crawls away to die.  Jubal’s tragedy, and that of his 
                                                          
349 Thus, for example, pamphlets entitled “A Missionary Jubilee, By Jubal” (Wesleyan-Methodist 
Magazine 1, 1845, 388) or various discussions of the “jubilations… of Jubal” (e.g. London Quarterly 
Review 6, 1856, 359). 
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community, is that his music unites his audience around a illusorily definite affect: a 
community coheres around his music, but one that shares nothing other than the insisted-
upon fact of this coherence.   
Eliot’s “Legend of Jubal” is thus a parable of bad musical nationalism, one that can 
read strangely like Theodor Adorno’s critique of Wagner.  For Adorno, Wagnerian music 
drama is a bad response to the conditions of capitalism: it assumes that the artist and his 
audience are no longer members of a face-to-face exchange, but attempts to overcome that 
distance “by incorporating the public in the work as an element of its ‘effect.’” 350 
 
Mirah’s melancholy 
 It is in this Wagnerian context that the particular force of a listening “beyond the 
occasion” is apparent: as a way of exploring the possibilities of a community formed in the 
gap between audience and artwork.  For, while Daniel puts away the text of the chanting he 
hears, Eliot gives it to us: 
The whole scene was a coherent strain, its burthen a passionate regret, which, if 
[Deronda] had known the liturgy for the Day of Reconciliation, he might have clad 
in its antithetic burthen: “Happy the eye which saw all these things; but verily to hear 
only of them afflicts our soul.  Happy the eye that saw our temple and the joy of our 
congregation; but verily to hear only of them afflicts our soul.  Happy the eye that 
saw the fingers when tuning every kind of song; but verily to hear only of them 
afflicts our soul.” (368)351 
                                                          
350 Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, 20.   
 
351 Eliot’s text is taken from The Festival Prayers, According to the Ritual of the German and Polish Jews, trans. 
David Levi, 6 vols (London: Abraham and Sons, 1859 to 1873).  See George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda 
notebooks, ed. Jane Irwin (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 374.  For a helpful discussion of the 
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For Deronda, the music of the synagogue allows him to access history sympathetically – to 
feel himself one with “long generations of struggling fellow-men” (367).  In his listening, 
“burthen” – the burden of an entire history: that which is borne – is telescoped into burden, 
the chorus of a song.352 
Consider, by way of contrast, a more obvious response to Wagner’s arguments (and 
their anti-Semitism) exemplified in Elizabeth Sara Sheppard’s 1853 novel Charles Auchester.  
Though little read today, the novel was wildly popular for about a decade after its 
publication.353  The novel follows its title character and narrator to Germany, where he 
becomes the acolyte of an idealized version of Mendelssohn; the novel grants to 
Mendelssohn’s most domestic, and most popular, productions – his Lieder ohne Worte, or 
songs without words, for solo piano – the ability to express “unsayable content” in public 
that Wagner claimed for his own works.354  In a key scene in the narrator’s musical 
education, Mendelssohn performs the “Volkslied” – the “low and hymn-like melody” of a 
“holy People’s Song,” as Auchester puts it – from the Lieder ohne Worte op. 53 before an 
audience made up mostly of German youth.  Charles Auchester gives his reaction: 
[T]hat stealing, creeping People’s Song, that in few and simple chords… held bound, 
as it were, and condensed in one voice the voice of myriads…  [O]ne chord sounded 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Avodah poems, see Michael D. Swartz, “Ritual about Myth about Ritual: Towards an Understanding 
of the Avodah in the Rabbinic Period,” in Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 6 (1997), 135-55.  
 
352 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, s.v. “burthen.” 
 
353 See Charles Auchester (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1853).  Henry James, writing in 1864, referred 
to it more coolly as “a novel at present languidly circulating in our literature.”  In “Emily Chester: A 
Novel,” in Literary Criticism I: Essays on Literature, American Writer, English Writers (New York: Literary 
Classics, 1984), 591.  For an account of its popularity, see R. Larry Todd, “The Unfinished 
Mendelssohn,” in Mendelssohn and his World, ed. R. Larry Todd (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991). 
 
354 Peter Ward Jones’s “Mendelssohn and his English publishers,” in Mendelssohn Studies, edited by R. 
Larry Todd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), gives a clear account of the genre’s 




behind the curtain from one instrument within the orchestra.  It continued and 
spread – it was the People’s Song…  It was once played through without vocal 
illustration, but we all knew the words, and began to sing them.  We were singing in a 
strange sort of roar I can’t describe to you … (212-3) 
The differences between Deronda’s listening and that of Charles Auchester are instructive. 
Deronda and Charles Auchester share, in their experience of music, a sense of self-
dissolution.  Charles Auchester imagines music as driving towards the spontaneous production 
of a linguistic meaning that Mendelssohn’s piano pieces are ostentatiously without: the 
collective voicing of Wagner’s “unsayable content,” a making-present of absent meaning that 
the actual page before us must always hold at a distance.  
Deronda, like Charles Auchester, hears a united voice though he cannot reproduce 
its words.  But as Eliot’s novel quickly reminds us, that is a real lack: the Avodah poem, after 
all, really exists.  But strangely, in Daniel Deronda, the text that only we read also insists upon a 
schematic opposition between seeing and hearing: in the liturgical poem, we remember 
seeing happily what is present, while hearing in the moment, longingly, what is absent.  This 
is what we as readers know, and know only because this piyyut is present to us though we are 
absent from its scene of performance.  The structure of the scene, in other words – in which 
the hiddenness of a text, otherwise present to the eye, allows for the attachment of longing – 
repeats itself in that hidden text itself.   
 And much the same shape structures Mirah’s hearing of her mother’s voice.  
Believing her mother to be dead, Mirah internalizes her singing: “‘I used to shut my eyes and 
bury my face and try to see her and to hear her singing. I came to do that at last without 
shutting my eyes’” (212).  This is a work of Freudian mourning, but it is not the “normal” 
mourning of “Mourning and Melancholia,” in which the self, in its attempt to become “free 
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and uninhibited again,” independent of its loss, repeats to itself its attachments to a lost 
object.355  This is precisely not how Mirah conceives of herself; when she was about to 
drown herself, she explains, “‘I could not hear memories any more: I could only feel what 
was present in me’” (223). If being present to oneself is a name for being dead, or nearly so, 
then being alive means differing from oneself – and memory, heard memory, is the name for 
that difference.  But unlike the self-difference of English irony – which notices that which is, 
and what we do, and thus remains a fundamentally closed structure – Mirah’s self-difference 
remains open: her re-creation of her mother’s singing voice is thus the properly endless 
melancholia of the later Freud, in which mourning is not only a threat to the self but a 
necessity, as the self makes itself up by identifying with its lost objects, thereby “setting 
[them] up again inside” itself but without ever quite coinciding with them.356   
 And for Mirah, text is part of what holds open, rather than closes, the longing 
produced by the voice:  
[A]fter Signora left us we went to rooms where our landlady was a Jewess and 
observed her religion.  I asked her to take me with her to the synagogue; and I read 
in her prayer-books and Bible, and when I had money enough I asked her to buy me 
books of my own, for these books seemed a closer companionship with my mother: 
I knew that she must have looked at the very words and said them. 
Interestingly, then, for both Mirah and Deronda identification – with one’s mother, with 
Jews in general – is based upon unknown language.  If, as I suggest at the opening of this 
dissertation, the effect of Mignon’s words seems open to a threat of disenchantment, then 
                                                          
355 “Mourning and Melancholia,” in the Standard Edition, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. 14 
(London: Hogarth, 1957), 245.  
 




surely the songs of Mirah’s mother are even more so: to say, like Mirah, that “because I 
never knew the meaning of the words they seemed full of nothing but our love and 
happiness” (210) is to suggest that had I known Hebrew, I would have felt differently.  For 
Mirah and Deronda alike, the gap between the meanings of words and their effects when 
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